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This supplement to the 1995 Cassini mission Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
focuses on information recently made available from updated mission safety analyses.
This information is pertinent to the consequence and risk analyses of potential accidents
during the launch and cruise phases of the mission that were addressed in the EIS. The
type of accidents evaluated are those which could potentially result in a release of
plutonium dioxide from the three Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) and
the up to 129 Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) onboard the Cassini spacecraft. The
RTGs use the heat of decay of plutonium dioxide to generate electric power for the
spacecraft and instruments. The RHUs, each of which contains a small amount of
plutonium dioxide, provide heat for controlling the thermal environment of the spacecraft
and several of its instruments.
Consistent with the commitment it made in the EIS, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) has evaluated the information recently made available and has
determined that preparation of this Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS)
for the Cassini mission will further the purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).
The planned Cassini mission is an international cooperative effort of NASA, the European
Space Agency, and the Italian Space Agency to explore the planet Saturn and its
environment. The Cassini mission is an important part of NASA's program for
exploration of the solar system, the goal of which is to understand the system's birth and
evolution. The Cassini mission would involve a four-year scientific exploration of Saturn,
its atmosphere, moons, rings and magnetosphere. The scientific information gathered by
the Cassini mission could help provide clues to the evolution of the solar system and the
origin of life on Earth.
The Cassini EISwas made available to Federal, state and local agencies,the public and
other interested parties on July 21, 1995. In addition to the No-Action Alternative, the
1995Cassini EISaddressed, in detail, three alternatives for completing preparations for
and operating the Cassinimission to Saturnand its moons. On October 20,1995,utilizing
the analysesin the 1995Cassini EIS, along with other important considerations, such as
programmatic, technical, economic, and international relations, the Record of Decision
(ROD) selecting the ProposedAction was rendered.
The Proposed Action and preferred alternative addressed in this SEIS consists of
completing preparation for and operating the Cassini mission to Saturn and its moons,
with a launch of the Cassini spacecraftonboard a Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur. The launch
would take place at Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) during the primary launch
opportunity in October-November 1997. A secondary launch opportunity occurs in late
November 1997-January1998,with a backup opportunity in mid-March-April 1999,both
using the Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur. The primary launch opportunity would employ a
Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter-Gravity-Assist (VVEJGA) trajectory to Saturn; the secondary
and backup opportunities would both employ a Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist
(VEEGA) trajectory. The Proposed Action would allow the Cassini spacecraft to gather
the full science return desired to accomplish mission objectives.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) has been prepared in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended (42
U.S.C. 4321 et. seq.); the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing
the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508); and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) policy and procedures (14 CFR
Subpart 1216.3) to support the decision-making process concerning the Proposed Action
and alternatives for NASA's Cassini space exploration mission.
NASA completed development of the Cassini mission Environmental Impact Statement
(hereafter denoted 1995 Cassini EIS) with distribution of the Final EIS to the public and
other interested parties in July 1995. The Record of Decision (ROD) was rendered in
October 1995. The 1995 Cassini EIS contained NASA's evaluation of the potential impacts
of completing preparations for and implementing the Cassini mission, with particular
emphasis on accidents that could potentially occur during launch and cruise phases of the
mission, and which could impact human health and the environment. While the 1995
Cassini EIS analyses used the best information available at that time, the 1995 Cassini EIS
noted that NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) were continuing to analyze
and evaluate additional accident scenarios specific to the Cassini spacecraft and its launch
vehicle and trajectory. In both the 1995 Cassini EIS and the ROD, NASA made the
commitment that, should significant differences arise between the results of the ongoing
analyses and the 1995 Cassini EIS, NASA would evaluate the information and make a
determination regarding the need for additional NEPA documentation, including
supplementing the 1995 Cassini EIS. Updates of the safety analyses in support of the 1995
Cassini EIS were recently made available to NASA. NASA has evaluated those analyses
accordingly, and has determined that the purposes of NEPA are furthered by preparation
of this SEIS.
PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE ACTION
The Cassini mission is an international cooperative effort of NASA, the European Space
Agency (ESA), and the Italian Space Agency (ASI), to explore the planet Saturn and its
environment. Saturn is the second-largest and second-most massive planet in the solar
system, and has the largest, most visible, dynamic ring structure of all the planets. The
mission is an important part of NASA's program for exploration of the solar system, the
goal of which is to understand the system's birth and evolution. The Cassini mission
involves a four-year scientific exploration of Saturn, its atmosphere, moons, rings and
magnetosphere. The Cassini spacecraft consists of the Cassini Orbiter and the detachable
Huygens Probe.
The Cassini mission represents an important step in the exploratory phase of planetary
science, with the detailed data that would be obtained from the mission providing an
important basis for continuing Earth-based studies of the planets. There are five major
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areas of investigation planned for the Cassini Mission. An overview of each area of
investigation follows:
The previous Pioneer and Voyager swingby missions to Saturn obtained only short-
duration, remote-sensing measurements of the Saturnian atmosphere. These
measurements have been sufficient to generally determine the basic composition,
energy balance, temperature profile, and wind speeds in the planet's upper
atmosphere. Cassini would further investigate cloud properties and atmospheric
composition, wind patterns, and temperatures, as well as Saturn's internal structure,
rotation, ionosphere, and origin and evolution. The missions would involve orbits
near the equator and the poles of Saturn so that the entire planet could be studied.
Titan is shrouded by dense clouds; therefore, little is known about its surface. Data
collected by the instruments onboard the Cassini orbiter and the Huygens Probe
would provide a better understanding of the abundance of elements and compounds
in Titan's atmosphere, the distribution of trace gases and aerosols, winds and
temperature, and surface state and composition. In particular, the spacecraft's radar
would penetrate Titan's dense atmosphere and reveal the moon's surface
characteristics. The Huygens Probe, carrying a robotic laboratory, would perform
chemical analyses of Titan's atmosphere and clouds. As the Probe descends, the
onboard instruments would measure the temperature, pressure, density, and energy
balance through the atmosphere to the moon's surface. The surface properties would
be measured remotely, and a camera would photograph the Titan panorama and relay
the images to Earth via the Cassini Orbiter.
Saturn's other satellites (i.e., moons) are ice-covered bodies. Cassini would investigate
their physical characteristics, the composition and distribution of materials on their
surfaces, their internal structure, and how they interact with Saturn's magnetosphere.
Of particular interest is the half-dark and half-light moon, Iapetus. The light side of
the moon is believed to be composed of ice and the dark side possibly of some organic
material. The data obtained by Cassini would assist in determining the geological
histories of the satellites and the evolution of their surface characteristics.
The Voyager swingbys in 1980 and 1981 proved Saturn's ring system to be much more
complex than previously realized, with intricate dynamic interactions in most parts of
the system. The short-term Voyager studies showed a wide range of unexplained
phenomena in the rings, including various wave patterns, small and large gaps,
clumping of material and small, so-called "moonlets" embedded in the rings. Long-
term, close-up observations of the rings by Cassini could help resolve whether the
rings are material left over from Saturn's original formation, or whether they are
remnants of one or more moons shattered by comet or meteor strikes. Applied to
larger-scale disk-shaped systems, the detailed studies of Saturn's rings proposed for
Cassini would provide important contributions to theories of the origin and evolution
of the dust and gas from which the planets first formed.
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The tilt of Saturn's ring plane changes as the planet orbits the Sun and the changing
angle of sunlight illuminating the rings dramatically alters their visibility. Cassini's
arrival at Saturn is timed for optimum viewing of the rings, during a period when
they will be well illuminated by sunlight. Upon Cassini's arrival at Saturn in 2004
when launched in October 1997, the tilt of the ring plane and resulting illumination
angle would allow Cassini's instruments an unsurpassed view of the ring disk.
Cassini would allow detailed studies of ring structure and composition, dynamic
processes, dust and micrometeoroid environments, and interactions among the ring
systems, magnetosphere, and satellites.
Saturn's magnetosphere is the region of space under the dominant influence of the
planet's magnetic field. Cassini would carry instruments to study the configuration
and dynamics of the magnetosphere; the nature, source, and fate of its trapped
particles; and its interactions with the solar wind and Saturn's satellites and rings. A
particular phenomenon of interest is the Saturn Kilometric Radiation--a poorly
understood, very low frequency, electromagnetic radiation--which scientists believe
is emitted by the auroral regions in Saturn's high latitudes.
Implementation of the proposed action would also ensure that the spacecraft would
complete its orbital tour before 2010, when Saturn's rings would present themselves
nearly edge-on to the Earth and Sun, severely limiting the ability for detailed
observations.
The Cassini spacecraft incorporates three (3) Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
(RTGs) to provide onboard electric power for spacecraft operation and scientific
instruments. The RTGs generate electric power by utilizing the heat from decay of
radioactive material. The material is an isotopic mixture of plutonium in the form of
dioxide, along with small amounts of long-lived actinides and other impurities. About 71
percent of the oxide mixture (by weight) is plutonium-238 (Pu-238). The three RTGs
onboard the Cassini spacecraft contain a total of 32.7 kg (about 72 lb) of PuO 2, amounting
to 1.49x1016 Bq (402,000 Ci). In addition, 129 Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) will be
employed to regulate the temperature inside the spacecraft and for several instruments.
Each RHU contains about 2.7 gm (0.006 lb) of mostly plutonium-238 dioxide, amounting
to a collective total of about 0.35 kg (0.77 lb), or about 1.48x1014 Bq (4,000 Ci) of radioactive
material in the 129 RHUs.
The 1995 Cassini EIS was made available to Federal, state and local agencies, the public
and other interested parties on July 21, 1995. In addition to the No-Action Alternative, the
1995 Cassini EIS addressed three alternatives for completing preparations for and
operating the Cassini mission to Saturn and its moons. On October 20, 1995, utilizing the
impact analyses in the EIS, along with other important considerations such as
programmatic, economic, and international relations, the ROD selecting the Proposed
Action was rendered.
ALTERNATIVES EVALUATED
The Proposed Action and preferred alternative consists of completing preparations for
and operating the Cassini mission to Saturn and its moons, with a launch of the Cassini
spacecraft onboard a Titan W(SRMU)/Centaur. The launch would take place at Cape
Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) during the primary launch opportunity of October 6
through November 15, 1997. A secondary launch opportunity occurs from late
November 1997 through early January 1998, with a backup opportunity from mid-March
to early April 1999, both using the Titan IV(SRMU)/Centaur. The primary launch
opportunity would employ a Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter-Gravity-Assist (VVEJGA)
trajectory to Saturn; the secondary and backup opportunities would both employ a
Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) trajectory. The Proposed Action would allow
the Cassini spacecraft to gather the full science return desired to accomplish mission
objectives.
Along with the No-Action Alternative, the 1995 Cassini EIS evaluated two other mission
alternatives. The March 1999 Alternative would have used two Shuttle flights launched
from Kennedy Space Center (KSC), with on-orbit integration of the spacecraft and upper
stage, followed by injection of the spacecraft into a VEEGA trajectory to Saturn. The
March 1999 Alternative is no longer considered reasonable at this time due to the long
lead-time in developing and certifying the new upper stage that would be needed to
implement this mission alternative. When combined with the significant additional costs
associated with this alternative, the 1999 dual Shuttle alternative is no longer considered
reasonable.
The other mission alternative evaluated in the 1995 Cassini EIS was the 2001 Alternative,
which would use a Titan W(SRMU)/Centaur to launch the spacecraft from CCAS in
March 2001 using a Venus-Venus-Venus-Gravity-Assist (VVVGA) trajectory. A backup
opportunity in May 2002 would use a VEEGA trajectory. The 2001 Alternative would
require completing the development and testing of a new high-performance rhenium
engine for the spacecraft, as well as adding about 20 percent more propellant to the
spacecraft. Science returns from this alternative would meet the minimum acceptable
level for the mission.
RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF ACCIDENTS
Evaluation of the recently available safety analyses has indicated that the only parts of the
previous Cassini EIS potentially affected are the analyses of the radiological consequences
of accidents involving a potential release of plutonium dioxide (source term) from the
RTGs and/or the RHUs onboard the spacecraft. The environmental impacts of
completing preparations for the mission are unaffected by the updated analyses, and
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remain as presented in the 1995 Cassini EIS. In addition, the analyses of the
environmental impacts of both an incident-free launch and incident-free interplanetary
gravity-assist trajectory are also unaffected and remain as presented in the 1995Cassini
EIS.
The EIS'sand recently available analysesoverall assessmentsof the Cassini mission's risk
are similar. The updated assessmentof individual mission segment accidents has
identified higher risks for launch segmentaccidentsand lower risks for the Earth gravity
assist (EGA) swingby segment. Both the EISand the updated analysesindicate that only
a fraction of conceivablelaunch accidentsarecalculated to result in releasesof PuO2.
The ongoing safety analysisprocess is similar to the processused for the earlier Galileo
and Ulysses missionsand has resulted in incremental improvements in the modeling and
analysis techniques. The potential source terms are determined by using simulations to
evaluate the responseof the RTGs,RTG components, and RHUs to the defined accident
environments. The ongoing analysesutilize probabilistic risk assessmenttechniques with
computer simulation and modeling of RTG responsesto accidentenvironments, and are
based upon safety test and analysis studies performed by and on behalf of DOE. The
safety test and analysis studies have been performed over the past 12 years on General
Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) RTGs and materials, and RHUs. These tests provide a
database of the performance response of the RTGs and RHUs to simulated accident
conditions such as high-velocity impacts on hard surfaces, impacts from high-velocity
fragments, and exposure to thermal and mechanical stresses such as would be
encountered in a reentry from Earth orbit or exposure to burning solid rocket motor
propellant. It must beemphasized that for a releaseof plutonium dioxide (PuO2)to occur,
the initiating accidentmust be followed by other events to createan accidentenvironment
that threatensthe integrity of the RTGsand RHUs.
Sincethe issuanceof the 1995CassiniEIS, the refinements in the evaluation of accidents
and estimation of their potential consequenceshave resulted in revised estimates.
Comparison between the 1995CassiniEISresultsand the updated results arepresented in
this SEIS. The 1995 Cassini EIS reported point estimates of the "expectation" and
"maximum" cases. The expectation caseutilized source terms for eachaccident scenario
that were probability-weighted, and was based upon a range of release conditions
consideredin the analysis. The maximum caseutilized sourceterms that corresponded to
either the upper limit deemed credible for the scenario, based on consideration of
supporting analysesand safety testdata, or to atotal probability greater than or equal to a
probability cutoff of lx10 "7(1 in 10million). The updated analysesused probabilistic risk
assessmenttechniques similar to those used for the Galileo and Ulysses missions to
generateupdated estimatesof consequencesand risk.
The 1995CassiniEISutilized the conceptof risk asone of the key measuresin the accident
analyses. Risk, for the purpose of the 1995CassiniEISand for this supplement, is defined
as the total probability of an event occurring (i.e., a release from an RTG or RHU),
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multiplied by the mean consequenceof the event (i.e., health effects described as latent
cancer fatalities over a 50-year period within the population potentially exposed by an
accident). With respect to the Cassini accident analyses,the total probability of a release
occurring is determined by multiplying the probability of the initiating accident that
could threaten the RTGs and RHUs, times the conditional probability that the accident
will result in a release. Risk estimatesfor the Cassinimission (expressedashealth effects)
have been developed for each mission phase/accident scenario and for the average
exposed individual. The updated analysesreport the best estimate of consequencesand
risks. While the overall probability of an accident that could threaten the RTGsor RHUs
during the Cassini mission is 2.8x10-2,or 1 in 36, the probability of an accident predicted
to releasePuO_is 2.8x103, or less than 1 in 357. Such an accident could result in 0.089
mean health effects. This results in an overall mission risk of 2.5x10-4,or 0.00025,health
effects worldwide. This risk level is lower than the overall risk reported in the 1995
CassiniEIS (expectedvalue of 1.7x10-3,or 0.0017,health effects).
The total mission risk is distributed over four major mission segments-i.e., pre-launch
(Phase0),early launch (PhasesI and 2), late launch (Phases3 - 8) and Earth Gravity Assist
(EGA). The preqaunch segment runs from 48 hours (T-48 hrs) prior to launch to T-0
seconds(s). The early launch segment starts with ignition of the SRMUs at T-0 s and
extends through T+143s when the SRMUs are jettisoned. The time period from T+143s
to T+206sis not consideredbecausethereareno accidentsthat could result in a releaseof
PuO2during this time period of the mission. The late launch segment starts at T+206 s
and extends to the point where the spacecraft has escaped from Earth orbit. The EGA
segmentencompassesthe period from Earth escapeto completion of the Earth swingby.
Pre-launch accidentswere not covered in the 1995Cassini EISbecause,at that time, none
were postulated that could result in a releaseof PuO2. However, information recently
made available from the updated mission safety analysesindicates the total probability of
a pre-launch accident that results in a releaseof PuO2is 5.2x10s, or about 1 in 19,200,and
could result in 0.11mean health effectsand could contaminate 1.5 kIrt 2 (0.58 mi 2) of land
above 7.4x103 Bq/m 2 (0.2 tlCi/m 2) (the Environmental Protection Agency's [EPA's]
guideline level for considering the need for further action).
The total probability of an early launch accident that results in a release of plutonium is
6.7x10 -4, or about 1 in 1,490, and could result in 0.082 mean health effects and could
contaminate 1.6 km 2 (0.62 mi 2) of land above the EPA guideline level. In comparison to
the 1995 Cassini EIS, this segment's mean mission risk is 0.000055 health effects, which
exceeds the 1995 Cassini EIS estimate of 0.00000046.
The total probability of a late launch accident that results in a release of plutonium is
2.1x10 -3, or 1 in 476, and could result in 0.044 mean health effects and could contaminate
0.057 km 2 (0.02 mi 2) of land above the EPA guideline level. In comparison to the 1995
Cassini EIS, this segment's mean mission risk is 0.000092 health effects, which exceeds the
1995 Cassini EIS estimate of 0.00000037.
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The total probability of an EGA accident that results in a releaseof plutonium is 8.0X10 -7,
or less than 1 in 1 million, and could result in 120 mean health effects and could
contaminate 15 km 2 (5.8 mi 2) of land above the EPA guideline level. In comparison to the
1995 Cassini EIS, this segment's mean mission risk is 0.000098 health effects, which is less
than the 1995 Cassini EIS estimate of 0.0017.
In addition to these new best estimate analyses, DOE has conducted a study of the
uncertainty in the underlying test data and models used to estimate accident risks and
consequences. This information is presented in Chapter 4 of this SEIS.
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SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
1.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR ACTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
In July 1995, NASA completed and made available to the public and other interested
parties, the Final Environmental Impact Statement, dated June 1995, for the Cassini
mission to Saturn (hereinafter, denoted 1995 Cassini EIS) (NASA 1995). This was
followed in October 1995 by the Record of Decision (Appendix A), in which NASA chose
to implement the Proposed Action. Specifically, NASA chose to continue preparations for
and implement the Cassini mission to collect scientific data from Saturn, its atmosphere,
moons, rings and magnetosphere. The mission would be launched from Cape Canaveral
Air Station (CCAS), onboard a Titan IV (SRMU or SRM)/Centaur at the primary launch
opportunity from October 6 through November 15, 1997, and inserted into a Venus-
Venus-Earth-Jupiter-Gravity-Assist (VVEJGA) trajectory to Saturn. A secondary
opportunity exists from November 27, 1997 through January 9, 1998, with a backup
opportunity from mid-March to early April 1999, both using a Titan IV (SRMU or
SRM)/Centaur launch vehicle and a Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA)
trajectory.
The Cassini spacecraft incorporates three (3) Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
(RTGs) to provide onboard electric power for spacecraft operation and scientific
instruments. The RTGs generate electric power by utilizing the heat from decay of
radioactive material. The material is an isotopic mixture of plutonium in the form of
dioxide (to be referred to as plutonium dioxide, or PuO_) along with small amounts of
long-lived actinides and other impurities. About 71 percent of the mixture (by weight) is
plutonium-238. The three RTGs onboard the Cassini spacecraft contain a total of 32.7 kg
(about 72 lb) of PuO 2, amounting to 1.49x1016 Becquerels (Bq) (402,000 curies [Ci]). In
addition, 129 Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) will be employed to regulate the
temperature for several instruments and inside the spacecraft. Each RHU contains about
2.7 gm (0.006 lb) of mostly plutonium-238 dioxide, amounting to a total of about 0.35 kg
(0.77 lb), or about 1.48x1014 Bq (4,000 Ci) of radioactive material in 129 RHUs.
The EIS analyses indicated that continuing preparations for and implementing a normal
Cassini mission would not adversely impact the human environment. The 1995 Cassini
EIS determined that only in the event of an accident resulting in a release of plutonium
dioxide was there any potential for substantial impacts to the human environment.
In evaluating the potential impacts associated with accidents for the 1995 Cassini EIS,
NASA and its cooperating agency, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), using the best
information available at that time, developed an array of four representative launch
accident scenarios and the resulting accident environments. Accident scenarios identify
the physical events that occur as a result of launch failures and the associated probabilities
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of occurrence. Accident environments describe the various forces which impinge upon
the RTGs. The four scenarios were representative of accidents that could potentially
occur across all launch phases and could lead to a release of PuO 2. Accident scenarios and
associated environments were also evaluated for an inadvertent reentry of the spacecraft
into the atmosphere during an Earth swingby maneuver of the gravity-assist trajectory.
The four launch accident scenarios were evaluated across launch Phase 1 (Phase 1 is
initiated at T minus zero seconds IT-0 s], with ignition of the SRMUs at the launch pad),
through launch Phase 6 (insertion of the spacecraft into the planetary gravity-assist
trajectory). No pre-launch Phase 0 accidents were identified that could cause a credible
release. (For additional details regarding the accident scenarios and environments and
the initiating probabilities, see Sections 4.1.5 and 4.1.6, respectively, of the Cassini EIS.)
Releases from the RHUs were not considered significant when compared to potential
releases from the RTGs.
NASA and DOE analyzed the representative accident scenarios with respect to the
consequences and risks to human health (defined as excess latent cancer fatalities over a
50-year period, beyond those normally expected to occur, within the exposed population)
and the environment. The results of those analyses were presented in Section 4.1 of the
1995 Cassini EIS. The 1995 Cassini EIS estimated the risk within each launch phase and
for the Earth gravity-assist swingby to potentially affected human populations, as well as
the overall mission risk (i.e., across all launch phases, including the Earth gravity-assist),
to be small.
The 1995 Cassini EIS also indicated that NASA, DOE and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) were
continuing to conduct mission safety analyses to determine the potential for release of
PuO 2 in the event of an accident and the associated consequences and risks. In view of the
ongoing mission analyses, NASA made a commitment in the 1995 Cassini EIS (see Section
4.6--Incomplete or Unavailable Information, item 2) and in the ROD (Appendix A).
Specifically, this commitment noted that if the ongoing investigations resulted in risk
greater than those presented in the 1995 Cassini EIS, NASA would evaluate the
information and make a determination regarding preparation of additional NEPA
documentation.
Results recently made available from the updated analyses are more refined and
comprehensive than those in the 1995 Cassini EIS. Refined probabilistic risk assessment
techniques, similar to those used for the Galileo and Ulysses missions, were used to assess
the full range of accident scenarios and environments (including the four representative
accident initiating events considered in the 1995 Cassini EIS) that could occur during
launch of the spacecraft, as well as an inadvertent reentry during Earth swingby. The
refined techniques used by the ongoing analyses specifically estimate the response of the
Cassini RTGs and RHUs to the environments associated with each accident scenario
possible for the Cassini mission. This SEIS provides the results of the updated analyses.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, while the overall best estimate of risk has not changed
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appreciably for the mission, the variability in the updated analyses' results for individual
mission segment accidentshasprompted NASA's preparation of this SEIS.
1.2 PURPOSEOF THE PROPOSEDACTION
NASA, in an international cooperative effort with the European SpaceAgency (ESA) and
the Italian Space Agency (ASI), proposes to conduct an extended investigation of the
Saturnian system. The Cassini spacecraftwould tour and study Saturn, its rings, moons
and magnetosphere over a four-year period. Saturn is the second-largestand second-
most massive planet in the solar system and has the largest, most visible, dynamic ring
structure of all the planets. The mission is an important part of NASA's program for
exploration of the solar system,the goal of which is to understand the system'sbirth and
evolution. The Cassini mission involves a four-year scientific exploration of Saturn, its
atmosphere, moons, rings and magnetosphere. The Cassini spacecraft consists of the
CassiniOrbiter and the detachableHuygens Probe.
For several months, prior to its arrival at Saturn in July 2004, the spacecraft would
perform scientific observationsof the planet. The planned arrival date at Saturn provides
a unique opportunity to have a distant flyby of Saturn's outer satellite, Phoebe. As the
spacecraftmaneuvers into its Saturn orbit, it will be at its closestdistance to the planet
during the entire mission. This offers a unique opportunity to observe the inner regions
of Saturn's ring system and magnetosphere. About three weeks before Cassini's first
flyby of Titan, Saturn's largest moon, the Huygens Probe would be deployed on its
trajectory for later descent into Titan's atmosphere. The Probe would sample and
determine the composition of Titan's atmosphereduring its 2.5hour descentand gather
data on the moon's landscape. The Cassini Orbiter would then continue its tour of
Saturn's system,making about 72orbits of the planet over four years. The Orbiter would
have about 35encounterswith Titan, about 6 encounterswith icy moons of high interest
such as Enceladus and Iapetus, and many more distant flybys of Saturn's other moons.
The scientific information gathered by the Cassinimission could help provide clues to the
evolution of the solar systemand the origin of life on Earth.
For details of the goalsand specificscientific observationsthat will bemade by the Cassini
Orbiter and the Huygens Probe,refer to Section1.2of the 1995Cassini EIS.
1.3 NEED FOR THE ACTION
As stated in the 1995 Cassini EIS, conduct of the Cassini mission represents an important
step in the exploratory phase of interplanetary science, with the detailed data that would
be obtained from the mission providing an important basis for continuing Earth-based
studies. Implementation of the proposed action would also ensure that the spacecraft
would complete its orbital tour before 2010, when Saturn's rings would present
themselves nearly edge-on to the Earth and Sun, severely limiting the ability for detailed
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observations. Additional details regarding the need for action can be found in Section 1.3
of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
1.4 RESULTS OF PUBLIC REVIEW OF THE DRAFT SEIS
NASA published its Notice of Availability (NOA) for the Draft SEIS in the Federal
Register on April 9, 1997 (62 Federal Register 17216), and mailed copies of the Draft SEIS
and the supporting HN-US document to over 130 Federal, State and local agencies,
organizations, and individuals. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
published its Notice of Availability in the Federal Register on April 11, 1997 (62 Federal
Register 17810), initiating the 45-day review and comment period. Additional requests
for the Draft SEIS and the supporting HNUS documentation subsequent to publication of
the EPA NOA raised the total number of copies distributed to over 150.
The comment period for the Draft SEIS closed on May 27, 1997. A total of 16 response
letters were received - 3 from Federal agencies, 12 from private individuals, and 1 from an
organization. The comments ranged from "no comments" and questions regarding the
ability of the RTGs and RHUs to survive reentry conditions; to questions regarding use of
solar power, and emergency response planning.
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2.0 PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES EVALUATED
The 1995 Cassini EIS, released in July 1995, examined mission alternatives available at that
time for accomplishing the mission objectives within a reasonable time frame, as well as
the No-Action Alternative. In the course of developing the mission alternatives, three
major mission components (launch vehicles, mission trajectories to Saturn, and spacecraft
electrical power sources) were examined in detail (JPL 1993a, JPL 1993b, JPL 1994). These
three mission components remain the principal factors influencing the development of
feasible mission designs (mission alternatives) and are also the factors determining the
potential environmental impacts associated with each mission alternative under normal
(incident-free) and accident conditions. Updated information regarding the evaluations
of these three components and their availability in determining the mission alternatives is
provided in this section.
The 1995 Cassini EIS examined in detail the feasible components that combined to form
those mission alternatives; the Proposed Action (a 1997 Titan IV [SRMU or
SRM]/Centaur launch ), a 1999 Mission Alternative (a dual shuttle launch), a 2001
Mission Alternative (a Titan IV [SRMU] launch) and the No Action Alternative. The 1999
Mission Alternative would have involved dual Shuttle launches in 1999, with on-orbit
assembly of the spacecraft and a specially-designed and developed upper stage. The
launch site for this alternative would have been either Launch Pad 39A or 39B located at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. The 1999 Mission Alternative is no longer being
considered because of the insufficient time to develop and test the special upper stage,
and associated cost.
Of the alternatives examined in the 1995 Cassini EIS, only the following are currently
available to NASA:
@ Proposed Action - The Proposed Action and preferred alternative consists of
completing preparations for and operating the Cassini mission to Saturn, with a
launch during either the primary (October-mid November 1997), secondary (late
November 1997-January 1998), or backup (March-April 1999) opportunities. The
SRM-equipped Titan Iv/Centaur launch vehicle option that was considered in the
1995 Cassini EIS is no longer available. The SRMU is now fully flight-certified for
use on the Titan IV. The first Titan IV(SRMU) mission was successfully launched
by the Air Force on February 23, 1997.
2001 Mission Alternative - This mission alternative is to complete preparations for
and operate the Cassini mission to Saturn in March 2001, or during the backup
opportunity in May 2002. This alternative would utilize the Titan IV
(SRMU)/Centaur launch vehicle.
• No-Action Alternative - Under the No-Action Alternative the mission would not
be implemented.
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A brief description of the Proposed Action is found in Section 2.1 of this SEIS. Changes in
spacecraft design, the Earth swingby maneuver of the gravity-assist trajectory, and the
range safety systems that have been made since completion of the 1995 Cassini EIS are
highlighted.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this SEIS provide brief additional details of the 2001 and No-Action
Alternatives, respectively. The changes made in the spacecraft design, range safety
system and Earth swingby maneuver noted for the Proposed Action also apply to the
2001 Mission Alternative. Additional details regarding the 2001 Mission and No-Action
Alternatives can be found in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of the 1995 Cassini EIS. For additional
details of the Proposed Action, refer to Section 2.1 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
The following paragraphs summarize the basic elements of the Proposed Action that are
pertinent to evaluating the results of the refined accident analyses and to comparing those
results with the 1995 Cassini EIS analyses. Changes that have been made in the areas of
range safety systems, spacecraft design, and in the design of the EGA trajectory are
discussed where applicable.
2.1.1 Mission Design
The primary launch opportunity of the Proposed Action occurs within a 41-day launch
period beginning October 6 and closing November 15, 1997 0PL 1993a). Using the Titan
IV (SRMU)/Centaur described in Section 2.1.6 of this Final SEIS, the spacecraft would be
launched and injected into the 6.7-year VVEJGA interplanetary trajectory to Saturn, as
shown in Figure 2-1.
After the spacecraft's launch and injection into the interplanetary trajectory in October
1997, it would swingby the planet Venus for the first time in April 1998, followed by a
second Venus swingby in June 1999. The spacecraft would then fly on to Earth in slightly
less than two months, where it would obtain its third planetary gravity-assist in August
1999. The spacecraft would obtain a fourth and final gravity-assist at Jupiter in December
2000, before proceeding to Saturn.
Cassini would arrive at Saturn in July 2004 and begin a four-year tour of the Saturnian
system, after deploying the Huygens Probe on a trajectory for entry into Titan's
atmosphere.
Changes in Mission Design Since the 1995 Cassini EIS: Two mission maneuvers have
been altered. First, the swingby altitude for the Earth gravity assist maneuver has been
increased from 500 km (310 miles) to 800 km (500 miles) or higher. Second, the last
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trajectory correction before the Earth swingby has been delayed from ten days prior to
swingby to seven days prior to swingby. This delay in the maneuver increases the biasing
of the trajectory away from Earth during the period before the Earth swingby. Both of
these changes work to keep the chances of an inadvertent Earth swingby reentry below
one in one million.
2.1.2 Launch Opportunities
For the Proposed Action, the primary launch opportunity occurs during the 41-day
period between October 6 and November 15, 1997. Problems with the launch vehicle or
spacecraft or adverse weather conditions during this period could cause the loss of this
primary launch opportunity.
Mission planners have identified secondary and backup launch opportunities from late
November 1997, through early January 1998, and from mid-March to early April 1999,
respectively, in the event such conditions arise. Both the secondary and backup
opportunities would utilize a VEEGA trajectory to Saturn instead of the VVEJGA
trajectory used with the primary launch opportunity.
Both the secondary and backup launch opportunities would have adequate allocations of
propellant to meet the minimal science objectives. However, lower electrical power
output available from the RTGs during the science portion of the mission due to the
natural decay of the radioisotopes would result in fewer instruments being operated at a
given time, or less engineering support given to some instruments (JPL 1993c). These
mission constraints would reduce the science return from levels anticipated for the
primary launch opportunity.
2.1.3 Spacecraft Description
The Cassini spacecraft, illustrated in Figure 2-2, is designed to be a three-axis stabilized
probe-carrying orbiter for exploration of Saturn and its atmosphere, moons, rings and
magnetosphere.
The components of the spacecraft relevant to an assessment of the potential for
environmental impacts from the mission are the RTGs, RHUs, the propellants, and the
propellant pressurant (helium). (RTGs and RHUs are addressed in Section 2.1.4 of this
SEIS.) For propellants, Cassini would carry up to 132 kg (291 lb)of hydrazine for small
maneuvers and attitude and articulation control, and about 3,000 kg (6,614 lb) of
bipropellant (one tank each of monomethylhydrazine [MMH] and nitrogen tetroxide
INTO]) for larger maneuvers. Two high-pressure helium tanks are also used to provide
pressure for the bipropellant and monopropellant tanks. The spacecraft (i.e., the Orbiter,
the Probe and its supporting equipment, and the launch vehicle adapter), with
propellants, would weigh 5,824 kg (12,840 lb) at launch (JPL 1993a).
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Figure 2-2 Diagram of the Cassini Spacecraft
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Spacecraft Design Modifications Since the 1995 Cassini EIS: The spacecraft design has
been modified in four places to improve the protection against micrometeoroid damage
to the spacecraft propulsion subsystem. First, two layers of beta cloth (a woven fiberglass
material more resistant to micrometeoroid damage than the multi-layer insulation
material used for the spacecraft thermal blankets) were added to the core propulsion
module. Second, stand-off beta cloth shields have been added around the helium and
hydrazine tanks. Third, the thickness of the outer plate on the propulsion electrical box
on the spacecraft bus was increased from 0.18 cm (0.070 in) to 0.89 cm (0.350 in). Fourth, a
retractable main engine cover was added to protect the nozzles.
2.1.4 Spacecraft Electrical Power and Heating Sources
The Cassini spacecraft would use three RTGs to provide electrical power for its
engineering subsystems and science payload and a maximum of 129 RHUs to regulate the
temperature of various subsystems on the spacecraft and the Probe. The U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) provides the RTGs and RHUs and would retain title to them at all times.
(See 1995 Cassini EIS Chapter 2 for details.)
An in-depth analysis of the available electrical power systems was performed to identify
the most appropriate power source for the Cassini mission (JPL 1994). The use of RTGs
was identified as the only feasible power system with the physical and operational
characteristics compatible with achieving a high percentage of the science return from the
• Cassini mission.
During the comment period for the 1995 Draft Cassini EIS, some commentors asked why
NASA is not using the new solar cells recently developed in the laboratory by the
European Space Agency (ESA). Though NASA responded to these questions in the 1995
Cassini Final EIS, the question continues to be raised. Therefore, the purpose of the
following information is to explain why solar arrays, even arrays using the new ESA cells,
are not feasible for the Cassini mission.
For the Cassini spacecraft to complete the mission's science objectives, it must carry
enough fuel to travel to Saturn, to brake and insert itself into orbit around the planet and
to continue in orbit for four years. This amount of fuel is very heavy. Thus, in order to be
light enough to launch, travel to Saturn and accomplish the science objectives of the
mission, it is critical to keep the rest of the spacecraft as light as possible.
Another limiting factor in completing the mission science objectives is spacecraft electrical
power. While orbiting Saturn and its moons, Cassini will use a variety of science
instruments, singly or in combination, to collect many different types of data. Since the
spacecraft has a limited amount of fuel and a limited amount of time in which to collect
data at Saturn (four years), its power system must have the capability to simultaneously
supply multiple science instruments, as well as continuously run the spacecraft itself.
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Thus, a lightweight and highly-efficient method of providing electrical power becomes
very important.
NASA has found that even with solar arrays containing the latest high-efficiency solar
cells developed by ESA, it would not be possible to conduct the Cassini mission using
solar power. The simplest and most immediate explanation for this is that the arrays, in
order to meet Cassini's electrical power requirements, would have to be so large that the
spacecraftasa whole would be too massiveto launch.
ESA has produced, under laboratory conditions (i.e., not manufacturing conditions),
highly-efficient solar cells that have been tested successfully under simulated space
environments. These environments approximated the sunlight and temperature
conditions at about 805 million kilometers (500million miles) from the Sun, or about the
samedistanceasJupiter's orbit. Thesesolar cells do not exhibit the typical low-intensity,
low-temperature (LILT) degradation that considerably reduces efficiencies for currently-
available commercial cells. However, it is important to note that the cells could be less
efficient at Saturn,which is almost twice asfar from the Sun asJupiter. Figure 2-3depicts
the size of the theoretical arrays that would be required if a solar Cassini mission were
possible.
Other limitations of the ESA solar cell technology include:
• The actual efficiencies of commerdally-produced advanced solar cells have
historically been somewhat lower than efficiencies reported for research and
development (R&D) manufactured units.
The ESA gallium arsenide (GaAs) devices are relatively thick and heavy compared
to conventional solar cells.
Considering theoretical analysis and published data, these advanced cells would
be radiation sensitive. This would lower their efficiency if used on Cassini, due to
the radiation environment through which the spacecraft will travel on its way to
Saturn.
If an array were to be made with the ESA cells (or any solar cells, for that matter),
special diodes would have to be added to the array to compensate for cell
fracturing that would be expected to occur from time to time. These diodes would
add even more mass and complexity to the array.
Taking the previous data into consideration, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 0PL) has
estimated that solar arrays built for the Cassini mission would require a total area greater
than 500 square meters (5,380 square feet) and that the spacecraft would require two
arrays, each 9 meters (30 feet) wide and 32 meters (105 feet) long. There would also have
to be supporting structures for the solar cells.
Attaching two such huge solar arrays to the Cassini spacecraft would severely impact the
design, mass and operation of the spacecraft. One significant factor would be the array
itself, which is a mechanical structure that ties the many solar cells together. This
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Figure 2-3 Theoretical Arrays (Using ESA GaAs Cells) for the Cassini Spacecraft
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structure would have to be deployable, which means that it would have to be stowed for
launch so that it could fit inside the Titan IV payload fairing and then unfold once the
spacecraft was on its way to Saturn. This, in turn, would require mechanical components
to fold and unfold the arrays and support the long array arms when extended. Such
components and support structures would increase the size and mass of the spacecraft
considerably. The long and unwieldy solar arrays would also severely complicate
spacecraft maneuvering and turning for scientific observations and data transmission
back to Earth. Therefore, special devices would have to be added to enable the spacecraft
to turn, again adding significantly to the mass. Finally, to properly regulate electrical
power on board the spacecraft, special regulators and batteries would be required. This,
too, would increase the overall mass.
As with other solar power options studied for the Cassini spacecraft, the extremely large
mass of even the lightest solar configuration is beyond the lift capability of the Titan IV
(SRMU)/Centaur launch vehicle. Even if a heavy-lift booster and a suitable upper stage
could be developed and certified for such a massive solar-powered spacecraft, the
adjustments necessary to accommodate solar power would have substantial negative
effects on the mission. First, they would make spacecraft maneuvering so slow and
difficult that the mission would run out of time for scientific data collection, causing some
crucial observations to be lost. Second, the addition of so many moving parts susceptible
to mechanical failure would add considerably to the overall risk to mission success. As a
final note, the researchers who developed the ESA solar cells evaluated the JPL solar
study and concluded that "Low (insolation) intensity and low temperature (LILT) solar
cells (including those developed by ESA) are not a viable power source alternative for the
presently defined Cassini mission of NASA" (see Appendix C).
The present standard General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) module is a product of years
of extensive safety testing and analyses. Previous NASA spacecraft such as Galileo and
Ulysses carried instruments powered by GPHS modules. Any future development of
new GPHS modules would require extensive testing, evaluation, and space qualification
before becoming potentially applicable to any space mission.
2.1.5 Spacecraft Propulsion Module Subsystem
The propulsive power for the Cassini spacecraft will be provided by two redundant
bipropellant 445 N (105 lb of thrust) main engines for trajectory and orbit changes, and 16
monopropellant thrusters rated at 1.0 N (0.22 lb of thrust) for attitude control and very
small orbit changes (JPL 1993c). The bipropellant engines use nitrogen tetroxide (NTO)
and monomethyl hydrazine (MMH), and the monopropellant thrusters burn hydrazine.
Pressures in both the bipropellant and monopropellant elements are maintained using
helium gas.
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2.1.6 Launch Vehicle (Titan IV [SRMU]/Centaur) Configuration
The Titan family of expendable launch vehicles has a launch history spanning more than
30 years of operations involving more than 320 Titan vehicles of all models. Titans have
successfully carried astronauts into space ten times and have successfully launched RTG-
powered spacecraft into space five times. The Titan W/Centaur with the newly-
developed SRMUs is proposed for this mission to Saturn. The SRMUs are now flight-
certified and are the most capable strap-on U.S. boosters available.
The Titan W/Centaur comprises four basic components: core vehicle, the solid rocket
booster motors (upgrade) (SRMU), payload fairing (PLF) and Centaur (upper stage). The
Titan W (SRMU)/Centaur configuration is shown in Figure 2-4.
The core vehicle, which provides thrust, consists of two stages with their associated
airframes, structures, avionics, mechanical systems and liquid propulsion system. Stage 1
contains two bipropellant liquid rocket engines. The oxidizer is 101,176 kg (223,051 lb) of
NTO, and the fuel is 53,240 kg (117,372 lb) of Aerozine-50 (i.e., a 50-50 blend of
unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine and hydrazine). Stage 2 contains a single bipropellant
engine virtually identical to the two used in Stage 1. The Stage 2 propellants comprise
22,239 kg (49,028 lb) of NTO and 12,436 kg (27,416 lb) of Aerozine-50 (Martin Marietta
1992).
Two SRMUs, located on opposites sides of the core vehicle, would provide the initial
boost for the launch vehicle at liftoff. Each SRMU is composed of three solid rocket motor
segments. The filament-wound motor segments consist of a graphite fiber/epoxy resin
composite cased forward segment with an integral forward dome, two graphite/epoxy
composite cylindrical sections and a steel aft dome. The SRMU has passed all of its
qualification tests and is now flight-certified. The first mission using the SRMU was
successfully launched by the USAF on February 23, 1997.
Each SRMU is 34.3 m (112.4 ft) long and has a 3.32 m (10.9 ft) outer diameter. The
nominal weight for each SRMU is 352,271 kg (776,612 lb), of which 315,724 kg (696,040 lb)
are propellant. The propellant is a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Hazards Class 1.3
(DOD 1992), solid propellant, consisting of 69 percent ammonium perchlorate (dizoxier)
and 19 percent nonspherical aluminum (fuel), with 9.06 percent hydroxyl terminated
polybutadiene (HTPB) binder. The remaining 2.94 percent includes bonding and curing
agents (MMT 1992).
The PLF, mounted on top of the core vehicle, encases the Centaur (upper stage) and
spacecraft, thereby providing aerodynamic and thermal protection for these elements
during ascent. The payload fairing is an all-metal structure composed primarily of
aluminum and has three segments. At approximately 206 seconds after liftoff, each of the
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Figure 24 Diagram of the Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur Launch Vehicle
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three fairing segments would uncouple and be jettisoned from the rest of the launch
vehicle, falling back into the ocean (MMT 1992).
The Centaur uses two liquid hydrogen (LH_)/liquid oxygen (LO2) rocket engines with
multiple restart capability. The LH_ and LO 2 are contained in two large tanks that account
for the bulk of the Centaur's internal volume (MMT 1992).
2.1.7 Cassini Mission Timeline
The Cassini mission timeline is divided into phases that primarily serve as the basis for
potential launch accident scenario definitions and environmental analyses. The 1995
Cassini EIS, in addressing four representative launch accident scenarios, divided the
mission timeline into six launch phases, beginning with Phase 1, which commences at T-0
s, with ignition of the SRMUs to initiate liftoff from the launch pad, and ends with
insertion of the spacecraft into its interplanetary gravity-assist trajectory in 1995 Cassini
EIS Phase 6. The gravity-assist trajectory was addressed separately from launch of the
spacecraft.
The updated safety analyses (MMT 1997, LMM&S 1997 a-j), in addressing a larger array
of potential launch accidents (including a pre-launch accident with a release), divided the
launch into eight phases, plus EGA trajectory. Pre-launch Phase 0, starts at T-48 hours
with installation of the RTGs on the spacecraft, includes fueling of the Centaur upper
stage, and ends with ignition of the SRMUs at T=0. Phase 8 (as with the 1995 Cassini EIS's
Phase 6) is insertion of the spacecraft into its interplanetary trajectory. As with the 1995
Cassini EIS, the EGA trajectory was evaluated separately. The eight launch phases were
also grouped into four principal mission segments (pre-launch, early launch, late launch,
plus the EGA). Regardless of how the launch is divided for the convenience of the
particular analysis, the phases and segments used are essentially identical for all the
launch opportunities associated with the Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur (the Proposed Action
and the 2001 Mission Alternative). The phases and typical timeframes used in the
ongoing analyses are summarized in Table 2-1. The nominal Cassini mission timeline is
subject to slight modifications as the design of the Cassini mission is further refined.
2.1.8 Range Safety System Considerations
Range Safety encompasses all activities from the design concept through test, checkout,
assembly and launch of space vehicles, to orbit insertion from any range facility. All
space vehicles launched from the Eastern Range, which includes KSC and CCAS, must
carry an approved Flight Termination System (FTS) that allows the Flight Control Officer
(FCO) to terminate powered flight if the vehicle violates established flight safety criteria.
The FTS, which includes the Titan IV launch vehicle system and a Centaur system,
provides ground personnel with the capability to shut down any thrusting liquid stage
only, or to shut down any thrusting liquid stage and then destruct the SRMUs and all
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Table 2-1. Cassini Mission Launch Segments and Phases and Key Events
for the Updated Analyses
Pre-
Launch
Early
Launch
Late
Launch
EGA
Mission Elapsed Time, Phase Start and Finish Events
_nds.
:Phase F_sh : Key Events _ P_
: ,,, ,,, ,. ,,,
0 -48 hours 0 IComplete RTG Installation (PLF Door Closure) to
SRMU Ignition
Start Centaur Tanking; Complete Centaur Tanking; Arm
Ordnance
1 0 143 SRMU Ignition to SRMU Jettison
Clear Launch Complex; Clear Land; Reach 10 km
Altitude; Safe SRMU and Centaur AutoDestruct
Systems (ADSs); Stage I Ignition
2 143 206 SRMU Jettison to PLF Jettison
SRMU Separation System Fires
3 206 320 PLF Jettison to Stage 1 Jettison
PLF Separation System Fires; Safe Stage 1 ADS; Stage
2 I_aition
4 320 554 Stage 1 Jettison to Stage 2 Jettison
Stage 1 Separation System Fires; Safe Stage 2 ADS
5 554 707 Stage 2 Jettison to Centaur Main Engine Cut-Off
(MECO) 1
Stage 2 Separation System Fires; Centaur Main Engine
Start (MES) 1; Attain Park Orbit
6 707 1,889 Centaur MECO 1 to Centaur MES 2
Safe Centaur Flight Termination System
7 1,889 2,277 Centaur MES 2 to Earth Escape
8 2,277 2,349 Earth Escape to Centaur MECO 2
Interplanetary trajectory/Earth swingby
liquid stage tanks. This element of the FTS is called the command shutdown and destruct
system (CSDS).
Additionally, the FTS will automatically destruct a stage that prematurely separates from
the portion of the vehicle carrying the command receivers and antennas. This element is
referred to as the automatic destruct system (ADS). Upon activation of an automatic
destruct, Range Safety can, at their discretion, command destruct the Centaur and the
remaining Titan IV elements.
The necessity for and design issues involved in a Space Vehicle Destruct System (SVDS)
for the Cassini spacecraft were reviewed to determine if a SVDS would reduce the risk in
the event of a launch phase accident. Analyses and testing involving the spacecraft's
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hypergolic propellant indicated that the launch vehicle configuration for the Proposed
Action would not require a SVDS. (A SVDS is, therefore, not on the Cassini spacecraft.)
Range Safety System Modifications Since the 1995 Cassini EIS: Since publication of the
EIS, two additional Range Safety systems have been added to improve the FCO's ability
to monitor vehicle off-nominal turns. These systems include a Laser Illumination System
(LIS) and Range Safety Advisory System (RSAS).
The LIS provides vehicle attitude imaging during nighttime launches and is used in
conjunction with the RSAS to detect off-nominal turns early in the launch. The LIS
consists of three portable equipment setups to provide at least two operational systems
for launch. Vehicle attitude imaging during nighttime launches and/or conditions of fog
are provided by laser pulses that reflect off the vehicle back to cameras near the launch
site. The image is displayed at the FCO console in the Range Operation Control Center
(ROCC), providing the primary tool for determination of launch vehicle attitude during
the first 30 seconds of flight.
The RSAS assures minimization of FCO reaction time early in the launch, when attitude
control failures could result in an intact impact of the full vehicle with the surface of the
Earth (ground or hard surface). The RSAS uses vehicle telemetry, from the Titan IV core
vehicle and the Centaur upper stage, to supplement the full complement of data
(including LIS) used to monitor launch vehicle attitude. This provides early detection of
conditions that could lead to an intact impact of the launch vehicle by providing an
auditory advisory signal to the FCO when abort telemetry criteria is reached. Primary
information from the LIS for a command destruct decision is considered confirmed when
the RSAS auditory signal is heard.
The effect of the above changes is to increase the reliability of the FCO response in the
unlikely event that a command destruct action would be required during the early phases
of the Titan IV launch. This, in turn, keeps the probability of an intact impact of a
complete launch vehicle very low.
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE 2001 MISSION ALTERNATIVE
The 2001 Mission Alternative would be similar to the Proposed Action in that it would
include the Cassini spacecraft with the Huygens Probe and the Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur
launch vehicle, as described in Sections 2.1.3 through 2.1.5 of this SEIS. The primary
launch opportunity for this mission alternative, however, would insert the Cassini
spacecraft into a non-EGA trajectory. The launch vehicle would be the Titan IV
(SRMU)/Centaur and would have a similar mission timeline as described in Section 2.1.7
of this SEIS. The primary launch opportunity would occur during the first 2.5 weeks of
March 2001, and would use a 10.3-year VVVGA trajectory, as depicted in Figure 2-5. The
first Venus swingby would occur in August 2001, the second in September 2002, and the
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third in November 2005, with Cassini arriving at Saturn in June 2011for the four-year
tour of the Saturnian system (JPL1994). A backup opportunity in May 2002would usea
VEEGA. This alternative was discussedin detail in Section2.4of the 1995CassiniEIS.
2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
The No-Action Alternative would cancel the Cassini mission to Saturn. Additional details
can be found in Section 2.5 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
2.4 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
2.4.1 Impact Analysis from the 1995 Cassini EIS
For the Proposed Action and preferred alternative, the environmental impacts of
completing preparations for the Cassini mission and a normal launch of the Cassini
spacecraft on a Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur would entail no substantial impacts on the
human environment. For additional details, refer to Sections 2.7 and 4.1 of the 1995
Cassini EIS.
The principal concern associated with the mission is the potential release of some of the
approximately 32.7 kg (72 lb) of PuO_ (consisting of about 71 percent by weight Pu-238 at
launch) in the RTGs and the 0.35 kg (0.77 lb) in the RHUs onboard the spacecraft. In the
unlikely event that an accident were to occur during the launch of the spacecraft (i.e.,
from the time of ignition of the SRMUs, through the insertion of the spacecraft into its
interplanetary trajectory), the safety features incorporated into the RTGs and RHUs, in
most cases, would limit or prevent any release of the PuO 2.
To assist the reader in making comparisons between the 1995 Cassini EIS and the updated
analyses, the following description indicates how the EIS launch phases compare with the
launch segments used in the updated analyses. For 1995 Cassini EIS launch Phases 1
through 6 (analogous to the early launch and late launch segments used in the updated
analyses), four accident scenarios were identified in the 1995 Cassini EIS as representative
of the categories of failures that could release PuO 2 to the environment. Pre-launch
accidents were not covered in the EIS because, at that time, none were postulated that
would result in a release of PuO 2. In addition, two postulated low-probability (i.e., much
lower than the probabilities for Phases 1 through 6) accident scenarios that could occur
during the interplanetary portions of the VVEJGA and VEEGA trajectories were
identified as the short-term (EGA) and long-term inadvertent reentry scenarios. The
short-term scenario would involve the inadvertent reentry of the spacecraft into the
Earth's atmosphere during a planned Earth swingby, and the long-term scenario would
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involve a spacecraft failure that leavesthe spacecraftdrifting in an Earth-crossing orbit
and potentially reentering the Earth's atmospherea decadeto millennia later.
The 1995Cassini EIS analyses indicated that, depending on the accident scenario, the
CCAS/KSC regional area, limited portions of Africa for an 8-10secondperiod under the
space vehicle flight path, or indeterminate locations within the global area could be
impacted by PuO2releases. The CCAS/KSC regional area could be impacted if an early
Phase 1 (early launch segment in the updated analyses) accident were to result in a
release. Areas outside the region (i.e., a portion of the African continent; areas elsewhere
around the world) could be impacted if an accident resulting in a release were to occur in
Phase 5 or 6 (late launch segment in the updated analyses). No releases of plutonium
from the RTGs or RHUs to the environment were postulated in the 1995 Cassini EIS if any
of the representative accident scenarios occurred in Phases 2, 3, or 4.
During the interplanetary portions of the mission, postulated short-term (EGA segment of
the updated analyses) and long-term inadvertent reentry accident scenarios could result
in releases of PuO 2 to the environment. However, NASA is designing the mission to
greatly reduce the potential for such accidents. Mission design criteria require that the
mean probability of an inadvertent reentry during the VVEJGA trajectory be no greater
than one in a million. If such an accident were to occur, PuO 2 could be released in the
upper atmosphere and/or scattered on indeterminate locations on the Earth's surface,
•resulting in a slight increase in the background radiological exposure of a large number of
people worldwide.
The principal measure used in the Galileo and Ulysses Tier 2 EISs, and in the 1995 Cassini
EIS and supporting safety analyses, for characterizing the radiological impacts of each
alternative evaluated, is health effects risk. Health effects are expressed as the number of
excess latent cancer fatalities over a 50-year period (above the normally observed cancer
fatalities). As used here, health effects mission risk is the probability of an accident
resulting in a PuO 2 release (i.e., the probability of an initiating accident times the
probability that the accident would result in a release of PuO2), multiplied by the
consequences of that accident (i.e., the 50-year health effects that could be caused by the
exposure of individuals to the PuO_), summed over all postulated accidents. Estimates of
health effects mission risk, as discussed here, represent the expectation of latent cancer
fatalities. The expectation health effects mission risk over all mission phases (i.e., the 50-
year period health effects) does not include contributions to risk from the long-term EGA
reentry scenario.
For the Proposed Action, the 1995 Cassini EIS mission risk estimate, considering all
launch phases for the primary launch opportunity, was 8.4x10 °7(0.00000084) health effects.
The mission risk from the short-term inadvertent reentry accident during the Earth
swingby portion of the primary launch opportunity's VVEJGA trajectory was estimated
as 1.7x10 -3, (0.0017) health effects, and for the secondary and backup opportunity VEEGA
trajectories as 1.8x10 -3 (0.0018) health effects. The overall mission risk (considering all
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launch phases and the EGA trajectories), from the primary launch opportunity was
1.7x10-3(0.0017)health effects,and from the backup launch opportunity, it was estimated
at 1.8x103 (0.0018)health effects.
2.4.2 Changes in Estimated Impacts from Accidents Since the 1995 Cassini EIS
The refinements in the evaluation of accidents and estimates of their potential
consequences since the early scoping analysis of the Cassini EIS have resulted in different
estimates of impacts. The following highlights the changes in approach for estimating the
accident probabilities, health effects and risks:
The EIS used four representative accidents for the launch of the mission and
estimated their probabilities of occurrence. Pre-launch accidents were not
addressed in the 1995 Cassini EIS because, at that time, none were postulated that
would result in a release of PuOv
The updated analyses use more detailed accident descriptions, accident
environments and probability distributions. In addition, the updated mission
safety analyses have determined that a release could occur from some on-pad
accidents during the two hour period prior to launch. Further, the probabilities of
accidental reentries during the late launch segment are higher than in the 1995
Cassini EIS.
Both the 1995 Cassini EIS and the updated analyses use the same accident
definition and event trees for the inadvertent reentry during an Earth swingby
accident. The 1995 Cassini EIS reported bounding estimates of potential releases
because there was uncertainty in whether the General Purpose Heat Source
(GPHS) modules or Graphite Impact Shells (GISs) would survive an inadvertent
reentry during Earth swingby or release plutonium in the upper atmosphere.
The updated analyses uses results of additional research and modeling to refine
estimates of behavior of RTGs, GPHS modules and components on reentry. The
analysis also uses probability distributions for some key variables on the reentry
event trees used in the 1995 Cassini EIS rather than nominal estimates of the
branch probabilities. The results are reported as probability distributions of source
terms for the accident.
The 1995 Cassini EIS used simpler techniques to estimate nominal and maximum
source terms and the corresponding conditional probabilities that PuO 2 would be
released.
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The updated analyses use probabilistic techniques to evaluate the accident
conditions. The resultant source terms are reported as a probability distribution
for eachaccidentcase.
The 1995 Cassini EIS modeled accident consequencesusing the same basic
approaches,assumptionsand model parametersthat had beenused for the Galileo
and Ulyssesmissions.
The updated analysesextendstechniques used in the 1995Cassini EISand for the
Galileo and Ulysses missions. The analysis makes wide-scale use of probability
distributions. It usesbest estimate values for certain key parameters, and more
comprehensive modeling to determine PuO2particle dispersion, uptake by people
and the potential for latent cancer fatalities. (Best estimates are defined in
Appendix B.)
The 1995 Cassini EIS stated that there were uncertainties in the estimated
probabilities of an accident occurring, the conditional probabilities of material
being releasedand the resultant sourceterms of the accidents.
The updated analysesinclude the most extensiveevaluation of the uncertainties of
accident consequencesever attempted for a spacemission. The analysis expands
techniques reported for the Ulysses mission and provides an estimate of the
consequencesand risk with their associateduncertainties.
Launch phase consequenceand risk estimates from the updated analyses are derived
directly from a mathematical distribution as opposed to the 1995 Cassini EIS's point
estimatesthat were based on a semi-quantitative assessmentof previous mission safety
analyses. A comparison of the two setsof estimates indicates that the 1995Cassini EIS's
overall assessmentof risk was closeto results of the updated analyses,even though the
1995Cassini EIS's assessmentof individual mission risk and variability were lower for
launch phase accidents, but higher for the EGA swingby accident risk. Both the 1995
Cassini EIS and the updated analysesindicate that only a fraction of conceivable launch
accidentscould result in releasesof PuO2.
2.4.3 Overview of Updated Mission Safety Analyses of Radiological Impacts from
Accidents
Since completion of the Final EIS for the Cassini Mission (dated June 1995) NASA and
DOE have continued the safety analysis process for the mission. This process was
described in Section 4.1.5.1 of the 1995 Cassini EIS. The "Cassini Titan IV/Centaur RTG
Safety Databook, Revision B" dated March 1997 (MMT 1997), describes accident
probabilities and environments for the mission. DOE contractors have incorporated the
MMT 1997 information into their accident analyses and recently completed their
preparation of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) "GPHS-RTGs in Support of the Cassini
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Mission" (LMM&S a-j). Results from thoseanalyses,along with the companion SAR for
the LWRHUs (EG&G 1997), are reported in this SEIS. While some of the individual
resultsof the SARsdiffer from those reported in the April 1997Draft SEISand companion
document HNUS 1997,the overall mission risk remains similar.
Concurrent with the recent completion of the SAR (LMM&S a-j), a supplement to the
CassiniEarth Swingby Plan dated May 19,1997(JPL1997)was issued. This supplement
contains slightly lower estimatesof EGA inadvertent reentry probabilities, and is part of
the separate, (non-NEPA), ongoing nuclear launch safety analysis process and will be
evaluated asa part of that process.
The process currently used by the updated mission safety analyses in determining the
mission risk associatedwith the Cassini mission is similar to the process used for the
earlier Galileo and Ulysses missions. The PuO2releasepotentially resulting from each
accident (i.e., the source terms) are determined by evaluating the responseof the RTGs
and RHUs to the defined accident environments. For each combination of accident and
environment, simulations are used to determine the probability of rupture or breach of
the iridium clads of the RTGsor the platinum-rhodium clads of the RHUs, which contain
the PuO2. For simulations in which clad failure occurs, the massof the PuO2escapingthe
clad is determined, along with information on particle size, particle density and release
location. The safety analyses for both the RTGsand RHUs utilized empirical results of
safety tests and analyses, and modeling studies conducted by DOE and NASA. The
updated analyses,however, aremore refined and comprehensive than thoseused for the
1995CassiniEIS.
Table 2-2presents the means of the best estimate results from the updated analyses,and
comparesthem with the results in the 1995CassiniEIS. (SeeAppendix B for a description
of the best estimate.) The launch accidents and consequencesaddressed here apply to
both the ProposedAction and 2001Mission Alternative.
Pre-launch accidentswere not addressedin the 1995CassiniEISbecauseat that time none
were postulated that would result in a releaseof PuO2. Sincethat time, updated analysis
has shown that PuO: releasescould result at the launch pad if the Centaur upper stage
experienced a major structural or mechanical failure during the two-hour pre-launch
fueling and preparation period. The probability of apre-launch accident that could result
in a releaseof PuO2is 5.2x10-5,or 1 in 19,200,and could result in 0.11health effectsand
could contaminate 1.5kn'l 2 (0.58 mi 2) of land above 7.4x103 Bq/m 2 (0.2 laCi/m 2) (the EPA's
guideline level for considering the need for further action, EPA 1990). Based on the 99-
percentile of the consequence distribution function, there would be a 1% probability that
approximately 1.0 or more health effects could occur. The total probability of such an
accident is 5.2x10 -7, approximately 1 in 1.92 million. Land area contaminated above the
EPA guideline level could exceed 8.6 km 2 (3.3 mi2). Note that doses and health impacts
do not include implementation of accident contingency plans or any other mitigation
actions by governmental authorities.
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While the probability of an early launch accident that could threaten the RTGs is 6.2x10 3,
or 1 in 160, the probability of an early launch accident that could result in a release of
PuO 2 is 6.7x10 "4, or 1 in 1,490, and could result in 0.082 health effects and could
contaminate 1.6 km 2 (0.62 mi 2) of land above the EPA guideline level. Such an accident
could occur in a number of ways, such as, if the RTGs impacted ground on or near the
launch pad following an in-air explosion due to a malfunction, or by the activation of the
CSDS or ADS. In comparison to the 1995 Cassini EIS, this mission segment's mean
mission risk is 5.5x10 -s (0.000055) health effects, which exceeds the 1995 Cassini EIS
estimate of 0.00000046. Based on the 99-percentile of the consequence distribution
function, there would be a 1% probability that approximately 1.5 or more health effects
could occur. The total probability of such an accident is 6.7x10 6, less than 1 in 149,000.
Land area contaminated above the EPA guideline level could exceed 20 km 2 (7.7 mi2).
Note that doses and health impacts do not include implementation of accident
contingency plans or any other mitigation actions by governmental authorities.
While the probability of a late launch accident is 2.1x10 -2, or I in 48, the probability of an
accident that results in a release of plutonium is 2.1x10 °3, or 1 in 476, and could result in
0.044 health effects and could contaminate 0.057 km 2 (0.02 mi 2) of land above the EPA
guideline level. Such accidents could occur if a Centaur failure resulted in atmospheric
reentry and hard surface impact of the RTG modules. For suborbital accidents, a hard
surface impact on southern Africa and/or Madagascar is only possible during a ten-
second window of the suborbital flight. Orbital failures leading to ground impact could
occur after attaining park orbit and result in orbital decay reentries from minutes to years
after the initial accident if implementation of the spacecraft's Sufficiently High Orbit
(SHO) capability failed. (In the event of a late launch accident, such as a failure of the
Centaur upper stage to initiate its second burn and send the spacecraft on its
interplanetary trajectory, the spacecraft has a capability to be separated and boosted to a
high [2000+ year] storage orbit.) For those late launch Centaur accidents, for which the
spacecraft cannot be successfully separated and boosted, orbital decay reentries would
occur from minutes to years after the accident. In comparison to the 1995 Cassini EIS, this
mission segment's mean mission risk is 9.2x10 -s (0.000092) health effects, which exceeds
the EIS estimate of 0.00000037. Based on the 99-percentile of the consequence distribution
function, there would be a 1% probability that approximately 0.55 or more health effects
could occur. The total probability of such an accident is 2.1x10 s, or less than I in 47,600.
Land area contaminated above the EPA guideline level could exceed 0.34 km 2 (0.13 mi2).
Note that doses and health impacts do not include implementation of accident
contingency plans or any other mitigation actions by governmental authorities.
The probability of an EGA accident that results in a release of plutonium is 8.0X10 -7 or less
than 1 in 1 million, and could result in 120 health effects and could contaminate 15 kin 2
(5.8 mi 2) of land above the EPA guideline level. Such an accident could occur if, during
the EGA swingby, the Cassini spacecraft became non-commandable after experiencing a
failure that placed it on an Earth impact trajectory and subsequently released PuO= at high
altitude or as a result of ground impacts. In comparison to the 1995 Cassini EIS, this
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mission segment's mean mission risk is 9.8x10-s (0.000098)health effects,which is less
than the 1995 Cassini EIS estimate of 0.0017. Based on the 99-percentile of the
consequencedistribution function, there would be a 1% probability that approximately
450or more health effectscould occur. The total probability of such an accident is 8.0x10-
9, approximately I in 125 million. Land area contaminated above the EPA guideline level
could exceed 55 krn 2 (21 mi2). Note that doses and health impacts do not include
implementation of accident contingency plans or any other mitigation actions by
governmental authorities.
As noted earlier, if the spacecraft were to become non-comrnandable during its
interplanetary trajectory, and control could not be restored, its orbit around the Sun could
intersect that of the Earth resulting in a long-term inadvertent reentry. The probability of
such an event is 2.0x10 -7 or, 1 in 5 million. It is reasonable to assume that the consequences
of such a reentry would be of a similar order of magnitude as that estimated for the short-
term EGA.
In addition to the above best estimate analyses, DOE has conducted a study of the
uncertainty in the underlying test data and models used to estimate accident risks and
consequences. This information is presented in Chapter 4 of this SEIS; see also HNUS
1997 and Appendix D.
2.4.4 2001 Mission Alternative
With respect to the 2001 Mission Alternative, which would also be launched on a Titan IV
(SRMU)/Centaur, the 1995 Cassini EIS concluded that potential launch accident
consequences and risks would be essentially the same as those estimated for the Proposed
Action. This also holds for the updated results from the ongoing mission safety analyses.
Specifically, the pre-launch, early launch and late launch consequence and risk analyses
results would also apply to those segments of the 2001 Mission.
The only difference postulated at this time is in the EGA results, which do not apply to
this alternative. Without an Earth swingby as part of its primary opportunity VVVGA
trajectory, the probability of an inadvertent reentry accident during an Earth swingby
would be zero. Therefore, radiological consequences associated with the Earth swingby
would be eliminated. The backup opportunity for this alternative is a VEEGA, however,
and therefore the potential exists for a short-term and a long-term inadvertent reentry as
noted earlier for the Proposed Action. The potential consequences for the backup and the
long-term accident are assumed similar to those postulated respectively for the
secondary/backup and the short-term EGA accident described for the Proposed Action.
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2.4.5 No-Action Alternative
The No-Action Alternative would not result in any adverse health or environmental
impacts. For other impacts associated with the Non-Action alternative see Section 4.4 of
the 1995 Cassini EIS, and Section 4.3 of this SEIS.
2.4.6 Summary Comparison of Alternatives
Table 2-3 provides a summary comparison of the Proposed Action, including the
secondary and backup launch opportunities, and the alternatives. The factors used are
the key parameters discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this SEIS and the 1995 Cassini
EIS. All launch opportunities involve the Titan W(SRMU)/Centaur and are expected to
have similar environmental impacts with normal launches. The accident impacts and
risks are expected to be similar for the pre-launch, early-launch, and late-launch segments
of each mission alternative with any of the launch opportunities. The principal
differences involve the short- and long-term risks of an inadvertent reentry during the
EGA and interplanetary cruise portions of the mission. Updated analyses indicate that
the EGA accident impacts and risks are now estimated to be less than those presented in
the 1995 Cassini EIS. As a result the mission risk contributions of each inadvertent
reentry would be nominally the same.
Although the primary opportunity for the the 2001 Alternative uses a VVVGA trajectory
and therefore presents no short-term inadvertent reentry risk, a long-term risk of an
inadvertent reentry similar to the other launch opportunities would remain. The risks
associated with the backup opportunity (a VEEGA trajectory) would be the same as the
secondary and backup VEEGA opportunities for the Proposed Action.
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Table 2-3 Summary Comparison of the Potential Mean Radiological Impacts and Risks
for Cassini Mission Alternatives
Mission Segment Proposed Action 2001 Alternatives
Primary
(VVEJGA)
Secondary/ Primary
Backup VV'VGA
(VEEGA)
Backup
VEEGA
No-Action
Pre-Launch
Total Probability a
Health Effects
Land Area Contaminated (kin 2)
Health Effects Risk
1 in 19,200
0.11
1.5
5.5x10 _
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
Early-Launch
Total Probability a
Health Effects
Land Area Contaminated (kin 2)
Health Effects Risk
I in 1490
0.082
1.6
5.5x10 -5
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
Late-Launch
Total Probability a 1 in 476 Same Same Same No Effect
Health Effects 0.044 Same Same Same No Effect
(km 2) 0.057 Same Same Same No EffectLand Area Contaminated
Health Effects Risk 9.2x 10-5 Same Same Same No Effect
EGA/Interplanetary Cruise
• Short-Term Inadvertent Reenetry
Total Probability a 1 in 1,250.000 I in 2,900,000 No Short Same as Sec. No Effect
Term
Health Effects 120 227 None Same as Sec. No Effect
(kin 2) 15 21 None Same as Sec. No EffectLand Area Contaminated
Health Effects Risk 9.8x 10-5 7.6x 10 -5 None Same as Sec. No Effect
• Long-Term Inadvertent Reenetry
Total Probability a 1 in 5,000,000 1 in 1.700,000 Same Same as Sec. No Effect
Radiological Impacts similar to short-term similar to short- Same Same as Sec. No Effect
term
Overall Mission Risk 2.5x 10 -4 2.3x 10 -4 Same Same as Sec. No Effect
a. Total probability of an accident with a release of PuO2
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3.0 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
The 1995 Cassini EIS addressed the affected environment in terms of the local/regional
environment and the global environment that could potentially be affected by the
Proposed Action and the alternatives. Given that potential accidents and the resulting
radiological consequences are the focus of this SEIS, only the local/regional land use and
population descriptions are summarized here. There has been no substantial change in
the characteristics of the global environment since publication of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
The Cassini mission would be launched from CCAS, which is located on the east coast of
Brevard County near the city of Cocoa Beach, approximately 24 km (15 mi) north of
Patrick Air Force Base. CCAS is bounded by NASA/KSC on the north, the Atlantic
Ocean on the east, the city of Cape Canaveral on the south and the Banana River and
KSC/Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge on the west.
The six-county region surrounding CCAS consists of Volusia, Seminole, Lake, Orange,
Osceola and Brevard Counties. The region is about 1.7 million ha (4.1 million acres) in
size, of which about 8 percent (132,742 ha; 328,000 acres) is urbanized. The most heavily
populated urban areas in the region are Orlando in Orange County, about 85 km (53 mi),
and Titusville, about 24 km (15 mi) to the west of the Titan IV launch complexes at CCAS,
with the Daytona Beach/Ormond Beach area about 110 km (68 mi) and Port Orange and
New Smyrna Beach 58 and 79 km (36 and 49 miles), respectively, to the north. To the east
of CCAS is the Atlantic Ocean, with the city of Cape Canaveral immediately to the south.
Cocoa Beach lies about 28 km (17 mi) to the south, with Melbourne and Palm Bay about
52 km (32 mi) also to the south.
About 35 percent of the land in the region is devoted to agriculture (about 566,580 ha; 1.4
million acres) and about 25 percent to conservation and recreation lands (about 404,700
ha; 1 million acres). Within the agricultural area, the three principal uses are crops, citrus
and pasturage. About 29,900 ha (73,850 acres) is used for cropland, 50,200 ha (124,000
acres) is in citrus production, and about 309,100 ha (763,500 acres) is in pastureland. The
region also contains about 2,185 ha (5,400 acres) of saltwater beaches and about 32 ha (80
acres) of historical and archaeological sites.
CCAS occupies about 6,394 ha (15,800 acres) of the barrier beach that also contains the city
of Cape Canaveral. Approximately 1,880 ha (4,700 acres) of the facility, or 30 percent of
the station, is developed, consisting of over 40 launch complexes and support facilities,
many of which have been deactivated. The remaining 70 percent (about 4,440 ha; 11,100
acres) is unimproved land. The two Titan IV launch complexes (LC 40 and LC 41) are
located in the northeastern most section of CCAS, about 450 m (1,500 ft) inland from the
Atlantic Ocean.
About 85 percent of the regional population lives in urban areas, with the largest
concentrations in three metropolitan areas: (1) Orlando in Orange County, with
3-1
expansions into the Lake Mary and Sanford areasof Seminole County to the north and
into the Kissimmee and St. Cloud areas of OsceolaCounty to the south; (2) the coastal
area of Volusia County, including Daytona Beach,Ormond Beach and New Smyrna
Beach; and (3) along the Indian River Lagoon and Coastal area of Brevard County,
specifically the cities of Titusville, Melbourne and PalmBay.
The 1990population of the region numbered about 2 million people. About 86percent of
the regional population were white, 11 percent black, 2 percent Native
American/Eskimo/Aleut/Pacific Islander/Asian and the remaining 1percent not falling
into any of the abovecategories. About 6 percent of the total population was of Hispanic
origin. About 9 percent of the regional population (about 189,000people) lived within 32
km (20mi) of the Titan IV launch complexesat CCAS. The racial and ethnic composition
of that group reflected the overall regional population, being predominantly white.
Approximately 10percent were black, with the remaining 10percent falling into the other
two categories. About 6 percent of this population were of Hispanic origin. The
uncontrolled population nearest the launch complexes is about 16 km (10 mi) to the
southeastand contains lessthan 2 percent of the regional population. Racial composition
was about 97.5 percent white, 1 percent black and the remaining 1.5 percent divided
amongst the remaining two racial categories. About 2 percent of the uncontrolled
population were of Hispanic origin.
The 1990 median annual household income across the six-county region ranged from
$7,237to $76,232,with both endsof the rangeoccurring in Orange County. Within 32km
(20 miles) of the launch complexes, the median income ranged from $10,940to $55,606,
with most censustracts within this area recording median incomes in excessof $25,000.
The median income within the nearestuncontrolled population (16km, [10 mi] from the
launch complexes)was$34,000.
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4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
The environmental impacts of the Cassini mission were addressed in Chapter 4 of the
1995 Cassini EIS. Completing preparations for and implementing a normal, incident-free
mission were determined to have no substantial impacts to the human environment for
either the Proposed Action or any of the other mission alternatives, including the 2001
Mission. It is unlikely, given the present composition of the population in the region, that
any given racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group in the population would bear a
disproportionate share of any environmental impacts. The ongoing mission safety
analyses have yielded no information that changes those analyses, nor is there any change
in the impacts associated with the No Action Alternative. The cumulative impacts of a
normal Cassini mission which center around the SRMU exhaust emissions are unaffected
by the results of the updated analyses. Details of the impact evaluations of a normal
launch can be found in Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
4.1 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
Since completion of the Final EIS for the Cassini Mission (dated June 1995; issued in July
1995), NASA and DOE have continued the safety analysis process for the mission. This
process was described in Section 4.1.5.1 of the 1995 Cassini EIS. The "Cassini Titan
W/Centaur RTG Safety Databook, Revision B" dated March 1997, (MMT 1997), describes
accident probabilities and environments for the mission. DOE contractors have
incorporated the MMT 1997 information into their accident analyses and recently
completed their preparation of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) "GPHS-RTGs in Support
of the Cassini Mission" (LMM&S a-j). Results from these recent analyses, along with the
companion SAR for the LWRHUs (EG&G 1997), are reported in this SEIS. While some of
the individual results of the SARs differ from those reported in the April 1997 Draft SEIS
and companion document HNUS 1997, the overall mission risk remains similar.
The Draft SEIS was issued in April 1997 with the best available information available at
that time. A separate report (HNUS 1997) was prepared that summarized the
methodology and interim results available from the NASA/DOE safety analysis process
for the Cassini mission. Since that time, definition of the probabilities and accident
environments for launch area accidents that might involve fallback of the SRMU
propellant and the "full stack intact impact" accident have been completed (MMT 1997).
The DOE contractor has incorporated that information into the accident analyses and
completed their RTG SAR (LMM&S g, LMM&S h, LMM&S j). This final SEIS
incorporates the results of these recently completed analyses.
As with the Draft SEIS (DSEIS), the analytical results reported in this Final SEIS (FSEIS)
do not include consideration of de minimis. To review analytical results both with and
without de minimis, please refer to Appendix D.
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4.1.1 Radiological Accident Impact Analysis
4.1.1.1 Safety Analysis Process
The process used in the safety analyses to determine the risk associated with the Cassirri
mission is fundamentally similar to the process used for the earlier Galileo and Ulysses
missions and is illustrated in Figure 4-1. NASA has defined those accidents which might
occur during the pre-launch, early launch, late launch, and EGA segments of the mission
in the Cassini Titan IV/Centaur RTG Safety Databook (MMT 1997). The JPL swingby
plan (JPL 1993b), and supplement (JPL 1997), address those accidents which may occur
during the interplanetary trajectory. Together, MMT 1997 and JPL 1993b/JPL 1997 define
the accidents, associated probabilities of occurrence, and accident environments that
might threaten the RTGs and RHUs.
The source terms are determined by evaluating the response of the RTGs and RHUs to the
defined accident environments (LMM&S a-j, EG&G 1997). For each combination of
accident and environment, techniques such as computer simulations (again, similar to
those performed for the Galileo and Ulysses missions), and analyses based upon
empirical data from safety tests and evaluations are used to determine the probability of
rupture or breach of the iridium RTG clads and the platinum-rhodium RHU clads which
contain the PuO 2. For simulations in which clad failure occurs, the mass of the PuO 2
released from the clad is determined, along with information on particle size, particle
density and release location. For clad failures in the vicinity of burning propellant, the
source term also includes the amount of PuO 2vaporized and the fireball buoyancy effects.
The source terms for each case are then evaluated to determine the consequences of the
release to the environment and to people. The approach used is again quite similar to that
used for the Galileo and Ulysses missions, as well as the 1995 Cassini EIS. Each source
term is evaluated to determine how it transports and disperses from the point of release,
including the effects of weather, deposition and resuspension. Long-term (50-year)
passive exposure from inhalation of resuspended material and ingestion of foodstuffs is
considered, as well as the more immediate airborne and ground-based external
exposures. The consequence reported consists of the overall radiological effect of the
source term via all of these pathways over a period of 50 years (immediate or short-term
exposure, plus subsequent exposures over a 50-year period) and is expressed in terms of
radiological dose (rein), potential health effects (latent cancer fatalities) and area of land
potentially contaminated above the EPA recommended guideline level (7.4x103 Bq/m 2
[0.2 _Ci/m 2] ) at which the need for further action needs to be considered.
The final element of the analysis is the combination of the first three steps in Figure 4-1
into an overall estimate of risk. This is accomplished by weighting the consequences
determined for each accident case by the respective probability of occurrence and
conditional probability of release. The measure of risk is then the probability-weighted
sum of consequences.
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Figure 4-1 Overview: Basic Elements in the Nuclear Launch Safety Risk Analysis
Process
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4.1.1.2Accident Scenariosand Probabilities
The updated mission safety analyses include detailed evaluations of 14 accident cases for
the pre-launch and early launch segments, and four cases for the late launch mission
segment, plus the EGA. These 19 accident cases and their contribution to the overall
mission segment accident probabilities are listed in Table 4-1.
During the Earth gravity assist swingby, malfunctions could cause the spacecraft to
reenter the Earth's atmosphere, subjecting the RTG and RHUs to high aerodynamic loads
and thermal stresses. The mean probability of short-term Earth impact (i.e., during the
VVEJGA Earth swingby maneuver) by the spacecraft is 8.0X10 "7. Loss of spacecraft control
during the interplanetary cruise could potentially result in long-term Earth impact a
decade to millennia later as the spacecraft orbits around the Sun. The estimated mean
probability of long-term Earth impact is 2.0x10 -7.
4.1.1.3 Potential Accident Source Terms
For each accident case identified, the associated conditional probability that PuO 2 would
be released and the resultant amount and characteristics of the PuO 2 released were also
evaluated. Rather than the expectation and maximum case estimates used in the 1995
Cassini EIS, the updated mission safety analyses use more elaborate computer
simulations for the probabilities and source terms for each mission segment. The
simulations for the launch-related mission segment accident cases are fundamentally
similar to those performed for the Galileo and Ulysses missions.
Information on launch vehicle accident probabilities and environments was used in
conjunction with mathematical models to determine the response of the RTGs and RHUs
to each accident environment and the characteristics of potential PuO 2 releases. These
models are based upon (1) physical principles, (2) the known mechanical properties of the
components of the RTGs and RHUs and (3) the results of series of tests conducted by DOE
on the GPHS-RTGs, their components, and the RHUs. As with the Galileo and Ulysses
EIS's, a computer code, the Launch Accident Scenario Evaluation Program, Titan
IV/Centaur (LASEP-T), was used to simulate the effect of explosions, fragments and
ground impacts on the RTGs and their components. The result of repeating the
simulation thousands of times for each accident case produces probability distributions of
the amount, location and particle size distribution of potential PuO 2 releases for each
accident case.
Source terms from the sub-orbital and orbital reentry accidents occurring in the late
launch mission segment were estimated using techniques similar to the early launch
mission segment. Probabilistic sampling techniques were employed to account for the
variations in location of the event, the source term if hard rock surfaces are hit, the
number of modules that might hit rock, meteorological conditions, and population
densities.
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Table 4-1. Accident Case Descriptions ab
Accident
! i !iiii&!ii!ili_i)_iil ¸ Case
_on _ent Number
Case Description
1.9
Mean Initiating
Probability
6.7x 10-5
Centaur Explosion
Pre-Launch 0.0 On-Pad Explosion, Configuration 1
Pre-launch Total b 6.7x 10-5
Early Launch 1.1 Total Boost Vehicle Destruct (TBVD) 4.2x10 -3
1.2 Command Shutdown and Destruct (CSDS) 6.6x104
1.3 TBVD with SRMU Aft Segment Impact 8.1x104
1.4 SRMU Explosion 1.2x104
1.5 Space Vehicle (SV) Explosion 7.6x 1014
1.6 TBVD without Payload Fairing (PLF) 9.1x10 6
1.7 CSDS without PLF 1.5x10 -6
1.8 SV Explosion without PLF 1.4x10 -6
1.4x104
1.10 Space Vehicle/RTG Impact 2.3x104
1.11 Payload FairinJRTG Impact 1.9x10 -6
1.12 Payload Fairin_ffRTG Impact, RTG Falls Free 1.9x 10-6
1.13 Full Stack Intact Impact 1.6x10-6
Early I a vnch Total b 6.2x 10-3
Late Launch 3.1 Sub-Orbital Reentry 1.4 x 10-3
5.1 Sub-Orbital Reentry from CSDS Configuration 5 1.2 x 10-2
5.2 Orbital Reentry, Nominal 8.0x 10-3
5.3 Orbital Reentry, Off-Nominal Elliptic Decayed 3.0 xl0 -7
1___teLaunch Total b 2.1 x 10-2
VVEJGA Short Term Reentry 8.0x 10-7
Overall Mission
Total b 2.8x 10-2
a. See HNUS 1997, Section 4.1 and LMM&S 1997 a for more information on the accident case descriptions.
b.Only accidents which threaten the RTGs or RHUs with a potential for release of PuO2 are included.
4-5
Since the 1995 Cassini EIS, more detailed reentry analyses have been completed that
provide additional insights into various branch-point probabilities in the source term
event trees for the EGA (LMM&S b&c). This has allowed refinements to many of the
values in the event trees that result in different probabilities for each of the potential end
states for the PuO 2. As with the earlier mission phase accidents, probabilistic sampling
techniques were employed to account for the variations in parameters that could affect
the source term, such as reentry angle, latitude band of reentry, altitude of fuel releases,
location of the event, the source term if rock or soil surfaces are hit, and the number of
modules that might fail.
For additional detail about source terms see Appendix D and LMM&S b, c, g & h and
EG&G 1997.
4.1.2 Environmental Consequences and Impacts
4.1.2.1 Radiological Consequences and Risk Methodology
The Cassini nuclear launch safety risk analysis performed for each of the accident cases
identified for the RTGs and RHU's is fundamentally similar to that performed for the
Galileo and Ulysses missions and for the 1995 Cassini EIS. The updated analysis,
however, extends the techniques developed in the earlier analyses and applies
probabilistic techniques to each of the source term probability distributions. Calculations
include (1) collective radiation dose (50-year), (2) latent cancer fatalities (health effects)
over a 50-year period induced by exposure to released PuO 2, (3) maximum individual
dose and average individual risk, (4) land area contaminated above the EPA guideline
level for considering the need for further evaluation, and (5) radiological risk.
For further information on radiological consequences and risk methodology see LMM&S
d-h and EG&G 1997. It should be noted that although the Cassini spacecraft will carry
129 RHUs, the updated analyses presented in this SEIS are based on an inventory of 157
RHUs.
4.1.2.2 Radiological Consequences and Risks
The summary of radiological consequences and mission risks is presented in Table 4-2.
The mean, 5-, 50-, 95- and 99-percentiles values of health effects are presented.
It should be noted that the radiological consequences and risks are reported in Table 4-2
for the GPHS-RTGs, the LWRHU's, and as "Combined." The results reported for the
GPHS-RTGs can be found in the Safety Analysis Report for the RTGs (LMM&S a-j).
Those reported for the LWRHUs can be found in the Safety Analysis Report for the RHUs
(EG&G 1997). The "Combined" consequences and risks reported in Table 4-2 are
probability-weighted to account for the results of both the above referenced safety
analyses. See Appendix D, page D-2 for a sample calculation.
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For 5-, 50-, 95-, and 99- percentile values of maximum individual dose, land area
contaminated, and collective 50-year radiation dose, refer to Appendix D. The dose and
health effects consequences presented assume no implementation of accident contingency
plans or any other mitigation actions by governmental authorities. A value less than or
equal to the 5-percentile level of consequences would be expected to occur 5 percent of the
time (i.e., 1 in 20). Similarly, a value greater than or equal to the 95-percentile
consequence level would be expected to occur 5 percent of the time.
The combined total probability that a pre-launch mission segment accident would result
in a PuO 2 release is 5.2x10 -5, or 1 in 19,200. The mean 50-year health effect consequence is
1.1x10 -1 or 0.11 health effects. The mean area of land contaminated above the EPA
guideline level predicted for this mission segment is 1.5x10 ° or 1.5 km 2 (0.58 mi2). The
mean maximum individual dose associated with the preqaunch mission segment is
1.4x10 -2 or 0.014 rem over 50 years--a dose that represents about 0.093% of the average
individual's 50-year exposure to natural background radiation. The risk contribution
attributed to the pre-launch mission segment is 2.2% of the overall mean mission risk. At
the 95-percentile level, the predicted health effects and land contamination for this
segment is equal to or less than 1.0x10 q or 0.10 health effects and (from Section 4.1.2.5 of
this SEIS), 5.5 km 2 (2.1 mi2). At the 99-percentile level, the predicted health effects and
land contamination for this segment will be equal to or less than 1.0x100 or 1.0 health
effects and (from Section 4.1.2.5 of this SEIS), 8.6 km 2 (3.3 mi2).
The combined total probability that an early launch mission segment accident would
result in a PuO 2 release is 6.7x104, or 1 in 1A90. The mean health effect consequence is
8.2x10 -2 or 0.082. The mean area of land contaminated above the EPA guideline level
predicted for this mission segment is 1.6x10 ° or 1.6 km 2 (0.62 mi2). The mean maximum
individual dose associated with the early launch mission segment is 2.1x10 °2 or 0.021 rem
over 50 years-a dose that represents about 0.14% of the average individual's 50-year
exposure to natural background radiation. The risk contribution attributed to the early
launch mission segment is 22% of the overall mean mission risk. At the 95-percentile
level, the predicted health effects and land contamination for this segment will be equal to
or less than 1.8x10 1 or 0.18 health effects and (from Section 4.1.2.5 of this SEIS), 6.1 krn 2
(2.4 mi2). At the 99-percentile level, the predicted health effects and land contamination
for this segment will be equal to or less than 1.5x100 or 1.5 health effects and (from Section
4.1.2.5 of this SEIS), 20 km 2 (7.7 mi2).
The combined total probability that a late launch mission segment accident would result
in a PuO 2 release is 2.1x10 -3, or I in 476. The mean health effect consequence is 4.4x10 -2 or
0.044. The mean maximum individual dose associated with the late launch mission
segment is 1.1x10 ° or 1.1 rein over 50 years--a dose that represents 7.3% of the average
individual's 50-year exposure to natural background radiation. The risk contribution
attributed to the late launch mission segment is 37% of the overall mean mission risk. The
area of land contaminated above the EPA guideline level predicted for this mission
segment is 5.7x10 -2 or 0.057 km 2 (0.022 mi2). At the 95-percentile level, the predicted
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health effects and land contamination for this segment will be equal to or less than
2.3x10-1or 0.23health effectsand (from Section 4.1.2.5of this SEIS),0.24K1TI2(0.093mi2).
At the 99-percentile level, the predicted health effects and land contamination for this
segment will be equal to or less than 5.5x10-1or 0.55health effects and (from Section
4.1.2.5of this SEIS),0.34km2(0.13mi2).
The combined total probability that an EGA mission segment accident would result in a
PuO2releaseis 8.0x10-7,or lessthan 1 in 1 million. The mean health effect consequenceis
1.2x102or 120. The mean area of land contaminated above the EPA guideline level
predicted for this mission segment is 1.5x101or 15 km2 (5.8 mi2). The mean maximum
individual dose associatedwith the EGA mission segment is 5.1x102or 510 rem over 50
years,about 34 times the averageindividual's 50 year exposure to natural radiation. This
mean maximum individual doseis accounted for in the 120estimated health effectsnoted
above. It should be noted that this estimate is at a probability of lessthan 1 in 1 million.
At the 95-percentile level, the predicted health effects and land contamination for this
segmentwill be equal to or lessthan 3.2x102or 320health effectsand (from LMM&S), 37
km2 (14 mi2). At the 99-percentile level, the predicted health effects and land
contamination for this segment will be equal to or lessthan 4.5x102or 450 health effects
and (from LMM&S), 55km2(21mi2). The risk contribution attributed to the EGA mission
segmentis 39%of the overall mean mission risk.
In the unlikely event that the spacecraft becomes non-commandable anytime after
injection into its interplanetary trajectory, and control could not be reestablished, the
spacecraft's orbit around the Sun could eventually cross that of the Earth, and the
spacecraft could impact the Earth a decade to millenia later. The combined total
probability of suchan impact is 2x10-7,or I in 5 million, and the amount of PuO2released
could be similar to that released in a short-term EGA accident. However, there are
uncertainties related to the amount of PuO2released. Theuncertainties include the timing
of the reentry which has a bearing on the composition of the PuO2,given the 87.75-year
half-life of Pu - 238. The radiological consequencesof a long-term reentry are therefore
assumed to be similar (sameorder of magnitude) to those estimated for the short-term
EGA.
Overall, the consequencespredicted for the Cassinimission are low when compared with
other risks. Using a typical natural (background) radiation dose of 0.3 rem/yr and a
health effectsestimator of 5x10-4latent cancer fatalities/rem, the risk to an individual of
developing fatal cancerfrom a 50-year exposure to background radiation is estimated at
7.5x10-3,or 1 in 133. This estimated lifetime risk from background radiation is over five
orders of magnitude (i.e., 100,000times) higher than the Cassinimission segmentwith the
highest average individual risk (late launch; seeAppendix D, Table D-8), estimated at
1.8x10-8or less,or a probability of lessthan 1 in 55million of any given individual in the
potentially exposed population incurring a fatal cancer due to exposure from an
accidentalPuO2release.
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4.1.2.3 Uncertainty Analysis
In addition to the best estimate analysis, a study of the underlying test data and model
input parameters used to estimate accident consequences and risks has been conducted
(LMM&S f, h). Because of uncertainty, the mean consequence of the overall mission or a
given mission segment has a distribution of possible values where the best estimate for
this analysis lies near the median of that distribution. Table 4-3 summarizes the risks for
various mission segments and the total mission from accidental PuO 2 release. The 95
percent confidence level risk is two orders of magnitude higher than the best estimate,
and the 5 percent confidence level is about two orders of magnitude lower than the best
estimate.
Table 4-3 Summary of Uncertainty Analyses:
GPHS-RTG Mission Risks
Pre-Launch 3.4x 10-6 7.6x 10-8 6.0x 10-6 4.2x 10-4
Early Launch 4.7 x 10-s 5.1 x 10-6 6.2x 10-5 7.9x 10-4
Late Launch 9.2x 10-5 4. Ix 10-7 7.3x 10-5 1.3x 10-2
EGA Reentry
(Short Term) 8.8 x 10-5 1.2x 10-6 7.5 x 10-5 4.6x 10-3
Total Mission 2.3x 10-4 8.3x 10-6 2.2x 10-4 1.9x 10-2
4.1.2.4 Emergency Response Planning
In accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), prior to
the launch of the Cassini spacecraft with RTGs and RHUs onboard, comprehensive
radiological contingency plans will be in place. These contingency plans, similar to the
ones developed for the Galileo and Ulysses missions, would ensure that any accident,
whether it involves a radiological release or not, will be met with a well-developed and
tested response. The plans will reflect the combined efforts of Federal agencies, including
NASA, DOE, DOD, EPA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the State
of Florida and local organizations involved in emergency response. (For additional
details, see response to comment no. 8-1 in Appendix E.)
4.1.2.5 Potential Clean Up Costs Associated with Land Contamination
While the need for mitigation, and the cost involved, would be based upon actual
conditions, and the amount of land area contaminated by an accident, the 1995 Cassini
EIS developed an estimated range of cleanup costs for a postulated early launch accident
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near the launch site. Potential costs were estimated by taking the land area potentially
contaminated at greater than the EPA guideline level (7.4x103Bq/m2; 0.2 _Ci/m2), and
multiplying by a range of costs (escalatedto 1994dollars) developed by the EPA for
mitigation both with ($50 million/km 2) and without ($5 million/km 2) removal and
disposal of contaminated soil at a near-surfacefacility. Using the land area potentially
contaminated by a near-launch site accident (1.5km 2 [0.58mi2] ), the EIS estimated the
potential coststo range from about $7.5million (without removal and disposal), to about
$75 million (with removal and disposal). Table 4-4 of this SEIS uses the same
methodology and unit costs asthe 1995Cassini EIS in developing cost estimates for the
mean, 95- and 99-percentile land area contamination estimates provided by the updated
analyses.
Table 4-4 Summary of Potential Cleanup Costs Associated with Land Contamination
Pre-launch
Early Launch
l ..... : ILl[
..... I Cleanup Cost Clean p_
Consequence Land Mea without R_oval [ _th Removal and
Level a Contaminated b :t and_ _
(kan 2) ($ _nions).... ($ _llions)
mean
95%
99%
mean
95%
99%
1.5
5.5
8.6
1.6
6.1
20
7.5
27.5
43
8.0
30.5
100
75
275
430
80
305
1000
a. Estimated land areas are presented for the mean and 95- and 99-percentile levels of the consequence
distribution functions.
b. Land area estimated contaminated above 7.4x 103 Bq/m 2 (0.2 laCi/m2).
c. Assumes $5 million dollars/km 2 for cleanup without removal and disposal of contaminated materials;
and $50 million dollars/km 2 for cleanup with removal and disposal of contaminated materials
4.1.3 Radiological Impacts of the Secondary and Backup Launch Opportunities
Impacts of pre-launch, early-launch, and late-launch accidents associated with the
secondary and backup launch opportunities for the proposed action are expected to be
approximately the same as for the primary Titan IV/SRMU launch opportunity presented
in Table 4-2. The analysis was prepared for the secondary launch opportunity, and is
applicable to the backup opportunity.
Updated analyses of the potential impacts of a short-term reentry accident associated with
each Earth swingby of the VEEGA trajectory are reported in HNUS 1997. Those analyses
were performed using the same techniques and models used for the primary launch
opportunity. Like the reentry accident with the VVEJGA trajectory, the updated analyses
for the VEEGA reentries indicate that more of the RTG components are likely to survive
the reentry conditions, resulting in less vaporization of the PuO 2 in the upper atmosphere
and lower world-wide impacts. As with the VVEJGA reentry, the updated analyses
indicate that high-altitude vaporization of a large fraction of the PuO 2 is less likely than
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indicated in the EIS. This results in lower estimates of mean source terms and mean
radiological impacts than reported earlier in the 1995CassiniEIS.
The accidentrisks and impacts of a short-term inadvertent reentry for both the secondary
and backup launch opportunities using VEEGA trajectories are predicted to be similar.
The updated analyses indicate that the total probability of a PuO2releasefrom the RTGs
and RHUs with the two Earth swingby portions of the VEEGA trajectory is 3.4x10-7(1 in
2.9 million). The updated analyses also indicate that the mean impacts from an
inadvertent reentry could be 227health effectswith 21km2(8.1mi2)of land contaminated
above the EPA guideline level. As with the VVEJGA accident impact estimates, larger
impacts would be predicted at lower probabilities. The estimated health effects risk for
the Earth swingby portions of the secondaryand backup mission is 7.6x10-s.
The probability of a long-term inadvertent reentry from the interplanetary cruise portion
of the VEEGA trajectory prior to the final gravity assistis 5.9x10-7. No additional analyses
are available of the estimated impacts of such an accident. The reader is referred to
Section 4.1.6.2 of the 1995 Cassini EIS for discussion of the potential impacts of an
inadvertent long-term reentry accident.
4.2 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE 2001 MISSION
ALTERNATIVE
The 2001 Mission Alternative would be similar to the Proposed Action in that it would
include the Cassini spacecraft with the Huygens Probe and the Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur
launch vehicle, as described in Sections 2.1.3 through 2.1.5 of this SEIS. The primary
opportunity of this mission alternative, however, would insert the Cassini spacecraft into
a non-EGA trajectory. The launch would have a similar mission timeline as described in
Section 2.1.7 of this SEIS. This mission alternative would have a primary launch
opportunity during the first 2.5 weeks of March 2001 from CCAS, and would use a 10.3-
year VVVGA trajectory, as depicted in Figure 2-5. The first Venus swingby would occur
in August 2001, the second in September 2002, and the third in November 2005, with
Cassini arriving at Saturn in June 2011 for the four-year tour of the Saturnian system (J-PL
1994). A backup opportunity in May 2002 would use a VEEGA. This alternative was
discussed in detail in Section 2.4 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
Radiological impacts of pre-launch, early-launch, and late-launch accidents associated
with either the primary VVVGA or backup VEEGA launch opportunities are expected to
be approximately the same as for the primary Titan IV/SRMU launch opportunity
presented in Table 4-2.
With the primary VVVGA trajectory, there would be no opportunity for a short-term
inadvertent reentry but a long-term inadvertent reentry risk would remain. However,
with the backup VEEGA trajectory, both short- and long-term inadvertent risks would be
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present and be approximately the same as indicated for the secondary and backup
(VEEGA) primary launch opportunities presented in Section 4.1.4 of this SEIS.
Prior to launch of either the primary or backup opportunity, comprehensive radiological
emergency plans would be in place and implemented as discussed for the Proposed
Action in Section 4.1.2.4 of this SEIS.
4.3 THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
There would be no adverse environmental impacts associated with the No-Action
alternative; however, there would be major adverse programmatic and potentially
adverse international relations impacts from a cancellation of the Cassini mission. In
addition, cancellation of the mission would result in the loss of existing United States
engineering and scientific expertise and capabilities. For further discussion of the impacts
of the No-Action alternative, see Section 4.4 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
4.4 ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED
The unavoidable adverse environmental impacts associated with both the Proposed
Action and the remaining 2001 Mission alternative are related primarily to the effects of
solid rocket motor emission during the first few seconds of the launch. These impacts
remain unchanged by the ongoing mission safety analyses. For details, refer to Section 4.5
of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
4.5 INCOMPLETE OR UNAVAILABLE INFORMATION
The recently available analyses referenced in this SEIS constitute the full analytical
documentation relied upon in this NEPA process. Risk estimates may subsequently
become available and could potentially vary from the risk estimates reported in this SEIS.
Such subsequent information may occur as a result of statistical variance from the
ongoing separate and independent nuclear launch safety analysis and evaluation for
Presidential decision-making.
With respect to the long-term inadvertent reentry accident, the performance and behavior
of the materials used in the RTGs after many years (a decade to a millennia) in a space
environment are highly uncertain. Therefore, the response of the GPHS modules and
GISs in the long-term inadvertent reentry were therefore assumed to be similar (same
order of magnitude) to those estimated for the short-term VVEJGA inadvertent reentry.
4-13
4.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USES OF THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF
LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY
Neither the short-term uses of the environment nor the enhancements to long-term
productivity addressed in the 1995 Cassini EIS are affected by the updated mission safety
analyses. Should an accident occur causing a release, short-term uses of contaminated
land could be curtailed, pending mitigation. Refer to Section 4.7 of the 1995 Cassini EIS
for additional details.
4.7 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
For both the Proposed Action and the 2001 Mission alternative, quantities of various non-
renewable resources, such as energy and fuels, iridium metal, plutonium and other
materials, would be irreversibly and irretrievably committed. These remain unchanged
by the updated mission safety analyses. Additional details can be found in Section 4.8 of
the 1995 Cassini EIS.
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of this SEIS due to its special expertise (see 40CFR1501.6). The organizations and
individuals listed below contributed to the overall effort in the preparation of this
document.
List of Contributors
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mark Dahl Program Executive, Cassini
B.S.E.E.
Kenneth Kumor NASA NEPA Coordinator
JD, M.B.A., B.S. Civil Eng.
Science Applications International Corporation
Dennis Ford EIS Project Manager
Ph.D., Zoology
Douglas Outlaw
Ph.D., Nuclear Physics
Daniel Spadoni
M.B.A
Senior Environmental Scientist
Senior Engineer
let Propulsion Laboratory
Reed Wilcox Manager, Launch Approval Engineering, Cassini Program
M.S., City & Regional Planning
Mark Phillips Member of Technical Staff
B.S., Eng.
Paul VanDamme Member of Technical Staff
M.S., Public Policy
U.S. Department of Energy
Beverly Cook Program Director, Space and National Security Programs
B.S., Metallurgical Engineering
Lyle L. Rutger Nuclear Engineer
M.S., Nuclear Engineering
Donald Owings Physical Scientist
M.S., Physics
Halliburton NUS
Henry Firstenberg
M. Eng. Sci.
Project Manager
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Section
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Person
NASA
Mark Dahl
Kenneth Kumor
SAIC
Dennis Ford
Douglas Outlaw
Daniel Spadoni
Jet Propulsion
Laboratory
Reed Wilcox
Mark Phillips
Paul VanDamme
U.S. Department
of Energy
Beverly Cook
Lyle L. Rutger
Donald Owings
Halliburton NUS
Henry Firstenber_
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6.0 AGENCIES AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED
This Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) was preceded by a
Draft SEIS (DSEIS) and supporting documentation (HNUS 1997), which were made
available on April 9, 1997, to Federal, State and local agencies, organizations and to the
public for review and comment. The public review and comment period closed on May
27, 1997. Comments received were considered during the preparation of this FSEIS (see
Appendix E).
In preparing this SEIS, NASA has actively solicited input from a broad range of interested
parties. In addition to the publication in the Federal Register (F.R.) of a Notice of Intent
(NOI) (62 F.R. 10879) and a Notice of Availability (62 F.R. 17216) for the DSEIS, NASA
distributed copies of the DSEIS and the supporting documentation (HNUS 1997), directly
to agencies, organizations, and individuals who may have an interest in the
environmental impacts and alternatives associated with the Cassini mission.
Comments on the DSEIS were solicited or received from the following:
Federal Agencies
Council on Environmental Quality
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Science Foundation
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management and Budget
U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Department of the Air Force
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Health and Human Services - Centers for Disease Control
Department of Health and Human Services - National Cancer Institute
Department of the Interior
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Environmental Protection Agency
State Agencies
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation
State of California - Office of the Governor
State of Florida - Office of the Governor
State of Florida - Department of Commerce
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Stateof New Mexico - Office of the Governor
State of New Mexico - Department of Public Safety
Local Agencies
Brevard County: Board of Commissioners
Comprehensive Planning Division
Economic Development Council
Emergency Operating Center
Planning and Zoning Division
Public Safety/Emergency Management
Canaveral Port Authority
City of Cape Canaveral
City of Cocoa
City of Cocoa Beach
City of Titusville
Organizations
American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Cancer Prevention Coalition
Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Engineering and Public Policy
CBS-60 Minutes
Center for Defense Information
Citizens for Peace in Space
Colorado State University Libraries
Committee to Bridge the Gap
Dynamac Corporation
Energy Research Foundation
Environmental Defense Fund
Federation of American Scientists
Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice
Florida Southwest Peace Education Coalition
Friends of the Earth
Indian River Citizens for a Safe Environment
Institute for Space and Security Studies
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
Lee County Coalition for Peace
Lehigh-Pocono Committee of Concern
Marin County Peace Conversion Commission
6-2
National Audubon Society
National SpaceSociety
National Wildlife Federation
Natural ResourcesDefenseCouncil
Nuclear Age PeaceFoundation
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition
Physicians for SocialResponsibility - LosAngeles Chapter
PikesPeakJusticeand PeaceCommission
Planetary Society
Religious Education for the Catholic Deaf& Blind
Resourcesfor the Future
SierraClub
SouthDakota Peaceand JusticeCenter
SouthernCalifornia Federationof Scientists
Southern Rainbow Education Project
Union of Concerned Scientists
United Methodist Board of Church and Society
WestPalm BeachPost
Women's International Leaguefor Peaceand Freedom - Margaret Mead Chapter
World SpaceflightNews
Individuals
Peter Allan
Geraldine Jenara Amato
Ray and Ruth Anderson
Harvey and Lois Baker
Ron Balogh
Dr. Gary L. Bennett
Linda Bermann
A1 Berrie
Steve Berry
Blaine Browning
Harry A. Bryson
Thomas W. Chao
John Chaplick
Isabel K. Chiguoine
Mr. and Mrs. Malcolm Chubb
Marc M. Cohen
Fran Collier
Keith Cowing
Prof. R.W.R. Darling
Edward Dierauf
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Dr. CharlesDunlap
Anthony Ehrlich
Bob Ellenberg
Donna Ellis
Mark Elsis
Richard Eng
John P.Ferrell
RoseGaines
Harry Garcia,Jr.
John Geddie
Ronald Goodman
Gerry Greer
Karl Grossman
SonyaGuidry
StephenG.Harber
Richard H. Hiers, Ph.D.,J.D.
Merilyn Hiller
Thomas Hitchcock
RussellD. Hoffman
Robert R.Holt, Ph.D.
Brian Hoppy
John Huff
Carole and Frank Hyneman
Kathleen F.Kelly
EleanorS.Kenyon
Mr. and Mrs. Harry Kernes
CandaceKilchenman
Dr. Mary Ann Lawrence
John Robert Lehman
Sidney and Olive Manuel
Patricia Marida
A. Marshall
Allen McBride
Dr. Marcia A. McDonald
Karen McFadyen
Margery D. McIntire
David Migliore
Victoria Nichols
Mark Passen
Anna B.Pilson
Dr. Horst Poehler
Mr. and Mrs. Paul Puchstein
Ruth Putz
William Quick
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Edward D. Ramsberger
BethRaps
Ronald P.Reed
Irving Richman
Tom Rivell
Max Rothe,P.E.
Courtney Sadler
Don Schrader
Paul H. Schultz
Gerald R. Schultz
Phil Seligrnan
Kenneth Silber
William Smimow
Dorothy ScottSmith
Ruth E.and JackSnyder
Margaret M. Spallone
Nancy Strong
Edward S.Syrjale
Lyle A. Taylor
Sylvia Torgan
Kei Utsumi
Georgia Van Orman
RayVillard
JeanneD. Vicini
ReaD. Ward
Harvey Wasserman
Arnie Welber
William Westall, III
Lynda Williams
Warren and Olive Wilson
6-5
This page left intentionally blank.
6-6
7.O INDEX
-A-
Accident
cleanup costs, 4-10, 4-11
consequences of, vi, 2-16, 4-6, 4-11
probabilities, viiii, 2-19, 2-21, 4-5, 4-7
scenarios, vi, 1-1, 2-16, 4-4
segments, viii, 2-12, 2-13, 4-4, 4-5
swingby, ix, 2-17, 2-22, 4-5, 4-7, 4-9, 4-10, 4-12
Acronyms, xv
Affected Environment, 3-1
Agencies and Individuals Consulted, 6-1
Alternatives
comparison of, 2-24
to proposed action, vi, 2-14, 2-16
-B-
Benefits of mission, iii, 1-3
-C-
Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS), ii, vi, 1-1, 2-12, 2-17, 3-1, 4-12
Cassini mission description, 2-2, 2-12
Cassini spacecraft, I, ii, iii, v, vi, 1-1, 1-3, 2-4, 2-6, 2-7, 2-13, 2-14, 4-6, 4-10, 4-12
Centaur, ii, vi, 1-1, 2-9, 2-10, 2-12
Cleanup of contaminated areas, 4-10, 4-11
Command Shutdown and Destruct System (CSDS), 2-12
Contributors to the SEIS, 5-1
-D-
de minimis, 4-1
Department of Energy (DOE), i, iii, ix, 1-1, 2-19, 4-1
-E-
Economic impacts, 4-10
Electrical power for the spacecraft, 2-6
Emergency response planning, 4-10
Environmental consequences, 2-14, 4-6
European Space Agency (ESA), i, iii, 1-3, 2-6
7-!
-F-
Fueled Clad, 2-4
-G-
Galileo mission, vii, 1-2, 2-9, 2-17, 2-19, 2-20, 4-2, 4-4, 4-6, 4-10
General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS), vii, 2-4, 2-9, 4-1
Graphite Impact Shell (GIS), 2-4, 2-18, 4-13
Gravity Assist (Swingby)
Earth Gravity Assist (EGA) trajectory, vi, vii, viii, 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 2-16, 4-2,
4-4, 4-6, 4-9
Non-Earth Gravity Assist trajectory, vi, 2-14, 2-16, 4-12
-H-
Health effects, viii, 2-17, 2-18, 2-22, 4-2, 4-6, 4-8
Huygens Probe, iii, 1-3, 2-4
Hydrazine monopropellant, 2-4, 2-9
-I-
Inadvertent reentry from Earth orbit accident scenario, viii, 2-12, 2-16, 2-17, 2-22, 4-2
Incomplete or unavailable information, 4-13
Italian Space Agency (ASI), i, iii, 1-3
-j-
Jupiter, 2-2
-K-
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), vi, 2-1, 2-12, 2-16, 3-1
-L-
Land Contamination, viii, 2-20, 2-21, 2-22, 2-23, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10
Launch phases, 1-2, 2-12, 2-16, 2-17
Launch segments, vii, viii, 2-13, 2-16, 2-24, 4-4
Launch vehicle
Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade (SRMU), 2-9
Titan IV, vi, 2-9
7-2
-M-
Maximum individual dose, 2-21,4-6,4-8
Mission alternative
1999mission alternative, 2-1
2001mission alternative, 2-1,2-2,2-12,2-14,2-20,2-23,4-11
Mission objectives, iii, 1-1,2-2
Monomethylhydrazine, 2-4,2-9
-N-
National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA), i, iii, 1-1,1-2,2-1,2-7, 2-17,4-1,
4-10
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), i, iii, 1-2,4.13
Nitrogen tetroxide, 2-4,2-9
No-Action Alternative, vi, 2-1,2-14,4-12
_p-
PayloadFairing, 2-10
Plutonium dioxide, i, vi, vii, 1-1,2-4,2-16,2-17,2-18,2-19,4-2,4-3,44, 4-6
ProposedAction
alternatives to, vi, 2-1
description of, 2-1,2-2
environmental consequencesof, vi, 2-14,4-1
purpose of, 1-2
Propulsion Module Subsystem(PMS), 2-9
-R-
Radioisotope Heater Unit (RHU), i, v, vi, vii, 1-1,2-4,2-6,2-16,4-1,4-2
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG), i, v, vi, vii, 1-1,1-2,2-4, 2-6,2-10,2-12,2-
16,4-1,4-2,4-4,4-6
Rangesafety, 2-12
Recordof Decision, ii, iii, 1-1,A-1
References,8-1
Rhenium engine, vi, 2-13,2-22
Risk
general, i, vii, 1-2,2-9,2-13,2-17,2-18,2-19,2-24,4-2,4-6
Health effectsmission risk, 2-17
7-3
-S-
Safety
RTGdesign, 2-9,2-18
Saturn, i, ii, iii, iv, 1-1,1-3,2-1,2-2,2-6
Solararray, 2-4,2-6,2-7,2-9
Solid RocketMotor Upgrade (SRMU), ii, vi, viii, 1-1,1-2,2-1,2-9,2-10
Sourceterm, vi, vii, 2-18,2-19,2-20,4-2,4-4,4-6,Appendix D
SpaceVehicleDestruct System(SVDS),2-13
SpacecraftPropulsion Module Subsystem(PMS), 2-9
Swingby (seeGravity Assist)
-T-
Titan IV, ii, vi, viii, 1-1,1-2,2-1, 2-9, 2-10
-U-
Ulysses mission, vii, 1-2, 2-9, 2-17, 2-19, 2-20, 4-2, 4-4, 4-6, 4-10
Uncertainty, 4-9
Upper stage, 2-10
-V-
Venus, 2-2, 2-14
7-4
8.0 REFERENCES
EG&G Mound Applied Technologies (EG&G). 1997. Light Weight Radioisotope Heater
Unit (LWRHU) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Cassini Mission, MEM-
3826, Ernest W. Johnson, Lamb Associates, Inc. for EG&G Mound Applied
Techniologies, February 1997.
Halliburton NUS (HNUS). 1997. Nuclear Safety Analyses for the Cassini Mission
Environmental Impact Statement Process. HNUS-97-0010. Halliburton NUS
Corporation. Gaithersburg, MD. March 1997.
Hassan H. 1996. Personal Communication to D. Kindt, Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
regarding ESA assessment of the JPL system study related to the possible use of
photovoltaic arrays for the Cassini mission.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). 1993a. Cassini Program Environmental Impact
Statement Supporting Study, Volume 1: Program Description. JPL Publication
Number D-10178-1. Pasadena, CA. June 4, 1993.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). 1993b. Cassini Program Environmental Impact
Statement Supporting Study, Volume 3: Cassini Earth Swingby Plan. JPL Publication
Number D-10178-3. Pasadena, CA, November 1993 with addendum dated August
24, 1994.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). 1993c. Cassini Project Mission Plan. JPL Publication No.
D-5564, Rev. C. Pasadena, CA. August 16, 1993.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL). 1994. Cassini Program Environmental Impact Statement
Supporting Study, Volume 2: Alternative Mission and Power Study. JPL Publication
Number D-11777. Pasadena, CA. July 1994.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). 1997. Cassini Earth Swing by Plan Supplement. JPL
Publication 699-70-3-Sup, Pasadena, CA, May 19, 1997.
Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space (LMM&S a-j). GPHS-RTGs in Support of the Cassini
Mission, Safety Analysis Report, CRDL C.3, LMM&S, Valley Forge Operations,
Philadelphia, PA, completed May 30, 1997.
a Reference Design Document, Volume 1, November 1996.
b Accident Model Document, Volume II, Book I of 2, November 1996.
c Accident Model Document Appendices, Volume II, Book 2 of 2, November 1996.
d Nuclear Risk Analysis Document, Volume III, Book 1 of 2, November 1996.
e Nuclear Risk Analysis Document Appendices, Volume III, Book 2 of 2,
November 1996.
f Attachment to Volume III-Uncertainty Analysis Document, December 1996.
8-]
g Addendum to CRDL C.3,April 1997.
h Supplemental Analyses,May 1997.
i Initial ExecutiveSummary, November 1996.
j Updated Executive Summary, May 1997.
Martin Marietta Technologies, Inc. (MMT) 1992. Titan IV CRAF/Cassini EISDatabook,
Rev: Basic. MCR-91-2580. Martin Marietta Launch Systems,Denver, CO. December
1991. (Chapter 10published in 1992).
Martin Marietta Technologies, Inc. (MMT) 1997. Cassini Titan Iv/Centaur RTG Safety
Databook, Revision B, Martin Marietta Technologies, Inc., a Lockheed Martin
Company, Report NAS3-00031, March 1997.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 1995. Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission. Washington, D.C., June 1995.
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1988. Internal Dose Rate Conversion Factors for
Calculation of Dose to the Public. DOE/EH-0071, (July 1988).
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). 1992. DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety
Standards. DOD 6055.9-STD.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1990 Transuraniu.m Elements, Volume 2,
Technical Basis for Remedial Actions. Prepared by the U.S. Office of Radiation
Programs, Washington D.C. Report No. EPA/520-1-90-016. June 1990.
8-2
APPENDIX A, CASSINI RECORD OF DECISION
A-!
This page is left intentionally blank.
RECORD OF DECISION
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS. AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Cassini Mission
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
A. The Cassini Mission
The Cassini mission is an international cooperative effort
undertaken by NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and the
Italian Space Agency (ASI) to explore the planet Saturn and its
environment. Cassini is part of NASA's continuing program for
exploration of the solar system, the goal of which is to
understand its birth and evolution. The Cassini mission is
planned to be launched from Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) and
will involve a 4-year tour of Saturn, its atmosphere, moons,
rings, and magnetosphere by the Cassini spacecraft, which
consists of the Orbiter and the detachable Huygens Probe. The
Huygens Probe will be released from the Cassini Orbiter to
descend by parachute through the atmosphere of Saturn's largest
moon, Titan. During the descent, instruments on the Probe will
directly sample the atmosphere and determine its composition.
The Probe will also gather data on Titan's landscape. Upon
completion of the Probe mission, the Orbiter will continue to
make remote and in-situ measurements of Saturn and its
environment. This information could provide significant insights
into the formation of the solar system and the conditions that
led to life on Earth.
NASA will provide the Orbiter, the Earth-based communications and
operations network, and two scientific instruments on the Huygens
Probe. ESA will provide the Huygens Probe, and ASI will provide
major elements of the Orbiter's communications equipment and
elements of several science instruments.
The scientific and technological benefits expected from the
Cassini mission are demonstrated by the long record of support
not only by our Nation's scientific community, the Congress, and
Executive Branch agencies, but also by the international science
community and many European nations.
B. Introduction to the EIS
This EIS was developed to address all major elements of the
Cassini mission. Formal scoping began in February 1991 and
continued into April 1991. This scoping period was for the Outer
Solar System E-_loration Program, which included both the Comet
Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) and Cassini missions. Thirty-
three scoping comment letters were received. They dealt with:
alternative power sources; risks and impacts from plutonium-238
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(Pu-238) in the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs);
accident probabilities and risk factors; mission alternatives;
and NASA policy. In January 1992 the CRAF mission was canceled
and by May 1992 Cassini was restructured; an information update
to this effect was published in October 1992. The scoping
comments were then used in developing a Cassini-specific Draft
EIS (DEIS).
The DEIS was made available to the public in October 1994.
Fifty-one comment letters were receive_. These comments dealt
with a range of issues, including: the use of plutonium in space;
the status of solar technology for deep space missions; the
properties of plutonium; the radiological consequence and risk
analyses; effects on ground water near the launch site; and
cumulative environmental impacts on stratospheric ozone.
The Final EIS was made available on July 21, 1995, and the
waiting period expired on August 21, 1995. Ten comment letters
were received. These lettersraised no new issues, nor did they
provide new information; six of the commentors reiterated issues
they raised earlier for the DEIS.
A_ternatives Considered
The alternatives addressed in the EIS were:
• Completion of preparation for and implementation of the
Cassini mission to Saturn, including its launch onboard a
Titan IV (with either the Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade [SRMU]
or the Solid Rocket Motor [SRM] I, and a Centaur upper
stage) during the primary launch opportunity in October
1997, using a Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter Gravity Assist
(VVEJGA).trajectory; a secondary opportunity in December
1997, uslng a Venus-Earth-Earth Gravity Assist (VEEGA)
trajectory; or a backup opportunity in March 1999, using a
VEEGA trajectory. The primary opportunity will enable
gathering the full science return (i.e., data) desired to
accomplish the mission science objectives• Achievement of
the science objectives for the secondary and backup
opportunities would essentially be the same as for the
primary, but with reduced science return.
• Completion of preparation for and implementation of the
Cassini mission to S_turn involving dual Space Shuttle
launches in early 1999, with on-orbit assembly of the
spacecraft with its upper stage(s), followed by injection in
March 1999 on a VEEGA trajectory. A backup .opportunity,
also a VEEGA, occurs in August 2000. This alternative,
including both the primary and backup opportunities, would
IAt the time of this Record of Decision, the SRM has become
unavailable as an option.
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•obtain less science return than the Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur
1997 primary opportunity•
Completion of preparation for and implementation of the
Cassini mission to Saturn onboard a Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur
using a Venus-Venus-Venus Gravity Assist (VVVGA) trajectory
in March 2001 or a VEEGA backup opportunity in May 2002.
This alternative would require both increasing the
propellant capacity of the Cassini spacecraft and completing
development of a new, high-performance rocket engine. This
alternative, including both the primary and backup
opportunities, would obtain less science return than the
Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur 1997 primary opportunity.
• Adoption of the no-action alternative, resulting in
termination of preparations for implementing the Cassini
mission. This alternative would impede our Nation's Solar
System Exploration Program, deprive the world of invaluable
scientific discoveries, and disrupt internationally
cooperative space activities for the benefit of all
humankind.
Mission Components Evaluated
In addition to the basic engineering design of the spacecraft,
the other key components associated with the Cassini mission are
the launch vehicle, the interplanetary trajectory, and the power
system for the spacecraft's electrical requirements. These must
function together to satisfy the requirements of themission.
Key components were evaluated in the EIS in terms of technical
feasibility, ability to satisfy the science objectives of the
mission, and potential for reducing the postulated environmental
impacts associated with the October 1997 baseline mission design.
To be considered technically feasible, a component must have been
tested for space-flight applications or must be in the
development stages on a timetable consistent with satisfying
Cassini's science objectives. The requirement for components to
satisfy the science objectives is essential because the mission
must provide useful information in a timely manner•
The evaluation of mission components led to the following
determinations: (1) the Titan IV (SRMU)/Centaur is the most
capable U.S. launch system available and most closely matches the
requirements of the Cassini mission; (2) the Cassini mission to
Saturn requires planetary gravity-assist trajectories;and (3)
the spacecraft requires the use of three mainly @1utonium-238
dioxide-fueled (_PuO2) RTGs and up to 157 Radioisotope Heater
Units (RHUs) to satisfy the mission electrical and thermal
requirements. The total Z_PuO 2 inventory will be around 400,000
cur_es at time of launch. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory
conducted an in-depth analysis of the available electrical power
systems, including many different solar, battery, and long-life
fuel cell power sources and hybrid systems to identify the most
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appropriate power source for the Cassini mission. None of these
were found to be technically feasible for Cassini. For example,
a Cassini spacecraft equipped with the highest efficiency solar
cells available would make the spacecraft too massive for
launching to Saturn. The spectrum of available launch vehicles
was also analyzed, and it was determined that there is no
available launch vehicle which could avoid planetary gravity
assist trajectories.
Environmental Consequences of the Alternatives
In considering the consequences of the alternatives, it was
recognized that ordinarily the only direct or immediate
environmental impacts would be asseciated with the normal launch
of Cassini. The environmental impacts of normal Titan IV or
Space Shuttle launches have been addressed in other National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation (e.g., the Titan IV
Environmental Assessments lEAs]; Space Shuttle, Kennedy Space
Center, Galileo [Tier-2] and Ulysses [Tier-2] EISs), and have
been updated in the Cassini EIS. These impacts have been deemed
insufficient to preclude either Titan IV or Space Shuttle
operations.
Consideration of launch and inadvertent reentry accidents
involving radiological consequences was a principal focus of the
Cassini EIS. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), a cooperating
agency, provides the RTGs and RHUs. For the Cassini mission, DOE
has prepared a preliminary risk analysis for accidents which are
postulated as causing a release of plutonium dioxide fuel from
the RTGs or RHUs. The EIS incorporates the results of DOE's
preliminary risk analysis.
The analysis proceeded as follows:
a) NASA defined the launch vehicle, s), representative
(postulated) accident scenarios', and the environments
(e.g, propellant fires and explosions, high speed fragments,
reentry conditions, etc.) to which the RTGs and RHUs might
be exposed in the event of an accident. NASA also provided
the probabilities of occurrence of the accident scenarios.
ZThe Cassini EIS deals with a set of four credible launch
phase accident scenarios (i.e., Command Shutdown and Destruct,
Titan IV (SRMU) Fail-to-Ignite, Centaur Tank Failure/Collapse,
and Inadvertent Reentry from Earth Orbit) that are deemed
representative of those which could potentially result in a
release of plutonium dioxide from the RTGs or RHUs. The planned
Cassini Final Safety Analysis Report (FS_R) for the nuclear
launch safety analysis and evaluation processes will provide more
detailed evaluations of the full set of accidents and
environments that could occur during the Cassini mission.
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b) Based on the similarity of the representative accident
scenario environments to those arising from the accident
scenarios analyzed for the 1990 Ulysses Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) supplemented with additional
analyses, DOE estimated the response of the RTGs and RHUs to
those environments. In this manner, DOE was able to
determine if a given representative scenario could lead to a
release of plutonium dioxide fuel and the potential amount
of a release (i.e., a "source term").
c) For those cases where a release could possibly occur, DOE
then estimated the dispersion, deposition, and health and
environmental consequences along with the probability of
occurrence given that the postulated release occurred.
The radiological consequence results are reported in the EIS in
terms of "expectation" and "maximum" cases. The expectation case
for a given representative accident scenario represents a
probability-weighted average over conditions associated with the
accident scenario under consideration, and uses the average
source terms developed in the analysis. The maximum case for a
given representative accident scenario represents a nominal upper
limit without consideration of uncertainties 3, based on the use
of the maximum source terms. The maximum case corresponds to
either the upper limit deemed credible for a given representative
scenario based on consideration of currently available supporting
analyses, or that corresponding to a total release probability
greater than or equal to a probability cutoff of 10".
C. Assessment o_ the Analysis
Through over three decades of research, development, test, and
evaluation, DOE has reduced the hazards associated with the use
of the RTG space power system by the design of the RTG.
Materials have been chosen (e.g., plutonium dioxide in ceramic
form) and designs selected which, in the event of an accident,
contain or immobilize the fuel to the maximum extent practical.
The results of the analysis show that in most launch phase
accidents 4 there would be no release of nuclear material. In
the event of a release, the analysis indicates that for neither
the expectation case nor the maximum case would there be any
health effects (i.e., excess latent cancer fatalities).
3Due to the preliminary nature of the analyses presented in
the EIS, no uncertainty analysis was performed and uncertainties
are addressed in only general terms. Uncertainty analysis will
be performed as part of the ongcing studies in support of the
Cassini FSAR.
4See footnote 2 on p. 4
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During the interplanetary portion of the mission, postulated
inadvertent reentry accident scenarios could result in release of
plutonium dioxide. However, the mission's design ensures that
the expected probability of such reentry is less than one in one
million. If such an accident were to occur, the expectation case
predicts that there could be approximately 2300 health effects
worldwide over a 50-year period. The EIS presents a mission risk
summary (Table 4-18, page 4-78 of the EIS) in which the risks of
health effects are divided by the potentially affected
populations to estimate the average risk per individual. In this
regard, there would be a chance of about one in three trillion
for the average potentially exposed individual, in the global
population, incurring a fatal cancer as a result of a fuel
release from an inadvertent reentry during Earth swingby.
Finally, the risks are compared with tabulated, published risk
data. The risks associated with the Cassini mission are thereby
seen to be several orders of magnitude less than risks
encountered and accepted elsewhere in our daily lives.
Choice o_ Alternat_ves
In view of the small risks associated with the Cassini mission,
it is my intention to choose the proposed action, Alternative 1
(above, page 2), based on programmatic grounds as follows.
Alternative 1, completion of preparations for and implementation
of the Cassini mission, including its launch on a Titan IV (SRMU
or SRM)/Centaur in October 1997, the secondary opportunity in
December 1997, or the backup opportunity in March 1999, would
enable the earliest and best return of scientific information,
make most effective use of fiscal, human and material resources,
and avoid disruption of the Nation's program for solar system
exploration.
It is important that the Cassini mission is accomplished while
the Voyager exploration results are recent and much of the
associated scientific expertise is still available. There would
be more than 23 years between the Voyager flybys of Saturn and
the 2004 arrival of Cassini (for the primary launch opportunity).
The exploration of the Saturn system by Cassini is essential to
answering some fundamental questions about the origins of life
and of our solar system._ The international scientific and
technological community anxiously awaits its results.
The no-action alternative, while presenting the minimum
environmental risk, would, however, jeopardize our Country's
unique Outer Solar System Exploration Program, deprive society of
the invaluable scientific knowledge which will result fromthis
mission, and could seriously disrupt and strain the international
partnerships the U.S. has foraed to undertake space activities
for peaceful purposes, such as the Cassini mission.
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The choice to complete preparations for and to implement the
mission is fully consistent with the mandate of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act to contribute materially, among other
things, to the expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in
space.
D. Additional Information
In addition to requirements under the NEPA and NASA policy and
procedures, there is a separate and distinct Executive Branch
interagency process for evaluating the nuclear launch safety of
the mission. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Presidential
Directive/National Security Council Memorandum #25 (PD/NSC-25), a
Safety Evaluation Report (SER) will be prepared by an ad hoc
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP). I will be fully
briefed on the outcome of the safety analyses and the Cassini
INSRP evaluation prior to the launch of the Cassini mission.
Extensive safety and technical reviews are continuing for the
Cassini mission. In the event there are significant differences
between the analysis for the EIS and the results of the final
safety analyses and evaluations, those differences will be
considered and a determination made as to the need for any
additional NEPA documentation.
E. Mitiuation
The only expected or immediate environmental impacts of the
Cassini mission are the same as those for every Titan IV launch,
and mitigation will accordingly be the same. This EIS primarily
addressed possible radlological consequences of mission
accidents. Regarding such possible radiological impacts, NASA,
with expert technical assistance from DOE, the Department of
Defense, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and other
federal agencies, and in cooperation with state and local
authorities, will develop a federal radiological emergency
response plan. Key elements of monitoring and data analysis
equipment will be predeployed to enable rapid response in the
event of a launch contingency. The plan, to be documented
elsewhere, will address both monitoring and mitigation activities
associated with the launch. In particular, post-accident
mitigation activities, if required, will be based on detailed
monitoring and assessment at that time. The plan will carefully
detail the roles of the agencies involved. NASA will be the
Cognizant Federal Agency coordinating the federal response for
accidents occurring within U.S. jurisdiction, and would
coordinate with the Department of State and other cognizant
agencies, as appropriate, in the implementation of other
responses.
- 7 -
Decision
Based upon all of the foregoing, I am confident that reasonable
means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the Cassini
mission have been adopted; or, if not already adopted, will be
adopted, as appropriate, upon conclusion of the safety analyses.
Accordingly, it is my decision to complete preparation of the
Cassini mission for launch in the October 1997 opportunity, or
either the secondary or backup opportunities, and to implement
the mission.
Space Science
Dat_
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accident environment--Resulting conditions from an accident scenario, such as blast
overpressure, fragments and fire.
accident scenario--Launch vehicle and/or spacecraft condition resulting from failure
model(s) at the component and/or subsystem level(s). Different failure modes can result
in the same accident scenario.
astronomical unit (AU)--The distance from the Earth to the Sun. It is equal to 149,599,000
km (92,960,818 mi).
background radiation--Ionizing radiation present in the environment from cosmic rays
and natural sources in the Earth; background radiation varies considerably with location.
Becquerel (Bq)-Unit of radioactivity equal to I disintegration per second.
Best estimate--The best estimate reflects what is considered to be the most representative
mathematical models, parameter values used in the models, and probability distributions
to describe inherent variability as inputs to the analysis. As such, the best estimate reflects
the anticipated outcome of the radiological consequences and risk without consideration
of uncertainty in either the models or parameter values.
cancer--A group of diseases characterized by iancontrolled cellular growth.
clad--Thin-walled metal enclosure that encases the outer shell of nuclear fuel and
prevents the release of plutonium dioxide and alpha particles into the environment.
conditional probability--The probability that a release of radioactive material could occur
given an initiating accident (i.e., the accident has occurred).
cumulative impacts--Additive environmental, health, safety and significant
socioeconomic impacts that result from a number of similar activities in an area.
Curie (Ci)--A measure of the radioactivity level of a substance (i.e., the number of
unstable nuclei that are undergoing transformation in the process of radioactivity decay);
one curie equals the disintegration of 3.7x10 w (37 billion) nuclei per second and is equal to
the radioactivity of one gram of radium-226.
decay heat--The heat produced by the energy of decay of radionuclides.
decay, radioactive--The decrease in the amount of any radioactive material with the
passage of time due to the transformation of one nuclide into a different nuclide or into a
different energy state of the same nuclide. The decay process results in the emission of
nuclear radiation (alpha, beta, or gamma and neutrons) and heat.
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decontamination (radioactive)--The reduction or removal of radioactive contaminants
from surfaces of equipment by cleaning or washing with chemicals, by wet abrasive
blasting, or by chemical processing.
de minimis--This is a concept to indicate a collective dose level at which the risks to
human health are considered negligible.
deposition--In atmospheric transport terms, the settling out on ground and building
surfaces of atmospheric aerosols and particles (dry deposition) or their removal from the
air to the ground by precipitation (wet deposition or rainout).
dose-The amount of energy deposited in the body by ionizing radiation per unit body
mass.
dose commitment--The dose that an organ or tissue would receive during a specified
period of time (e.g., usually 50 years) as a result of intake (as by ingestion or inhalation),
frequently over one year, of one or more radionuclides from a defined release.
dose equivalent--The product of the absorbed dose from ionizing radiation and such
factors that account for the difference in biological effectiveness due to the type of
radiation and its distribution in the body (measured in Sieverts [rem]). The weighting
factor for beta and gamma radiation is 1, and, for alpha radiation, it is approximately 20;
thus, 1 Gy (100 rad) gamma radiation is equivalent to 1 Sv (100 rein), and 1 Gy (100 rad)
alpha radiation is equivalent to 20 Sv (2,000 rem).
exposure to radiation-The incidence of radiation from either external or internal sources
on living or inanimate material by accident or intent:
• Background--exposure to natural background ionizing radiation
• Occupational-exposure to ionizing radiation that takes place during a person's
working hours
• Population (or collective)-sum of the exposures to a number of persons who
inhabit an area
gravity-assist-Using the planetary gravitational field to increase the velocity or decrease
the injection energy of a spacecraft.
half-life (radiological)--The period required for the disintegration of half the atoms in a
given amount of a specific radioactive substance. The half-life varies for specific
radioisotopes from millionths of a second to billions of years.
health effect (for this EIS)-The impact to human health due to radiation doses. The
number of excess latent cancer fatalities over and above the normal occurrence rate that
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could occur in the exposedpopulation as a result of radiation from a launch accident or
swingby accident.
initiating event (failure)--An event that can begin an accident sequence if followed by
systems failures.
initiating probability--The probability that an identified accident scenario and associated
adverse conditions (accident environment) will occur.
ionizing radiation--Any radiation capable of displacing electrons from atoms for
molecules, thereby producing ions.
isotope--One of perhaps several different species of a given chemical element with the
same number of protons, which are distinguishable by variations in the number of
neutrons in the atomic nucleus, but indistinguishable by chemical means.
maximum individual dose--The maximum individual dose that an individual could
receive over a 50-year commitment period.
offsite--The area outside the property boundary of the CCAS/KSC site.
onsite--The area within the property boundary of the CCAS/KSC site.
onsite population--NASA, DOD and contractor personnel who are on duty at CCAS or
KSC and badged onsite visitors.
Orbiter--For purposes of this EIS, a spacecraft, such as Cassini, designed to orbit a planet
(i.e., a celestial body) without landing on its surface.
plutonium-A heavy artificially produced radioactive metal (atomic number 94) with 15
isotopes. The Pu-238 isotope forms the basis for the fuel in the RTG. With a decay half-
life of 87.7 years, Pu-238 is produced from the neutron bombardment of neptunium-237.
proposed action-For this SEIS, the proposed action consists of completing the
preparation for and implementing the Cassini mission, including launching the spacecraft
for its four-year science tour of Saturn.
radiation-The emitted particles (alpha, beta, neutrons) or photons (gamma) from the
nuclei of unstable (radioactive) atoms as a result of radioactive decay. Some elements are
naturally radioactive; others are induced to become radioactive by bombardment in a
nuclear reactor or other particle accelerator. The characteristics of naturally occurring
radiation are indistinguishable from those of induced radiation.
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radioactivity--The spontaneousdecay or disintegration of unstable atomic nuclei, usually
accompaniedby the emissionof ionizing radiation.
radioisotope heater unit (RHU)--An RHU is a radioisotope-fueled system consisting of a
one-watt pellet of plutonium-238 dioxide, a platinum-30 rhodium (Pt-30Rh) clad, an
insulation system of pyrolitic graphite (PG) and an aeroshell/impact body of fine-weave
pierced fabric (FWPF). RHUs help to regulate temperatures onboard the spacecraft and
the Huygens Probe.
radioisotopes--Unstable isotopes of an element that decay or disintegrate and
spontaneously emit particles or electromagnetic radiation.
rein--The unit dose representing the amount of ionizing radiation needed to produce the
same biological effects as one roentgen of high-penetration X-rays (about 200 kv).
risk--The accident probability coupled with the associated consequences. Risk is defined
quantitatively as the product of the frequency and the consequence. Risk, for the purpose
of the Cassini EIS and for this supplement, is defined as the total probability of an
accident times the consequence, and summed over all accidents in a given mission phase,
segment, or the overall mission.
risk assessment--A process comprising the identification of the hazards, such as patterns
and level of exposure, and the evaluation of the risk (i.e., accident frequency and
consequences) to affected individuals or populations from a known event.
Sievert (Sv)--The SI unit of dose equivalent. One Sv is equivalent to 100 rein.
solar energy-Energy from the Sun or heat from the Sun converted into an energy source.
source term--The quantities of materials released during an accident to air or water
pathways and the characteristics of the releases (e.g., particle size distribution, release
height and duration); used for determining accident consequences.
swingby--Part of the trajectory when, during an interplanetary mission, a space vehicle
passes by a planet to use the planetary gravitation to change course and to obtain
additional velocity/momentum.
trajectory-The flight path that a spacecraft will take during a mission.
upper stage--The portion of the launch system that injects the spacecraft (payload) from a
parking orbit into the desired orbit or interplanetary trajectory.
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memorandum
Ref: XP-
Your Ref.:
To:
From:
CC:
Subject:
1612-dos Date: 31st August 1996
H. Hassan (PY)
D. M. O'Sullivan (XP)
K Bogus (XPG), C. Signorini (XPG), J. Haines (XPM
Assessment of the JPL system study re(ated to the possible use of photovoltaic
arrays, for the CASSINI mission
Following evaluations of recently provided JPL documentation in the ESTEC Power and Energy
Conversion Division, please find attached two relevant assessments.
It is evident from the attached assessments that although ESA is currentJy proposing to use
photovoltaic solar arrays supporting Low Intensity, Low Illumination (LILI) solar cells for the ROSETTA
cometary encounter (3.25 AU) spacecraft, such an approach for the more power demanding, much
deeper space (93 AU) and poorly known Saturn radiation environment of the CASSINI mission, is
impractical in respect of its launcher capability and the scientific requirement for a rapid body orientation
ability.
As a result we concur with the reviewed JPL system level study which shows a mass and
configuration impact for the currently defined 837 watt CASSINI mission, which would be prohibitive for
the programme.
Although a new generation of ultrathin LILT soar cells could potentially offer a solution and produce
a lower mass impact than the 1396 kg addressed by JPL in the study such solar cells have not yet been
developed.
As a result of the attached deliberations it can be concluded that as of this point in time, LILT solar
ceils (including those developed by-ESA) are not a viable power source alternative for the presently
defined CASSINI mission of NASA.
D. M. O'Sullivan
i
European Space Agency
Agence spatiale europeene
Head of Power and Energy Conversion Division (XP)
i i
ESTEC
Postbus 299 - NL 2200 AG Noordwijk - Kepledaan 1 - NL 2201 AZ Noorclwijk ZH - Netherlands
Tel: (INT) + 31-71-5_3855 - Fax: (INT) + 31-71-5654994
E-Mail: JHAINES@vmprofs.estec.esa.nl
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memorandum
Ref: XP-
Your Ref.:
To:
From:
CC:
Subject:
1611_h Date: 31st August 1996
H. Hassan (PY) via D. O'Sullivan (XP
J.E. Haines (XPM)
K. Bogus (XPG), C. Signorini (XPG)
Assessment of the JPL system study related to the possible use of photovoltai¢
arrays supporting Low Intensity, Low IlluminationGaAs and Si solar cells for the
CASSINI mission. (Appendix D of the Cassini EIS SuppoflJng Studies Vol.2)
Following your request to assess the overall system/power system aspects of the JPL study on the
possibility of using GaAs and LILT solar ceils for satisfying the CASSINI mission, please find the result of
my own evaluation:
1) General
It is evident that the yvork presented in Appendix D demonstrates a comprehensive study on the part
of JPL into the potential of applying new solar cell technologies to the CASSINI mission. In particular the
study addresses the possibility of applying:
i) High efficiency silicon (Si) solar cells with defined Low Intensity, Low Temperature (LILT)
performance.
and
ii) Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) solar cells with defined Low Intensity, Low Illumination (LILT)
performance
to the CASSINI mission.
It must of course be noted that although the ESA ROSETTA spacecraft programme is intendedto be
operated with LILT solar cells up to a maximum sun distance of 5.2 AU (with full science operations only
needed up to a sun distance of 3.25 AU), CASSINI has the distinct disadvantage of having to operate in
Saturn orbit, this resulting in a full spacecraft performance requirement at a sun distance ranging
between 9 AU and 9.3 AU.
European Space Agency
Agence spatiale europeene
ESTEC
Pos_us 299 - NL 2200 AG Noor_wijk - Keplerlaan 1 - NL 2201 AZ Noordwijk ZH - Netherlands
Tel: (INT_ ÷ 31o71-5653855 - Fax: (INT) ÷ 31-71.5654994
E-Mad: JHAINES@vmprofs.estec.esa.nl
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In terms of solar intensity this results in CASSINI receiving only:
[(1/9.3)=/1] - 0.0115 (1.15 %) of the solar insulationas compared to an earth orbit
2) Solar Cell Technologies and Performances
An assessment regarding the solar cell performances evaluated during the course of the JPL study
contained in memorandum K. Bogus to H. Hassan (XPGIKBI4796-1/rnac) dated 4th July 1996.
The conclusions of this memorandum however were that JPL had presented a balanced and
realistic picture with regard to the predicted performances of both the LILT Si and LILT GaAs solar ceils
evaluated during the course of this study.
3) System Level Aspec.ts
In reviewing Appendix D it is apparent that an extensive assessment of the system level impacts of
incorporating a suitable photovoltaic array onto the CASSINI spacecra_ has been conducted with the
mass and cost implications being addressed in detail. The specific performances assumed for the solar
array area and consequent mass, its incorporabon onto the spacecraft and integration with the on-board
electrical power system appear to be realistic figures.
The only two technical points where it is considered the assessment has been excessively optimistic
is;
i) In regard to the fact that the introduction of the peak power tracker for main power bus regulation
(in lieu of an RTG shunt regulator), will result in an addrdonal 5% - 10% throughput power loss within this
'seriar type regulator.
This will be reflected as a 5% to 10% incr_a=_ein the power required from the photovoltaic array.
ii) In regard to the implications for spacecraft attitude control where for the LILT GaAs solar ceil
case the predicted increase in the CASSINI launch (wet) mess is from its current level of 5.630 tonnes to
7.026 tonnes (6023 kg of core spacecraft and 1003 kg of deployed, and highly flexible solar arrays).
Although the JPL study addressed the implication of a much reduced maneuver rate capability for a
solar powered CASSINI, it can be foreseen that the resultant configuration where the deployed, flexible,
solar array is a significant proportion-of the overall spacecraft mass, will result in the definition of highly
complex attitude control laws and an extensive supporting verification test programme.
This mass ratio between the core spacecraft and the deployed solar array panels will of course get
worse at end of mission life when the 3130 kg of on-board liquid propellant is depleted, the core
spacecraft mass then reducing to only 2893 kg.
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4) Conclusions
The detailed assessment conducted by JPL into the possibility of powering the CASSINI mission with
photovoltaic array and energy storage batteries has resulted in the identification of a projected mass
increase of 1.396 tonnes for a LILT GaAs solution to 1.977 tonnes for a LILT Si solution. Both of these
deltas result in a total spacecraft mass which is outside of the capability of the current best launcher
option (Titan IV/Centaur) for the CASSINI mission.
As a result of reviewing the system level evaluation conducted by JPL on can only support their
present conclusion, that replacement of the three currently baselined Radio-isotope Thermal Electric
Generators (RTGs) by a photovoltai¢ power source utilizing 'start of the art' technology is impractical for
the currently defined CASSINI/HUYGENS mission to Saturn and its moon T'dan.
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MEMO: XPG/KB/4796-1/mac 4-7-1996
FROM: K. Bogus (XPG)
TO: H. Hassan (PY)
cc.: XP, C. Signorini (XPC)
Subj." LILT Solar Cells and JPL's CASSINI Study
Attached pleasefinda draR of the XPG-assessment of the JPL-memo on "European LILT solar
cellsand Cassini"foryour perusal. IrolIowingthe incorporationof changes which you might
propose, thiscould.be send to JPL as planned.
[t is essential to take note of the following comments and remarks in order to read the assessment
in the proper perspective:
[1] The _L-memo is a revision of on earlier JPL note by the same author, P. Stella who is a
well-known solar cell expert at JPL. This previous note is not accessible in XPG.
[2] The JPL-memo mentions a Cassini solar array (system) analysi performed previously at
JPL which apparently studied the mission-impact of replacing RTG's by a solar array using US-
solar cells. This report is also not available and outside the scope of our comments.
[3] _.e comments made on European LILT cells developed under ESA contract are limited
to the component level. No solar array has been designed yet with these cells and statements on
array subsystem level are therefore of somewhat hypothetical nature. Further comments on
system level aspects could possibly be generated by systems engineers of the ROSETTA team.
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ESTEC, 4-07-1996
ESTEC-Solar Generator Technology Section Comments to the JPL-MEMO on
"European LILT Solar Cells and Cassini"
(P. Stella/Ref. hr. 342-PSRE-95-119 Rev. A/date: 26-06-96)
[1] General Remarks:
Data available at ESTEC on European LILT-solar cells are limited to ROSETTA-type
applications, i.e. up to about 6 A.U. and down to temperatures of-150*C. Therefore, data for the
CASSINI mission have to be based on extrapolations with their associated uncertainties. This
also applies to the panicle radiation damage which for CASSINI is much more severe that for
ROSETTA.
The approach chose for these extrapolations in the JPL-memo appears generally sound
and the general results obtained are considered as balanced and without over-pessimistic bias.
[2] Detailed Comments:
[2.1] The LILT-silicon cell efficiency reported by ESTEC at 5.8 A.U. and -150 degrees C is
24%-26% whereas the JPL-memo quotes 22'/.-24%. These lower values are considered as
realistic in the context of the memo considering the fact that the ESTEC reported data are peak
values of laboratory-made devices and not mass-production devices on the one hand and also the
possibly detrimental effects of temperature and lower sun intensity at 9.2 A.U..
[2.2] Similar comments apply for the efficiency of the GaAs-on-GaAs cells.
[2.3] The assumptions on cell mass and thickness for CASSINI-type solar arrays are
considered as non-pessimistic for the silicon and GaAs-Ge-LILT-cells developed so far. It is
noted that a reduction of cell mass might be feasible by developing LILT-GaAs cells in ultrathin
substrate-free configurations as demonstrated by recent developments for 1 A.U. applications.
Admittedly, the mass reduction on array level would be limited since the solar cell mass is only
one of several array-mass determining factors. Moreover, ultrathin LILT cells have not yet been
developed.
JPL's assumptions on array mass can not be verified at ESTEC sincethey are based on a
specific JPL-subsystem design. However, there is no reason to assume that the JPL data as used
in the previous CASSINI solar array study, are over-pessimistic.
[2.4] The statements made in the JPL-memo on radiation damage of LILT cells in the
CASSINI radiation environmem indicate correctly the general trends but are fairly vague. From
the data available at ESTEC the general trends as stated are confirmed and no data with higher
accuracy can be provided since (a) the available measured data of low-temperature radiation
damage in LILT cells are not giving a complete picture yet and (b) the CASSINI radiation
environment is not known in detail and has not been analyzed at ESTEC.
[3] Conclusion:
The statements made in the JPL-memo referring to European LILT-solar cells result in an overall
balanced and realistic picture of the LILT development results. The numerous uncertainties
appearing in the memo are unavoidable since the LILT-development in Europe is oriented
towards the ROSETTA-application which is very different from the CASSrNI case. It is doubtfial
whether more accurate CASSINI-specific LILT solar cell data would lead to a radically different
assessment regarding array mass and area.
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MEMO
342-PSRE-95-119
Tot
From:
Subject:
Date:
Sandra Dawson ._
European LILT silicon ceils and Cassini
March 27, 1995
geferettce: 1. "Low Temperature Irradiation Damages in Silicon Solar-Cells" by
I.,amu Nashiyama, 1 lth International Symposium on Space Technology and
Science, Tokyo, Japa_ July, 1975
The Cmsini solar array analysis was reviewed aad updated to accotmt for improved silicon ceU
LILT performance using published data on the European research cells. This ww done usin8
data available prior to the December. 1994, World Photovolmic Conference in Hawaii. The
attalysh that we performed first a:tempted to determine a cell efilciency for operation at 9.2AU.
Since the European data at that time only covered all.minces out to 3.5 Aid, that required m
extrapolation. Dam wesemed in December extends their meuurements to 5+ AU, but doesn't
sisnificantty change our assumptions. Their metmred cell efficiencie, have been in the 24-25%
range at the shorter disUmces. We amumed that actual production cell performances would
average apl_mi_ely 22% for use on Csuini, This reduction from the research results is
observed for both existing silicon cells and OaAs/Ge cells. In a converuttion with one of the
comnltom of the European work (K. _), he stated that he felt it would be necessary to
slightly reduce the maximum cell elfin, cies in order to obtain a reasonable cell fabrication
process. At preseat, the existitg process is quite complex and unlikely to provide a yield of cells
sufficient for retlistic _cx_
The existing European LILT silicon cell is approximately 200 microns thick, appreciably greater
than the 62 microns assumed in our existing Cassini analyses. Due to the complexity of their
process and the need for agoarate cell surface etching, it is unlikely that cell thickness reduction
can be implememed. At present, the Europeans have no plans to reduce the cell thickness. It
turns out that the use of a 200 micron silicon cell will have approximately the same array blanket
arm1 mass demity (Kg/meter 2) m the 85 micron thick CoA_Ge cell used in the Cassini analys_,
Consequently, the gplm:m_ undertaken in our "quick look" _ent was to recalculate the
CmAs/Ge array using the higher value of 22% eff'miency rather than the 18.3% value assumed
for CmAs/Ge. This basically .tlm,,t_,__ replacing the C.mAs/Ge cell with the thicker European
LILT siliccm cell maintaining the array blanket areal mass density vab_. The projected savin_
in array area would then be 20%, corresponding to the difference in cell efficiencies. However,
this needs to be modified to include bypass diodes in the silicon circuits for an areal penalty of
5%. These diodes are required to prevent catastrophic circuit damage in the event of cell
fract_es that are expected to occur. This requirement was determined from the NASA/JPL
APSA lightweight array development wosram recently completed by TRW. Comequemly the
• total army area reduction was 4bstimated at 15%. It was rammed that the mass savinSs would also
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be 15'/_ahhough m reali_theareareductionwould leadtoa lessermass reductionsincea |arge
fractionof theligh_seightdeployablearraymass iscontainedinareaindependentcomponents
suchasdeploymentmotorsand latches/conminmemstructures.Thisisconsideredan optimistic
ev_.
Additional reuo_ why actual improvenum'm might be less than this are focussed primarily on
cell radiation behavior. The quick analysis that was performed assumes that the European LILT
cell radiation desrad_on is the same as dax for the GaA.v'Ge cell. However, it is well known
that this is iaoonect - silicon cells desrade more severely than CraAs cells, Consequently it is
likely 1Jmtthe area/mass reduction will be much less than 15%. Furthermore, thick silicon ceils
degrade more scrawly than thin silicon cells. As a result, the EuropeEt cell _ will
most h_ly be more seve_ than mumed for d_e existing Cassini GaA_Ge or silicoe Imalym.
As a _ note, recent infofmltion (ref l .) discovered in our literature search (B. Nesmith and P.
Steila) iadimu_ dutt oells irndiated at low tempemure conditions, such u would be
eacctmtemi at/upim,, suffer more sevae desradazion than cells subjected to du: same
irradiadoa at room temperature conditim=. Inasmuch as the Cauiai analysis has been conducted
to date using room tem_ laboraw_ radiation data it is likely that all solar army eatlyjes
have been _ overly _¢ _ radittion assumptions. This call only be _ by
performiagtowtempenmu theo.s. andeuropmn
ce: C.Lewis
B .Nennith
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MEMO 342-PSR_-95-119 REV. A
To:
From:
Smdn
Eutopan LILT silicon cells and Cassini
Jm_ 26, 1996
Rm4aion Item: "this memo has been revised to include recent data on the
_tope_ LILT sohtz cells and on integral bypass diodes for solar cells. The diodes
that are now undergoing dcvdopment would fit beneath the solar ceils and not
utilize _lditiomfl array area. Althoush it is not clear that these would be coml_tible
with ultr_thinsolarcells,it will be assumed that they will be sJ,tit_ble.This most
dam indi_ that the initial Cassini array study results are still valid, i.e., that
any such arraywillbe prohibitivelymassive.
1. "Low Temperature L,'radi_on Damasks in Silicon Solar .Cells" by l.samu
Nub.i_ 11_ _ Symposium on Space Tech._lo_ and ,_ien_,
Tokyo, laC_sn,J'uly, 19/5,
2. "De_lopmeat of Advanced Si and Ga As Solar Cells for Interplanetary
Missions", by G. Strobi et al, Proceedings of the t ath Space Photovolmic Research
and Technology Conference, October, 1995, NASA Conference Publication 10180
The Cassinisolararrayanalysiswas reviewed and updated to account forimproved siliconcell
LILT performance using publisheddata on the European researchcells.This was done using
dam from the December, 1994, World _Itaic Conference inHawaii. The analysisthatwe
performed attempted w determine a cellefficiencyfor operationat9.:2AU. Data presem_
above extends their measuremeols to 5.8 AU and requires an exlrapolationfor use az 9.2 AU. It
is noted from their chit that their is a small fall offin efficiency when moving from 3 AU to 5.8
AU. This would sugse_ that 9.2 AU efficieucim would be even lower. However, it was decided
to use the 5.8 AU values, as mem_.,_t, as an optimistic estimate. Their measured ceil eff_ciencies
have been m the 22-24+% range a_5.8 AU, depending on the type of cell measured. They now
are working'with three (3) ceil Vype_ silicon, GsAs/_ and CmAx/Ge (for the latter two cells
the second enu_ is the base subsu-_e material. The GaAs/Ge cell has been added since this
memo was originally prepared. This was done m reduce c_ts and also to increase cell strength
since pure Ga_ h extremely fragile. G¢ (germanium) provides an improvement although it is
still much more fragile than silicon. For this reason, the CeaAs _,pe cells must be limited to
minimum thicknessestwice thethicknms of the d_nnest usable silicon cell.Since C.raAsand Ge
have more than twice the density of silicon, the tSinn_t Cr_s c_llis approximately four times
the mass of the thiam_ silicon cell. We L_uraed that actual production cell performances would
average approximately 22% for use on Cmsini. This reduct/onfrom the researchresultsis
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observed for _th _ silicon ceils and _Ge cells _: re.*_ec:s the _e_ vari_oes r_
exist in la_e production lout. At present, the _ prc_-._s_ is "_ore complex than for
coevemtiomd space cell manufacture and a drop of an effic_e,a_ point is uot umm.al _or
reasonable promotion yields. Slate a Cassini array weuld utiJiz: a ve_ I_xrse quantity of :.ells it
w_txid not be pra_¢tl m "haadpie_k" just the "hishest" cei_ T_is is especitily true since a cell
optimized for 9.2 AU, reduced grid line density, for example. -:¢ould not _e suitable for typical
The existht8 Eumpeea LILT silicon ceil is approximately 2_ _',microns thi_ tppre_bly greater
than the 62 microns resumed in our exist_ Casstut analys_. Ck_e to the complexity of their
process rout the need for ao:m'ate cell surface etchin_ it is :x-pec_ that cell thickness redam_ou
to this level wouIdiacur _ handfing and breakage _,-roblem.s. In fact, _ of
coaven_onal oells have discouraged use of cells of this thiv size due to exlreme breakage. (Ix
rams out that the use of a 200 micron silicon cell will have approximately the same array blar.ka
areal mass density (K_etez z) as the 8S microu thick C_m_s/Ge cell used in the initial Cassini
aaalysis).The appma_ uadertaken inour"qu_ck look" r_sseument was zo recalculatethe
GaAs/Ge array performma_ usin 8 the higher value of 22% efficiency obtained by the Eu:opetm
rather _snn the 18.3% value orisinaUy assumed for G_.s/Ge. (This basically simulausi repla_n8
the GaAs/Ge cell with the thicker Europem LILT silicon cell mainmi, ia 8 tbe array blanket areal
mass density value.) The projected savh_ in army area would _hen be 2_/,, corresponding
the differetu:e ia e,e.I/efficiencies. It was assumed that the mass savinBs wou_d be somewhat less,
in the 10-15% range. There are two reasons for this. First. a large fraction of the lig, hrweisht
deployable array mass is coutained in area independent c_mponents su_h as deployment moU_
and law, hes/containmem slruc_e_. Consequently, these masses would not change. Second. as in
the case of silicon, it has proven difficult to mam_'axre ulna ligh_ solar cells wixhoux ecxrmne
--remka@o. For _ C._ the minim,nn pra_i_tl thickness is rn_t likely 100-125 microns. For
GaAs/As it would be event thicker, especially in view of the use of an ultra-low mass flexible
substrate mad ul'a'a-thin coverslalr_ (50 microns). This is co_idered an optimistic evatuazioa.
At a first look k would seem that a cell mass savings could be achieved by using the LILT
silicon cell which exhibits e_iciencies at 5.8 AU comparable or better than the C.raAs based ceUs
However, reasons why this is not _'pected to be the case are f_ primarily on cell radi_on
behavior. However, it is well known thaz silicon cells degrade more severely than CraAS cells.
Dam preseated in refermee two shows a substtntial powe_ less for the silicon celts at radiation
levelsthatare tower clum preumfly am_cipated for the Jupiter fly-bye. From the dam it is
estimated that the silicon cells will lose between 30 and 40% of their unirradia_ed efficiency
_in 8 the severe fly-bye. Consequently it is likely thaz the a silicon array consisting of the LILT
silicon cells would end up heavier than r_heGaAs array in order to compensate for the radiation
induced power loss. As a f'mal note, informa_on (ref I.) discovered in our litera0are search (B.
Nesmith and P. Stella) indicates that oell$ irradiated at low tempml_e coctditiona, such as
would be enraxmtered at Jupiter, may suffer more severe degradation than cells subjected W the
C-II
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same irradi_onatroom temperatureconditions.Inasmuch asr.heCassmi analysishas been
todateusingroom temperaturelaboratoryradiation_ itislikelythatallsolararray
analyseshave beenusingoverlyoptimisticcellradiationassumptions.Thiscanonlybe
quaa_ed by performinglow tem_ irradiationson theU.S.and European cellsofinu_aT.
Coasequ_tly, it is concluded that the use of_pelm LILT cells on a Cassini array may
pray/de some improvement in mass and area factors. However, due to the extreme requiremeam
of _ _i.,_',¢_.theimpactof the_ improvements= minimaland does not_y c.han_
thein=itm_Imioa resa.-d_excessivearmy matt and area.
_: C.Lewij
B.Nmnith
_Wilcox
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APPENDIX D
Summary Tablesof SafetyAnalysis Results
This appendixpresentstablessummarizingresultsfrom the most recentCassinimissionsafety
analysesfor the GPHS-RTGFinal SafetyAnalysisReport (FSAR)(LMM&S 1997a-h)andthe
LWRHU FSAR (EG&G 1997)for usein theFinal SEIS.The primary referencefor the GPHS-
RTG resultswas the FSAR SupplementalAnalysis volume (LMM&S 1997h). The results
presentedby missionsegment(Pre-Launch,EarlyLaunch,LateLaunch,VVEJGA, andOverall)
includeaccidentsourceterms,releaseprobabilities,radiologicalconsequences,missionrisks,and
averageindividual risks. Theseresultsarepresentedin the following tables:
TableD-1 Summaryof Accident SourceTerms
TableD-2 Summaryof MeanRadiologicalConsequences
TableD-3 Summaryof 5-thPercentileRadiologicalConsequences
TableD-4 Summaryof 50-thPercentileRadiologicalConsequences
TableD-5 Summaryof 95othPercentileRadiologicalConsequences
TableD-6 Summaryof 99-thPercentileRadiologicalConsequences
TableD-7 Summaryof Mission Risks
TableD-8 Summaryof AverageIndividual Risks
TableD-9 Summaryof GPHS-RTGUncertainty AnalysisResults
TableD-10summarizesthe information sourcesfor the resultspresentedin TablesD-1 through
D-9, along with notes related to values extracted from the information sourcesand any
calculationsperformedin summarizingthe results. In summarizingthe resultsfrom the safety
analysesin TablesD-1 through D-9, slight differencesoccur when comparedto the source
documentsdueprimarily to roundoff.
For a given mission segment result type reported in Tables D-l.through D-9, results for the
GPHS-RTG and LWRHU are first reported separately and then combined. The combined result
represents a probability weighting of the separate results for the GPHS-RTG and the LWRHU.
As an example of this procedure, consider the results for the mean health effects (without de
minimis) for a VVEJGA inadvertent reentry, presented in Table D-2 as 13 health effects for the
LWRHU at a total probability of release of 8.0x10 z and 140 health effects for the GPHS-RTG
D-2
at atotal probability of 6.3x10-7. The combined result is calculated as follows:
Combined (rounded): 120 = [ 13(8.0x10 7) + 140(6.3x10 -7) ]/8.0xlO z
The results of 140 health effects for the GPHS-RTG and 13 health effects for the LWRHU cannot
be simply added. The difference in the total probabilities of 8.0x10 7 for the LWRHU and 6.3x10-
7 GPHS-RTG reflects the situation that given a VVEJGA inadvertent reentry with a probability
of 8.0x10 7, there is a conditional probability of 1.0 that there would be a radiological consequence
from the LWRHU and a conditional probability of (6.3x107/8.0x10 -7) = 0.79 that there would
be a consequence from the GPHS-RTG. This difference in conditional probabilities is associated
with the larger number of LWRHUs (157 considered in the analysis) compared to the number
of GPHS modules (54) that reenter.
This probability weighting procedure has been followed in Tables D-1 through D-6, always
normalizing to the higher of the two (GPHS-RTG or LWRHU) total release probabilities in each
case. One exception to this approach to combining results occurs when the risk values in Tables
D-7 and D-8 are combined. In this case, the risk is additive. Thus, the GPHS-RTG risk is added
to the LWRHU risk to determine the combined risk, because the probabilities are already
imbedded in the risk values.
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Table D-9 Summary of GPHS-RTG Uncertainty Analysis Results
Mission 5% Confidence 50% Confidence 95% Confidence
Sediment Mean Risk Level Level Level
Pre-Launch 3.4x10 .6 7.6xl 0 .8 6.0x10 6 4.2xl 0 .4
Early Launch 4,7x10 -5
Late Launch 9.2x10 .5
VEEJGA 8.8xl 0 .5
Overall 2.3x10 -4
5.1 xl 0 -6 6.2x10 .5 7.9xl 0 -4
4.1 xl 0 -7 7.3xl 0 5 1.3xl 0 .2
1.2xl 0 -6 7.5x10 .5 4.6xl 0 .3
8.3x10 6 2.2x 10 -4 1.9x10 "2
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APPENDIX E
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a Notice of
Availability (NOA) for the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(DSEIS) for the Cassini mission in the Federal Register on April 11, 1997 (62 F.R. 17810).
The DSEIS was distributed by NASA, along with supporting documentation (HNUS
1997), to over 150 potentially interested Federal, State and local agencies, organizations,
and individuals. The public review and comment period closed on May 27, 1997. A total
of 16 comment letters were received: 3 from Federal agencies, 1 from an organization,
and 12 from individuals.
This appendix provides specific responses to the comments received from the
agencies, the organization, and the individuals listed in Table E-1. Copies of the
comment letters are presented in the following pages. The relevant issues in each
comment letter are marked and numbered for identification along with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) response to each issue. Where a
comment resulted in a change in the text of the SEIS, it is so noted in the response.
The comments received address a number of issues, including, but not
necessarily limited to:
• the use of solar technology for the Cassini mission
• the properties of plutonium (e.g., toxicity)
• the ability of the RTGs to survive reentry
• emergency response plans
• availability of baseline assumptions and analyses
In addition, for those commentors requesting more in-depth background
information on the analyses, NASA has forwarded a copy of the Final SEIS and a copy
of the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (SARs). The SARs provide an in-depth
discussion of the assumptions and methodologies used to develop the consequences
reported in this SEIS.
E-3
Table E-1 Agencies and Individuals Providing Comments
Commentor
Number
Date of
Comment
Organization
Department of the Air Force
Individual Presenting
Comment
A 5/8/97 Olin C. Miller
B 5/20/97 Department of the Interior James H. Lee
C 5/27/97 Environmental Protection Richard E. Sanderson
Agency
1 4/14/97 Private Citizen Dr. MaryAnn Lawrence
2 5/23/97 Private Citizen Russell D. Hoffman
3 5/21/97 Private Citizen Gary L. Bennett
4 5/21/97 Private Citizens Anthony Ehrlich and
Harvey Baker
5 5/24/97 Private Citizen John Robert Lehman
6 5/21/97 Private Citizen Marc M. Cohen
7 5/23/97 Private Citizen Thomas W. Chao
8 5/22/97 Private Citizen Victoria Nichols
9 5/3/97 Private Citizen Dorothy Scott Smith
10 5/19/97 Private Citizen Jeanna D. Vicini
11 5/23/97 Private Citizen Margaret N. Spallone
12 4/11/97 Private Citizen Edward D. Ramsberger
13 4/29/97 Malcolm ChubbFlorida Southwest Peace
Education Coalition
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Commentor A: Department of the Air Force
MEMORANDUM FOR
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
_4n1__ wing (_ql_'l
CODE SD
ATTN: Mr. MARK R. DAHL
NASA HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON DC 20546 -0001
FROM: 45 CES/CEV
1224 Jupiter Street MS 9125
Patrick AFB FL 32925-3343
SUBJECT: Review Comments for the Oreft Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) Baseline for NASA'J _ CASSINI Mission to be
from Cmlavelld Air Station
1. The atached review commen_ (A_=h 1) for Ihe sul_ct Draft S_ EIS are
prov(ded for your _tior_ We have requestsd _dition_ copies of the sul_x:t document
from HQ NASA (Mr. Ken Kumor) for review by the 45th Spece Wing (45 SW) Safety
Office and Radiation Office. _, you may receive additiomll comments •l a later
date. Please ino0_:orata these comments and provide 8 minimum of four copi_l of the
future doctanen_ to 45 CES_CEV a the J_ve eddrmm. Pleue mtum a copy of all
comment sheets showing tbe action takan on each comment received.
2. In addition we are providing • copy the 45 SW updated Environmental Impact
Analysis Process (AIch 2) and our NEPA requirements regarding payloads (Atc_ 3).
The point of contact for the National _ Police Act at the 45 SW is
Ms. Ginger Crawford at 407494-5286.
OLIN C. MILLER
Chief, Environmental Flight
Attachments:
1. Review Comments
2. 45 CES/C Ltr, 28 Jan 97
3. 45 CES/CEV Ltr. 12 Jul 96
CC"
NASA/MD-MED-P94-142 t_a ,,_',-/.-
NASA/OE-EMO ," o -_,_
45 SW/XP wo arch
LBSC 5055 wo •tch
Go14_ L_Ir_'Y. &_mdle.u FwwT. .. Yow Nation "_Air For:*
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Commentor A: Department of the Air Force
0A_g 8 Nay 97
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O*OLsappreved
C-¢hec_
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_J p_oJ(_ t:vtrJ co._,.,,Ts _,cz t.or
I
P.qOJ(CT H,_,v.6"u= _n_. _:J:*L_A _AaaAun /
l it(v([',JtJr. _nS_ _,_=vzora Sr._SAI[L1g _ O-v,,..t..,,/f
¢01¢_'_S ACTTO.*I
¢OOg
Th£s document shoed be revtwed and el_roved by _Sth
Space Vin E (SV) Safe_ and l_diat:Lou an the? have launch
appto_Tal cemtrol,
Xnfermat£ou from the tee,mr Delta fa_lure should be 4,.
cluded La your evaZuat4en.
The cleanup coets de aot _nclude cest lapact8 due to
the aon-avallab_11ty ef the area,
1
A-1
A-2
JAG
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Commentor A: Department of the Air Force
Johnson Controls World Servmces Inc
Launch Base Support Proiect
Cape Canaveral Air Slatlon
Post Qffice Box 1228
Cape Canaveral. FL 32920-1228
dt@HN$ON
CONTROLS
45 CES/CEV
1224 Jupiter Street
Patrick AFB, FL 32925-3343
lAY I 2 1997
_ _--"4 t_le, _
 '.4Y 1#
SUBJECT: CONTRACT F08650-92-C-0062; Review of the Draft Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS) for the Proposed Cassini
Mission From Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS), Florida (CDRL 063A2)
REFERENCE: Written Request From Ms. Ginger Crawford 45 CES/CEV Dated 8April 1997,
Review of the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS)
for the Proposed Cassini Mission from Cape Canaveral Air Station
(CCAS), Florida (CDRL 063A2)
The LBS Environmental office has reviewed the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (DSEIS) for the proposed Cassini Mission to be launched from Cape Canaveral Air
Station (CCAS), as requested by reference. Our reviewers find the DSEIS to be complete and
adequate with regards to addressing the potential for radiological contamination caused by a
catastrophic mission accident that result= in the release of plutonium dioxide (PuO2). This
office would like to offer the following suggestions for consideration by the proponent
I) The last sentence in section 4.12.2 states a probability of less than 1 in 53 million
of incurring cancer due to exposure from an accidental PuO2 release. Some other
cancer probabilities, such as exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke, listed for
comparison, may further interpreting the low probability/insignificance of this
potential impact, and
2) based upon the new information recently made available from updated mission
safety analysis, the proponent might consider revising the Record of Decision
(ROD) included as Appendix A of the DSEIS.
A-4
A-5
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Commentor A: Department of the Air Force
Questions or requests for additional information regarding the review of the subject DSEIS
should be directed to Mr. Don George, 853-6578.
Mark P. Chatelain
Manager, Environmental Compliance
DG/Ib/853-6578/FAX 853-6543
Attachments: a/s
CC: Environmental Superintendent
Director, Technical Asstmmce
LBS 5055 (D. George)
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RESPONSES TO COMMENTS
Commentor A: Department of the Air Force
Comment Number A-1
Additional copies of the Draft Supplemental EIS were provided to the 45th Space
Wing for use by its Safety Office and Radiation Office.
Comment Number A-2
The safety analysis conducted for the Cassini mission encompasses all the
accident environments that were present during the Delta failure. Scenarios related to
launch pad accidents took into consideration the observed dispersal plumes associated
with the Delta solid rocket motor propellant fires.
Comment Number A-3
A Phase 0 and Phase 1 accident could potentially affect CCAS and its ability to
launch Department of Defense (DOD) missions. This eventuality is addressed in the
contingency planning process for the Cassini mission and in CCAS-----specific
radiological protection plans. In the unlikely event of such an accident, the
contamination levels would be assessed and the appropriate cleanup response
measures initiated to restore the affected portions of CCAS to mission-capable status in
a timely fashion.
Comment Number A-4
The June 1995 Cassini EIS provided a table (Table 4-20) which is useful in
comparing Cassini mission risks with various fatality risks in the U.S.
Comment Number A-5
A Record of Decision will be issued at the completion of the NEPA process with
the Final SEIS serving as a primary input document.
E-9
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Commentor A: Department of the Air Force
This page left intentionally blank.
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Commentor B: United States Department of the Interior
United States Department of the InteriorOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND COMPLIANCE
R/chard B. Rus_ll Federal Building
75 Spring Strut, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
May 20, 1997
ER-97/229
Mark R. Dahl
Program Executive, Cassini
Mission and Payload Development Div.
Office of Space Science
Code SD, NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 3330546-0001
Dear Mr. Dahl:
The Department of the Interior has reviewed the Draft Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the NASA's Cassini
Mission, as requested. We have no comments to offer.
Thank you for the opportunity to review this environmental impact
statement.
Sincerely,
Hai Lneeironmental Officer
E-1I
RESPONSES TO COMMENTS
Commentor B: United States Department of the Interior
Thank you for your letter.
E-12
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Commentor C: United States Environmental Protection Agency
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
MAY2 7 1997 OFFICE OFENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
Mr. Mark Dahl
Office of Space Science (Code SD)
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Dear Mr. Dahl:
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has reviewed the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) draft
supplemental environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Casslni
Mission. This review was conducted in accordance with our
responsibilities under section 309 of the Clean Air Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). We have classified
this draft EIS as EC-2 (environmental concerns, insufficient
information).
EPA is concerned that the radiological dose estimates were
presented in the document without sufficient information
regarding the key underlying assumptions used to make those
estimates. The documentation should have provided population
distribution information used to develop the radiological
collective dose and health effect information. Additional
information regarding the methods used to verify, validate or
benchmark the computer models used to perform these calculations
should be provided to the decision-maker and the public as well.
Additionally, EPA does not believe that the information
presented in the EIS sufficiently addresses the needs of
emergency response planning and activities. The consequences
from a full range of scenarios, including the worst case source
terms for both launch and reentry scenarios, should be calculated
and included in the final supplemental EIS. The use of
statistically derived worst case scenarios downplays the level of
risk which could occur in the worst case.
C-I
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Commentor C: United States Environmental Protection Agency
To illustrate our concern for this issue, a set of
calculations for releases of radioactivity from accidents during
the early launch phase of the Cassini Mission have been performed
by EPA's Center for Risk Modeling and Emergency Response. While
EPA recognizes that such an event has a very low likelihood of
occurring, EPA thinks it is important to consider such
occurrences for emergency response planning purposes. In
general, these equations estimate that higher doses may exist
miles downwind if the full inventory of radioactivity were
released near the ground. In contrast, the worst case scenario
in the supplemental EIS results in lower offsite doses than EPA's
calculations because it is weighted by the probability of such an
occurrence. The equations and assumptions used to make these
calculations are enclosed.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this
supplemental EIS. If you have any questions regarding these
comments or the ratings, please contact Patricia Haman of my
staff at 202-564-7152.
r
Sincerely,
Richard E. Sanderson
Director
Office of Federal Activities
Enclosure
C-5
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Commentor C: United States Environmental Protection Agency
Radiological Dose In Turbulent Shear Environment, T. MargulJes, EPA
x = e,
on(x-x,)
a(y - yj)2] (zz,)tt - 13)/2
4(X X,) bCZ + (x -13) (x - x,)
EXlJ[_ a(z z .a-p., + Z2, ".'P)b(2 + a - _)2(x - x,)
1
-¥ 2a (zz a)(z • a. p)tzb(2 + a - p)a(x -x.)
i
L)
; )
X
x = f B(t) dt
o
= a z." K, = t, zP K_ = B(x)zY
[] = 1 -a Vm
(1 - p)
(2 + ct - p)
Concentration ealcuintlom in a turbulent wind shear environment have bee.n solved for the case of comtaut
.____ndltions _litti tire _'ertl6_i'_i_dproflle, Ibe hoi'izontal dillbsivJty, and vertical dlfusivtty can be represented
by power law functions of tile vertical axis z. This relationship provides the concentration versus Iocatkm
(x,y,z) available to hypothetheticul indJvidu._ls outdoorLThis information has been combined with s source of
t_din.ctivlty, adult weighted brcathin 8 rate ( 2.66 104 mS/s), and dose factor information (1.04 104 Sv/lkl) to
estimate the Inhalation pathway contribution to dime. Formulas for the concentration X are shown above to
• obtain the concentration field from • source at ( x,, y, Z,). I-v is • modified Bessei function of the Ilrst kind of
order -v. TbJs was caklinted Jn • program for acckiental releases of plutoulum-238 with a decay rate of 67.75
years to estimate doses versus dlshlace. The release term assumed was 4360 curies at 10 meters, during neutral
weather conditions. The $0-_mr dose commitmentl are shown below.
Distance (eL) Dose ( Rem )
l
1: i , , 240211
1556
10 474
IS 236
20 144
2s 9s
[
a ffi 61; Im11.3; nffi.14$; pffi.855; z=l; B=1.65 z^(0.66T), z, ffil0; z--l; Q--4360
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Comment Number C-1
The recently available Cassini Mission Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) (LMM&S
a-j; EG&G 1997) have been forwarded to the commentor. The SARs provide detailed
descriptions of the suite of atmospheric transport and diffusion models, the modeling
assumptions, and the methodology implemented for the nuclear safety analysis. This
information can be found in the Nuclear Risk Analysis Document Appendices, Volume
III, Book 2 (LMM&S e):
Appendix F: SATRAP Model Description
Appendix G: GEOTRAP Model Description
Appendix H: HIAD Model Description
Appendix I: PARDOS Model Description
Appendix J: PUFF Plume Rise Model
The population data for the KSC/CCAS region, defined by a 200 kmx200 km
grid centered between LC-40 and LC-41 at CCAS, includes information for on-site and
off-site spectator, on-site worker, and off-site residential population groups as well as
surface type data (dry land, water, swamp, and ocean) at a 1 kmxl km resolution.
Other launch area data bases used in the risk analysis include pasture land, crop land,
citrus farms, ground cover, and land usage information. Beyond the launch area grid,
population distribution information is provided in a worldwide data base, which
provides surface type and population density distributions by surface type in 720 equal
area cells. See the RTG SAR, Volume III, Book 2, Appendices D and E (LMM&S e) for
additional information.
Comment Number C-2
The KSC/CCAS regional and worldwide population and land use data bases
used for these analyses are also presented in the document cited in C-1 above:
Appendix D: Site-Specific Demographic/Land Usage Data Description
Appendix E: Worldwide Demographic, Surface Type, and Meteorological Data
Comment Number C-3
Available verification of the modeling is contained in the SAR Volume III, Book 2,
Appendices F, G, H and J, (LMM&S e).
Comment Number C-4
It should be noted, at the outset, that the EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor
Air is a participant in emergency planning for the Cassini mission. Radiological
contingency plans are being developed by NASA/KSC and USAF/CCAS in accordance
with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) to address specifically
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the initial response that would be required in the unlikely event of an accident affecting
the launch site. Similar plans already exist at the State and county (Brevard) levels in
Florida, and are in the process of being updated for the Cassini mission. The
NASA/USAF and State of Florida plans are also being closely coordinated with the
USDOE, which maintains its own set of emergency response instructions for
radiological accidents of many kinds, to ensure a coordinated initial response to any
accident.
In addition NASA/KSC and the DOE are coordinating closely with the State of
Florida on development of recommended protective actions that could be implemented
in the unlikely event of a releaseof radioactive material, both for the launch site and for
public areas. Becausethere is a large range of variables influencing the outcome of
potential accident situations, the range of protective actions can be similarly large.
Protective actions for the general public would be announced by the State of Florida in
consideration of the specific circumstances accompanying any accident.
Further, in coordination with other Federal agencies,all contingency plans will
be in place prior to launch of the mission. In those plans the concept of operations for
longer-term actions such as recovery of the radioactive material and facilities are also
considered. Long-term actions will depend on all the circumstances surrounding an
accident, and cannot be fully developed until all such circumstances have been taken
into account. The details of the emergency response plans are independent of the
NEPA documentation for the mission.
The objective of a probabilistic risk assessmentis to determine the likelihood of
potential radiological consequencesfor the full range of possible pre-launch, launch,
and inadvertent EGA reentry releaseaccidents,and to communicate the associatedrisks
to the decision makers and the public. The information presented in the draft SEISand
the accompanying HNUS technical support document (HNUS-97-0010) provides
radiological consequenceresults for the mean and 5-th, 50-th, 95-th, and 99-th percentile
levels. Thesecalculated source terms and radiological consequencesare conditional on
the occurrence of a plutonium dioxide release accident, and the information
summarized by mission segment were developed from individual accident case
simulation results given in Appendix A of HNUS-97-0010. These source term and
radiological consequence results represent credible accident outcomes determined by
the detailed modeling, and any credible worst casescenario is implicit in these results.
Comment Number C-5
The difference between the SEIS and EPA early launch accident calculations is
unrelated to a probability weighting of the results, but rather arises from the fact that
the EPA calculations do not properly account for the particle size characteristics or
vertical distribution of the plutonium dioxide release. The hypothetical accident
scenario used in the EPA calculations involved the 99-th percentile GPHS-RTG source
term (4360 Ci) for the early launch mission segment as presented in HNUS-97-0010, and
the assumption that the total plutonium dioxide release was entirely in the form of
submicron, respirable plutonium dioxide in a puff at 10 meters. These are not credible
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early launch accident plutonium dioxide release conditions. The relevant information
on the early launch accident particle size distributions and the vertical plume
configurations are now presented in the SAR Addendum (LMM&S g).
As noted in the response to Comment C-4, the 99-th percentile radiological
consequences presented in Table 6-5 of HNUS-97-0010 apply given the occurrence of
the accident release. The calculated collective dose value at the 99-th percentile level
was 7500 person-rem for early launch accidents, while the corresponding maximum
individual dose for this mission segment showed that the dose received by any
individual in the exposed population was no more than 2.2 rem. The probability of
exceeding this radiological consequence outcome was and is 0.01 given an early launch
plutonium dioxide release accident, and the total probability was 6.3x10 °6 to observe
this radiological consequence outcome during the early launch mission segment. The
SAR Addendum provides updated and additional information, in the form of
complementary cumulative distribution functions, to estimate the possible radiological
consequence outcomes of early launch accidents at lower probabilities of occurrence,
but there are no credible accident outcomes that resemble the conditions of the
hypothetical scenario used in the EPA calculations. Additional information is provided
in Table D-6 of Appendix D.
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Mr. Mark R. Dahl
Program Executive, Cassini
Commentor 1: MaryAnn Lawrence
5951 S.W. 85th Way
Ft. Lauderdale, FI. 33314
April 14, 1997
Mission and Payload Development Division
Office of Space Science
NatiOnal Aeronautics and Space Administration
Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20546-0001
re I Casslni Mission - EIS dated 2/92, FEIS dated 6/95,
Nuclear Safety Analysis dated _/97 and D_EIS dated
Dear Mr. Dahl,
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment.
The people have spoken with overwhelming comments
in FEIS, reiterating that that the public doesn't want
NASA to put deadly plutonium in space. The creator
gave man a natural llfe system, which holds the earth
together. When the air is destroyed, man will b_
destroyed and there will be no future except death for
mankind. No government or industry owns the air and has
the right to send deadly plutonium into the air, with a
potential capability to fall to earth and kill millions
of people. It is likely that much smaller amounts
of plutonium releases have already occurred at different
times _n the past, resulting in increased rates of lung
cancer worldwide.
An important question to ask is, Why is NASA
taking such a big risk when there is evidence that
Cassini could be performed safely with solar power?
It has been common practice in the past for the
government to collaborate with big industry on
environmental issues, using a'good old boy' policy,
often allowing industry to set up government wrocedures
and rules for mutual Derks and benefits. One cannot
help but wonder 'who is benefiting' by NASA insistence
on going ahead with a program which could have such
damaging results. Never before, in the history of
mankind, has such a large amount of plutonium (73 lbs),
been sent up in space.
And all this is costing the taxpayers over three(3)
billion dollars.
I-I
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pg. 2 of 2 pgs.
Could it Just be that this so-called peaceful
mission of NASA, in combined cooperation with the
EuroDean and Italian SDace Agencies, to explore
Saturn and its environment, is, in realltw, a frantic
race by the Industrlal/milltary comnlex to develop
technology for control of nuclear militarization of
space?
I close with a short prayer I made,
Oh great creator of the Universe
Maker of the natural systems of life
Giver of the sweet air we breathe and fresh water we
drink
Let not the little men of greed, power and money
destroy our mother earth
Turning it from heaven into a living hell
Don't the little men know that, Just as in the past,
sooner or later, a nuclear accident will occur, and
their manipulated statistical charts will become
meaningless
Don't the little men know that they will perish right
along with millions of others - whose rights they have
trampled upon
ML,ml
n.c ely, tl I .
I-2
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Comment No. 1-1
It is not correct, as the commentor asserts, that the Cassini mission involves a
"big" risk. The recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997)
indicate that the risks are low.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory conducted for NASA an in-depth analysis of the
available electrical power systems, including many different solar, battery, and long life
fuel cell power sources and hybrid systems to identify the most appropriate power
source for the Cassini mission (see JPL 1994, Supporting Studies Volume 2). This study
concluded that RTGs are the only technically feasible and available power source for the
mission. Subsequent to this study, JPL conducted a further assessment of the new
high-efficiency cells under development by the European Space Agency, which
reaffirmed JPL's previous finding that solar power is not a viable option for the Cassini
mission to Saturn. For more details please refer to Section 2.1.4 of this Final
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS).
Comment No. 1-2
Cassini is an international scientific mission for peaceful purposes to benefit all
humankind. It is not "nuclear militarization of space" as the commentor contends.
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From" Russell D. Hoffman
P.O. Box 188006
Carlsbad CA 92009-0801
To: Mark R. Dahl
Program Executive
Cassini Mission and Payload Development Division
Office of Space Science, Code SD
NASA Headquarmrs
Washington DC 20546-0001
C.c: Earle K. Huckins m
Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science
NASA Headquarters
Washington DC 205464)001
Cc: The White House, various other interested parties
Date: May 23rd, 1997
Re: Final submission of 36-point commentary on NASA DSEIS for the Cassini hfassion.
Dear Sir:
Enclosed please find one copy of my comments to NASA regarding the DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CASSINI
MISSION. As stated in a letter from Mr. Huckins dated May 14th, 1997, I understand that
NASA will be publicly addressing the items in this commentary in the upcoming 1997 "Final"
EIS on the Cassini mission.
This document replaces the version of my answer marked "draft" and sent to you approximately
one month ago and sent to NASA Achninis_tor Daniel Goldin and President Clinton and others
somewhat more recently. I am sending this final version via ovemi .ght so .t_r.._._ce to ensure
it's receipt at your office prior to the May 27th (4:30 pm EDT) submission deadline.
The most significant change is an additional paragraph (#3) in item #8. "[here is also some
additional commentary in the beginning, and a few minor corrections throughout the rest of the
document.
I look forward to reading how NASA intends to answer this commentary. However, I must
make clear my feeling that the correct action on NASA's part would be to throw out the entire
EIS procedures and redo the document based on better science.
In any event, thank you.again for sending me the DSEIS and for your assistance in the matter of
getting this submission into the system. If I can be of any servic e please do not hesitate to
contact me.
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_..I:",: ). _r) .V_,)L: ; 4r.,"
Mwdeumse_
Nr. Run.L1D. HOffl_n
P.O. Box 188006
Carlsbad, CA 9_00g-0a01
l_ar Nr. Hof_nan:
Thank you tor your lo_or and prtnted vors£on ot your rob
sito dated April 26, 19970 %o HAS& Adnin£ntrator Daniel S.
Coldin conoorning the ¢amJinl nlmmton to llat_rn. Yo,_
na_arlsLs veto _orv_rded to ue taw 8 rssponoe,
we appreciate your concern in toktJml, l:ho.ttneto mdand.
conment on all our tatomtLonalma_laL. PA_mver, Z_Ltd
like to _llphastze t.hat _ _nfOZlmtiort_ij_d and
retoronced in our l_vironmentsl lnpact Starts° fa_
sheets, and_mbJAte am tJtebest 8vs$1able° FJtct_tX
lnfomtioa :olattn_ I to risks _nmo_alundv11_ It.be ¢_81n1
Ltss£On. Your ]i poLnt_ _ntlng on the ¢auLnl
Supplemental EnvironmentAl Inl_C_ $ta_nmt w$11 be
addrsosed in t_o Casa_nt rLnal supplament_2 _lrmmental ....
Z_p_og'_l_atel_n_ aJ1d lOgO _va_@blO tO _h@ I_lbll_. -
kdd2ttbnally, before iaunching il_!_spacecrst_ vtthRS_8,
t_oz_uqh anS detaliodsa£aty.teat_and mlyse8 of
c_nsequencesotpot_lal, accideats aroc_du_ted.
nucloa_ 8atoW analy_l_ for a _88Lonundergo _lelPenden_
evaluatkohs by natlmmlly or int_rnatlo_lly recogn_zed
_rta. Knm_10d_e4JDlt zq)p=oa/_rjtJi_lv_tl..£rOlKOl:horVedez_1.
8qen_io8 vho have Iq_aLoL O_l_r_Lse in nu_loarn_torialo
also ovalusto l_l_e_oanalyseo. These evtlaa_ion_ ere
presented to and eon_Ldered by _he IL_SA Ad:aLnLetrstor prlo_
to • do_sion to lam_._.
_. f_ . .._/
/_8rlo g. I_cktns Ill
'Deputy Ksso_Lste Adminlstra_o¢
for Spsce science
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Laugh, Cry, Be .4nifty, Do,_omethin_...
Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for the Cassini Mission
Analysis of NASA Procedures (Final Version)
by Russell D. Hoffman Copyright (c) 1997
First published online Saturday, April 12th, 1997
On Monday, April 6th, 1997, NASA sent me, via Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, a copy of the
DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CASSINI
MISSION (DSEIS) and an accompanying document called NU_ SAFETY ANALYSES FOR
CASSINI MISSION ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS.
These two NASA docmnen_ are not good science. They are not even science. They are nothing more
than a biased review of selected data, and very little real data is actually presented.
I found my name on the beck pages of the DSEIS, along with about 80 other individuals, 30
environmental, peace, and other groups, and about 30 Federal, state, and local government organizations.
A quick look where my name appears might lead youto think (as it did some of my friends) that I
endor=e this DSEIS, or that I have at least been eonsuRed. I have not been consulted and I do not
endorse these documents!
A US EPA Notice of Availability (NOA) regarding the DSEIS was published in the Federal Register on
April 11, 1997.
On May 17th, 1997 1 received a ifUfr from Mr. Earle K. Huckins HI. NASA Deputy Associate
Administrator for Space Science, stating that this 36-point conunentary "will be addressed in the Cassini
Final Supplemental Environn=ntal Impect Statement end made available to the public". Fat lot of good
that's going to do.*NASA should be THROWING OUT the EIS end redoing R with good science based
on the work of people such as Dr. Sternala_ Dr. Gofu_m, Dr. Morgan, Dr. Gould, Dr. Caldicott, and
many many others. Merely answering my questions can only go so far...
After receiving the documents, I called a former director of the Health Physies Division of Oak Ridge
National Laboratories, Dr. Karl Z. Morgan. Dr. Morgan is referred to as "the father of Health
Physics"and standsinstaunch opposition toNASA's nuclearspacepolicies.
I started to ask him about some oftbe claims NASA makes in the document, but he stopped me and said
it all doesn't really matter, because "it's a serious mistake to cant out such 'research'" and that all such
calculations "are a bit absurd'.
What plutonium particles can do:
I of 15 5/23/97 I0:01 A?._
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Dr. Morgan explained to me that the way plutonium works is basically like this: when a particle of
plutonium lodges in the body, the localized radiation dose to the nearby riving cells from one of the "fine
particles" can he 1000's of REM per year if the plutonium stays fated in one place. If it moves around in
the body, the dose will be spread out among the ceils it is in close proximity to.
At that hJgh level of radiation, nearby ceils will die, but ones a little fin'ther away will survive .- and he
irradiated, and poss_ly mutate into a cancerous form.
Dr Morgan also explained that tim incineration of an RTG would produce "a spectrum of sizes" and he
added "any one of them - they could all be inhaled. I hope our government will be more cautious in using
plutonium."
This is one oftbe many learned scientists whom NASA is ignoring. This is someone with the facts that
NASA would rather pretend not to know.
Next, I read the DSEIS documents.
Thesedocunmms suppkmmt theoriginal q_INAL" ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR
THE CASSINI MISSION. Inthatoriginaldocumm_ someoftlmitemsinthesetwo docmnmm am morn
thoroughlydiscusseA,butgram-allyitisstilla shallowreviewoftl_overallmissionrisks.
These docunaents arc missi_ a lot of important informstion. I came up with a list of items that I _
should he considered, included, or _ Some are major, and I suppose mum am minor. But all of_
should be comidered, every single one, and none shzuid be lett umomidemd. I th_ meay ofthe reasom
can stand alone as a reason not to use mmleur pow_ in spe_ and not to flytlm Cassini mission. Talmn
together,I believe NASA's positionisutterlyindefensible.
Cassinicanbe stoppedanytimebeforetheFINAL MOMENT when PresidentClintonsignsoffand takes
full,moralmspo,_'bITSyforthisdangerousand ill.conc_v_nfmionandsomeonepushes the
button. I would not push the button...
It is interestingtonote that in every instancewhereIfoundthescience_ tobecompromised,the
effect allowed NASA tof_e tilefiguresintheirfavor.EverysingleiustnzJ_.That'sa patlem.
On with the list:
2-a
1"
The solar option, which has been disavowed by NASA, would allow us to do the most interesting and
important experiments _ NASA is now incapable of doing with the current launch configuration.
TI_ rings of Saturn are tbe most interm_ reason to go to Saturn, and onlya long-term visit, so we can
observe how they change over time, will really reveal anything u._fixl. Yet NASA's Cassini mission will
end in 2004 just four years alter it arrives in Saturn's vicinity! On the othc_hand,useof a solar option
would have rmam that the spaeecratL once it got to Saturn,would be operablethere for decades and
decades. Then a proper study of the rings would be po_a'ole. Failu_ to use the solar option has meant
that the science is not as good or as useful as it could he.
2-1
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2:
The solar option which NASA discounts as unmaneuverable requires either four long arms, 140 feet by
11.5 feet each or two long arms, 105 feet by 30 feet. Why isn't NASA considering a circular array
mounted on an articulated gimbal instead? The same area as NASA's solar array (6,430 square feet) can
beobtainedina 45-footradiuscircle,which would be much easiertomaneuver than NASA's solar
example. And lighter to build. NASA's solar option uses an archaic solar array seemingly desi_led for
[adure!
3:
The report gives health guesses for a 50-year period. Because the half.life of Pu 238 is 87.7 years, a
500-year period or even a 1000-year period would be much more appropriate. Additionally I do not
believe NASA has accounted for a doubling, or even a 10-fold or 20-fold _ in population during
that time. These two factors alone can mean NASA's numbers are offbya factor of 100 or more.
4"
Plutonium in the food chain is covered by just one sentence in these d_ and by only a few
paragraphs in the original "final" Environmen_ Impact Statement. They don1 projeet past 50 years, yet
over the next few centuries this will becomo (a_r the smffhas largely settled back to earth) the most
common way that plutonium from an accidem will be immdoced to living beings - especially meat-eating
humanq - again and again, as part of the food chain. Considering the projection only goes out 50 years, it
is clearly a topic that needs more proper analysis.
5"
There are few descriptions ofhow NASA came about themany numbers theypresent.Are human factors
such asreliabilityincludedwben consideringthec_ ofa feflme?And the degreeof a_ura_ ineach
number NASA supplies adds a _ sense of confideace. Many of them are "sccurate" to three decimal
places. That is highly, highly, doubtful. Normally, sclem.i""'_s romld these sorts of things to no more than 2
digits and a multiplier, not three digits.
An appen_ co_ a complete example of how they did their math would at least offer some small
proofofNASA's confidence in their guesswork. A table showing the factors considered, and their
weights, might go a long way towards earning the public's confidence in NASA's numbers.
6"
Of all the reasons NASA offers for launching Cassini in the first place, probably 99°,4 oftbem would still
have been accomplished iftbe ultimate goal was something l_e MAG LEV TRAIN SYSTEMS or
INTERCONNECTING SCHOOLS THROUGH FIBER-OPTIC TECHNOLOGY. But no. Every thing
that NASA has ever accornplisbed or might accomplish is lobbed into "science at it's best" and the need
2-2
2-3
2-4
2-5
2-6
3of15 5/23/97 10:01 AX
E-27
Commentor 2: Russell D. Hoffman
for RTGs and a 'safe' nuclear space policy.
But in reality riot only would 99% of the technology still appear, but most of what wouldn't appear, isn't
wanted or needed anyway! Civilians will never need to use RTGs on earth, for example (and no one else
should). So if the mission's science benefits are largely independent of the use of the RTGs, then the
actual reasons for using the RTGs must be that much better if you are trying to use those reasons to
justify taking a risk, as NASA is required to do. And the reasons NASA has given -- the reasons that
could not be transferred tO _ any other project - simply aren_ that good.
7"
I wonder how come the ma,_mun worst case scenario NASA descn'bes in the DSEIS is only about 120
latent cancer deaths? 72 pounds ofplutonium is just much more deadly than that! What has happened is
that before calculating what the effect oftbe poison will be, they have fast fllmlcmt_4 aS much as 99% or
more oftbe poison from the calculation. They did this several ways. First, they average the releases from
different accidem scenarios. On the flyby, thek worst-case averaged to a little more than 1/15th of the
total fuel pack. This averaging is an inappropriate calculation! Then, they ignore any area that will be
damaged below an EPA threshold of.2 micro Curies per square meter. This is also totally inappropriate
(more on that later). Then, they further eliminate pos_ie "health effects" by using De _ (more on
that later too).
8"
NASA clalrm that most oftbe RTC_ will not be incinerated even in the worst of scenarios. But they are
dealing with an object _ burning through the air, that is a/ready at about 1,100 degrees Celsius (and
me_ at about 2,300 degrees Celsius) AND which is in a cylindrical container with COOLING FINS
which will catch the wind and burn offquicidy, leaving numerous holes and cavities to rip open the RTG.
Furthermore the RTGs are some oftbe most dense objects man puts into space (put up by some of the
most dense..,oh, never mind).
You can expect them to continue to travel at HIGH SPEED (--hotter) for a long, long time - all the way
to Earth impact, fftbey don_ incinenae COMPLETELY first. Tbey'll come in "hot", flzTql come in
heavy, and they can come in anywhere on Earth during the flyby. An RTG returning to Earth after a
collision with a random piece of space debris or for any other reason is a disaster whether it is entirely
incinerated in the upper atmosphere or not, bat it is much more of a disaster flit is incinerated.
Even NASA's own e_mates are that a very significant portion ofthe Pu 238 fuel will be released in the
upper atmosphere: From 32% to 34% for all the reentry cases studied (see NASA's FEIS. June 1995,
page 4-51). Of this, from 2(P/_ to 66% will be in the form ofrespirable particles. This is from 5 to 15
pounds of Pu 238 released at high altitude, and does not include any low-altitude and ground-level
releases. Thafs for a "normal"reentryscenario. Any number of events can result in an "abnormal"r_-ntry
where more - or even all - of the fuel is incinerated.
9-
2-6
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NASA groupsflybyaccidental re-entries intothreebroadcategories, shallow, steep, and skip (leave the [ 2-9
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atmosphere again). But in reality each angle presems a uniquely different scenario. The shallowest angles
(that don't skip) are the most dangerous from the point of view of atmospheric incineration, while the
steepest angles are most dangerous for impacts and subsequent fuel release near Earth's surface.
At the very least, each degree should be calculated separately and the result from each calculation should
be graphed. It's thousands of numbers, and the resulting graphic should be presented, NOT just analyzed
with only NASA's theoretical interpretation of the data presented, and no daml
10:
NASA's "skip" scenario (mentioned above, in item 9) enters Earth's atmosphere but subsequently leaves
earth'sgravitational pull completely.In reality, many "skip"scenarios will have the spacecr_ slowed
enoughto fall back to Earth in weeks,months, years- evencenturieslater. Some "skip" se.._n_ios
actually have the probe skimming through Earth's atmosphere dozens of times-sort of like skipping a
stone on the water, but it happens at the innermost portion ofa huse elliptical orbital path. NASA's
"skip"scenarios appear to never fall back to Earth under ow/circumstanc_ a fallacy.
If Cassini stays in orbit arouad the Earth after a flyby mhhap of any sort, it will contmwusly be subject to
the possibility of a collision with soma oftbe existing SPACE DEBRIS and any new space debris we add
while Cassini is in orbit. _re, "skip" scenarioswberethe probe_ fags to Earth a_ actually
the most dangerous.Iftlz probe staysup for cemuries,which it sbsolmtelycan do (NASA admitsthis)
tbe chances are aaually good (bener than 50/50) that it will collide with existin8 _ _ _
inc_ speed and kinetic force. This would break apart the RTGsprior to upper mmospbete
incineration -- makin8 the final incineration much more thorough and much more damaging. Th/s is a
situation where 100% of the RTG fuel can be burned.
11:
It seems that NASA has made the assumption that all "sldp" trajectories would l_v_ a clean
(non-nncle_) vapor trail as they slice through the aanospha_. If NASA thinks this, they are wrong
because some damage will occ_ to the slm,:ecr_ including poss_y igniting the liquid fuel component;
this damage could in turn hurt the RTGs. (BinI must stress that few of NASA's actual methods are
clearly deson'bed in the DSEIS.)
12:
De Minimk is ridiculous. Since plutonium in any quantity bombards local cells with enormous amounts
of radiation, and since recent cionm8 experiments have shown that aay cell wizh DNA (all but red blood
cells, essentially) is capable ofpmdudn8 an entire animal f_m embryo to adua, it should not be
considered a great leap to conclude that all cells are alsocapable of becorrdngcancerous when mutated
by radiation.
Here's the sequence: Cancer is a consequence of cell DNA mutation Plutonium's radioactivity mutates
cell DNA. Inhaling plutonium is absolutely the most dangerous way to introduce it to lifeforms, 100's or
even 1,000's of times more dangerous than insestin8 it. Cassini's Pu 238 is about 280 times more
radioactive - yes, that means much more deadly -- than the so-called "weapons grade plutonium"which
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NASA assures us isn't being used. Incinerating plutonium at high temperature and at high altitude is :
absolutely the "best" way to distribute it around the planet for subsequent inhalation. And finally,
incinerating something that starts at over 1,004) degrees Cebiu and hangs out like three sore thumbs
fi'om the space probe is just too easy.
What is a good phrase for it? You might call it a chain reaction! And when your chain runs out, you get
to be a "health effect". IfCassini fails, a lot of people's chains will run out.
And if Cassini fails, the stepsto cancerare not an unlikelysequenceof events- it is what will actually
happen for thousand& possiblymilfionsof peopleif Cassia fails.Possiblymany millions. Vaporized
plutonium is just incredibly, unbelievably deadly. Caseini carries enough plutonium that if just 1% of it
were vaporized and then inhaled in a clinical lab situation, itwould be enough to kill the entire world over
without question. All 5.8 billion of us without even using any of the plutonium twice. In any actual
accident scenario, much of the plutonium would be re-ingested many times. Make no mistake about it -
_s isdeadly
If Cassini fails, NASA has just three assurances for us sSamst thb threat: First: That onlya 5ttle will
vaporize. This is &guzd throughout this docum_. Second: That the world's ecosystem is so vast, that
only a tittle of that which is vg_ori_! will sub_lucntly be breathed in by billions ofl_opk_. But they
won1 even present the numb_ they th_ is valid (see item 13, below). Third: That oftho_ who do
breath in some plutonium, only a very few will get cancer. But NASA will not use mayoftl_ doze_ of
studies of the effects of minute exposure to calculate how tmny might actually get cancer that way.
Instead they extrapolate from a high exposure level (and relatively few cases) but the effect is not linear.
Chopping in halftl_ dosage and dot_ting the exposed popola "non,then cakulatin8 that the same mma_
ofpeopk will die, is not what actually happens. The more you divide it out, the more people win die.
And that's just what NASA's doing. Dividing it out. Here's some for you, and here's some for you. You
probably didn_ even know NASA was carryingplutonium on board any spacecraft before you heard
about this web site, and now you think the "science" NASA will be getting will benefit you somehow?. Is
"worth the risk"? Face it, my fellow couch potatoes: You_IInever benefitfrom NASA's poss/ble
knowledge gain, never, andhardlyaw/onoelse will either: And to gain all this "knowledge"NASA nat,st
use 5es and deeeptiom, because so many Anm-kam do Imow the truth, and my, they are raising a stink!
But the efli_t is, the knowledge gain from the nuclear option for society is co_ by the
knowledge lost to secrecy, lies, and confusions. NASA bed science outweighs NASA good science. And
the whole nuclear option - we loose freedomsto not just nuclear terrorism, but to C.m_ worries
about nuclear terrorism. We loose honesty haCmvennnmt because of the cover-ups and the lies. These
we loose even if Cassini snccceds!
It's not that science isn_ worth dying for, sometimes. Lots of things are worth dying for - life, h'berty,the
pursuit of happiness. But this? Is it humanly possible that we cannot draw the line? That we cannot say
"Ah ha! At last we have it! A science experimem so dangerous, of so little value, and so expensive, that
we will not do it!" Ladies ard Cn:ntlemen, this is that science experiment. This draws tbe line. This is nuts.
NASA assurances are hollow. The truth is, a Cassini accident can rank as one of the biggest
manmade ecological disasters in history. Not only that, but pure chance, not fancy engineering, stands
between a succesa_ mission and a disaster. Random pieces of space debris in near earth orbit (putthere
bymankind, mostly) can _ C.as_ and cause a catastrophic fat_'e. Man's own potential failuresjust
add totherisk,from loose nuts in the controlroom tomispmgrammed softwareprograms.We've all seen
those, and anyone who writes soltwarc (including myself) knows that all software can crash and no
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program is perfect. NASA is not perfect. NASA is human (I think).
Is this how we want to challenge God, or the gods, or fate, or nature, orjust -- the odds? THIS ISN'T
SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. This is roulette. The public should not fund this stuff.
Let's say something unknown to mankind's sphere of knowledge killed ofl_ over a period of a couple of
decades, one out of every 5,800 people on the planet by an ailment that manifests itsetf as cancer. You
cannot tell where the cancer came from. You cannot tell, but you die from it just the same. One in 5,g00
is very hard to study. No one would notice that an unknown thing was happening. But 1,000,000 people
would die around the world from this thing. You would die, but you wouldnt know why. And even if you
do suspect why, you cant do anything about it, and besides, youql be dead and cant do anything
anymore. This thingis Cassini, andit can go on killingend killingforcenturies.
Cassini can do this, and you still may not be able to prove, statistically, that it happened). So if statistics
are so hard to use, and NASA has usod them so badly on the health side -- do you really want to trust
them on the engineering side, especially considering aU the engineering inthe worki wont stop a piece of
space debris from destroying the mission anyway, during the flyby (or any time, really)? How many
do you think Fate can be tested before it gets sick of us?
_ is lots of otber ¢vkian_ that there is NO minimum lethal dose of plutonium. Yet NASA uses
something they call De Minimis. NASA's usesthisDe Minimisthingas away of edjusti_ the data by
eliminating "negli_k" amounts of plutonium from the count. And who defines "negligl_le'? Why,
NASA does, of course! .001 ren_ NASA doesnt care if5 billion people get .001 rein, to them, it doesn't
count. THAT's what De Minimis and NASA's other averaging technklues does. But that's not what ready
happens.
De Minimis as used by NASA is NOT a standard _ ginankk It is a _n_tical gimmkk tbey made
up for themselves! De Nfmitnis says (according to the way NASA uses it) that below a _id of.001
reinper yeartherewillbe "no _le healtheffectsto an individual'.Facts prove otherw_ so De
_timis isridiculous.Beskies,by firstlimitingtheareatoth_ contaminatedabove 0.2micro Curies_
square meter, NASA is taking it'sridiculcus De Minimis at least twice!
13:
One oftbe most important numbers is missing from the report. That _is the MAXIMUM
INDIVIDUAL DOS, REM for an accident involving the RTG's _ the Earth flyby. This number
would show the amount of plutonium that would be expected to be absorbed by each individual on the
planet in the event of an upper-am_sphere incineration of the RTGs.
Whenever this value should appear, instead there is a notation indicating the item is "Not available in the
current analysis." What that means is that the study was done without one oftbe most crucial pieces of
data! And that piece is missing from about 10 different tables (about 1/3 of the total number of tables in
the two documents). A notation in the DSEIS indicated the value will be available in the final report -
but by then it's too late to argue about it! We need it NOW_. (So we can argue about it, of course!)
14"
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Where are the graphs? NASA claims they are using sophisticated computer modeling to produce their
report.The subcontractorcompany thatdidthe NuclearSafetyAnalysisused forthereport,Halh'burton
NUS, claims (on their web page) to be "an information age veteran.., in the business of finding, storing,
and communicating vital information.., since 19733
All modem statistical packages generate beautiful three-dJmen_nal graphics, and have for decades.
Instead NASA gives us 19th-century tables of exponential numbers[ Perhaps NASA is afraid to give us a
graphicshowing the plume and it's potentialconsequences!
By giving us good graphk, RI depictions NASA could present us with some oftha RAW DATA that
supposedly have analyzed. Then, perhaps THE PUBLIC could make their own infommd decisions. But
no. NASA gives us one or two numbers which actually represent complex funetiou, and where the very
act of averaging does not do any justice to the extremes. It's a way of "punching down" the data. It is
commonly used by people who want to sell you a pig in a poke. It is being used now to sell us a pig in a
poke.
15:
Why areNASA estmmt_ ofisnd areathatmight he Cont_m/mt__ so small'? It is preposterous that only g
or 15 square kilomctars will bc contamimt_ in a "worstca.qe_n_R'io" but thntiswhat NASA'$
avemo_ teclmiques_md tha otlm"_ Im,eleRus.Tlmy am goiogabouti_allwrong.A morn
reasonable approach would be to figure out how BIG an area CAN be contamimted (for example, to a
50% lethal dose) with 72.3 pounds of Pu 238 Imrtialm in millions of pieces and millions ofsims, from all
altitudes and directiom, end then figure out whet the chances really am of that actmlly Imppe_. These
are separate cakul_iom, which should not be _ together in a report. Nowhere is the stark reality
expmmed of wirer 72.3 poumis of_ plutonium can do, least of all, in m infonmtive
computer-generated graphia.
16:
IfCassiniisas safeasNASA predicts,then why won_ NASA and theUnited StatesGovernment iusm_ it
properly?Insteadthey use tlm_ and inappropriatePrice-Andersonact,wlach limitsour
international liability to just $100,000,000.00 in direct violation ofm intefnatioml Outer S_once Trea_
we co-wrote and signed. Domesticadly, l_ice-Aaderson limits liability to about $7.3 billion, also
hopelessly inadequate. If Camini is snf_, why do they limit the insurance payout at all?
17:
Even accepting (more or less) NASA!$ nmnb_ is NOT a sustainable policy for safe space research (or
for plutonium disposal). Some people right now want to put 820 satellites in orbit, for example, for just
one communications project. Ifnukca arc OKAY, then ell of those might be nuclmr powered. Nukes
arenl okay for one mission, and daey aren't OKAY for all ofthem. What we really need are fiber-optic
cable systems throughout the world, not expensive, failure-prone, corporate-controlled and dangerous
satellites.
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18:
SPACE DEBRIS impactscancompletelydestroy the RTGs prior to (and causing)an Earth re-entry.
Where is thisspecific scenario_?
19:
You canX just say "each person will get this" or "that"amount - Some will get larger particles, or more
of them, and some will get le_ Ifs a distribution. With BILLIONS of exposures, many people will
receive 10 times the "average" dose - a few unlucky k_divkim_ - tho_ maybe even millions of
individuaLs- may even receive a hundred times the "average" dose. That's what happens when you
irradiate the workl through upper.atmosphere incineration of plutonium. So tlm numbers need to be
"crunched" to reflect the varying _ of the particles and the distribution of them. Any incinerating
nuclear payload from outer space - not just Cassini but any nuclear payload -- is a fierce fireball of filthy
death.
I believe what NASA has done in averaging the doses is wrong. They have taken tim amount of
plutonium they think might be released, and theoretically spread it even/y among the exposed population
But first, they eliminate all who live witere they wfll be cxposed to adose lower th_ the EPA sUmdard
measuremem wdue per meter (u._g t_ v_b= = _ is imppropr_, but they _ _). _ _ _
eliminate all those who would get less than .001 rein per year (equally imppropriate). Then they eliminate
potentially I/2 the world population - or more - for no good reason, by simply using a baseline of the
expected population at the thne of the flyby. But the dmmge will continne to occur for centuries _, or
may not even start to impact Earth for decries or centuries, and the population will continue to grow i. a
world crowded today with 5.8 billion people.
Each step eliminates health effects from view
20:
The inappropriatencm of using the EPA limit mentioned aboveis clear when you consider study after
study has shown that there is no minimum lethal dose ofplmonhun. At least three different ways to study
it lead overwhelmingly to the samecoucluslon. Firzt:. You can study it by giving extremely mull doses to
exuen_ly large populations ofl_omtory _, large enough to be able to pass standard scientific tests
of_ sigfificao_. This is very hard to do, because you need tens oftho_ or evenbundreds
of thousancts (or even millions) ofauim_ to do the study, but to as much an extent as possible, it has
been done. Second: You can study it by looking m pubScly available data from health officials and
radiation monhoring off_iah and compare the two sets of values. Dr. Stemsla_ Dr. Gofimn, Dr. Gould
and many others have published numerous papers and books doing just this. Third: You can study the
poss/ble mechanisms within the body which would allow plutonium to "do its th/ng" at extremely low
levels. And studies of mec_ni.e_ after mechanism consistently point to the conclusion that there is no
minimum lethal dose of plutonium. Any size patrick: can kill you. Maybe it will, maybe it won_, but it can
and studies show that it does. Studies NASA won_ use in their analysh.
21:
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NASA's useoftheEPA guidelineisacmaJ]yevenmore inappropriatethandescribedabove(initem20).
If the EPA guideline says that a cleanup need not be attempted below a certain threshold (for whatever
reason) that doesn't mean that it's just fine thank you to pollute beneath that level. But that is the logic
NASA has taken. They have taken a good thing -- an EPA standard (which may be way too high, but at
least it's something) -- and turned it into a excuse to pollute! 72 pounds ofp[utonium is 72 pounds of
plutonium no matter how you dress it up or spread it out.
22:
Out of 400,000+ Ci (Curies) total amount of radioactivity in the RTC_ NASA's worst case accident
scenarios will "only" rek.m¢ about 26,000 Ci. Thus, NASA will not present any study on the effect of
greater than about 1/15th of tim total plutonium fuel being incinerated. This is preposterous. Space
debris, as nmmioned above, below, and all around the globe, can easily and randomly destroy an RTG.
Even ifw¢ accept the tmunqXion that it is relatively tmlilmly tim all three RTCm would be hit by simce
debris (Mthough space debris actmdly otten dots corm in chmcts), still, at tbt very l_st, since tlmre m
three RTCr,, NASA should show lmalth effects for a¢/east 133,000 Ci rekm,ed in an Upl_r-mmospbere
incimrm/mn. And at least a pm_dtl bum oftha otl_ 2 RTGs. Irma/oftht other fuel onhom_ C.amini is
r.b_ could then inchsus_ one or more RTC-s. "rheliquxl £ue[ bein8 _ onbosrd Cass_ weisbs
more than entire previous probes l_ Cndiko and Voyag_ (combk_)! So that is perhaps 260,000 Ci -
I0 times more than NASA's "average". NASA needs to show the health effects, the geopolitical
comequem_ and th¢ financial burdem of these _s!
We can leave it to Hollywood to show the effect of it coming down on New York City, say, on
December 31st, 1999. (It can orbit for s whik before crashing, so it reallycan corm down anywber,,
anytime.)
If Cassini is as safe as NASA claims, why c,m_ they show a computer model ofit landing on a city and
tell us how many would dk! A shaIIow metmy, bum_ 1/2 the RTGs, tim wind to its back so the fallout
collects_ land.son Manhaoan... and it]antison Time's Squm_ New York, Decemb_ 31st, 1999... (If
I'm around, I'Llprobably be there, and I'll probably be passing out leaflets.) What would happen? (From
my _sIlets_
If Cassini crashed the world's biggest lmrty: Not one building would get destroyed. But within a _w
wccks: $0 million people doomed. That'swhat wouldhappen.(From the initial ewmt. Decade aRcr
decade, people would continue to die..) Oh, and: Maybe a couple oftmildings would be destroyod, too.
The RTGs willigniteanythingthey_ on, m tl_h- "resting"temlmratu_isaboutI, 100 degrees
Celsius, and they would have just flown in from outer space using air friction against blunt surfaces as
their only braking force. Okay but what are the chances of that sctually happen/ng? Zero if we don't
launch!
Why is NASA afraid to show the effect C.at.st_ can haw on my ttmm_ _tropolis on the planet? Just so
we all know what we're talking about: NASA certainly admits it can happtn. Why woRt they tell us what
the e_ect would be? "rhak little space probe can do all that, and it doean_ take a ion8 chain of events,
either. One pea-sized piece of spt_ debris Idotm can nmke this an ine"vnabiliv/.One single Random
Event. Cassini has a "onehit"capabilityon a concentrated population center that is so devastating, it
should be prevemed by beingprola_ited.
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When did we decide we should permit underpaid and overeducated scientists (or vice-versa, or anyone
else) to risk random destruction on so vast a scale? They know they can't stop it fi'om happening... It's
just chance. They just claim they can reduce the chance. We dofft really mind letting scientists blow up
their own science labs -- fine. Have tim. Knock yourself out. But the proper way to reduce the risk to the
planet on something like this is to eliminate the possibility of it happening. The money can go towards
even higher-tech activities elsewhere.
23-
I just want to make sure that when NASA says that the RTC_ will not break apart if they hit water, only
land, that they include ICE as "land". The plutonium RTCr_ and their subassemblies will smash into fine
particles and chunks if they impact on ice. Some would vaporize. Larger chunks and particles would melt
through the ice to solid ground, making it almost impo_ble to retrieve the pieces quickly in places that
are snow- and ice-covered at the time of the accident.
24:
Plutonknn in the food chain is bad for people that eat food, but it _uid not go unnoticed (as it does in
all NASA documents) that it is also bad for the food-had for plm_ bad for animals... Mankind will nat
be the only main_ to get caner and otlm" _ _uld _ _1. In f_t, for every humm injury
there will probably be tern of tha_ of _m/r_l injuries. Do we w_at to inflict this l_n, this _
on our fellow creatures, whom wc have been chm'ged with protecting, by nature of our being h_ at the
top of the food chain, and (suppo_lly) being _ as well? Do we want to inflict this insult on our
fellow creatures, _ relying on them for our _ for work, for comlmnionship? What me the
radiological comcquenz_ for cats, dogs, cows, hor_ _ or our close friend the pig? What are the
effects on mice, rabbits, and other _ _ fodder? Thea what are the effects on future science
experiments? None of this is discussed in my NASA docume_ and it is deviating.
25:
RTC_ are NOT _'odynmni¢ by any larctch of the inumir_on, and they are heavy and have a series of
pipes, valves, and other hardware. _ WILL _ and NASA predictions of just how much
should be taken with a healthy dose ofselt (with iodine, I Inesumc).
26:
Speaking of iodine, in the evem of an accidem at laugh, exactly what preparations, such as storing
millions of iodine pills, has NASA taken to mitigate the effects? Since proper steps can reduce the
danger, one would think that NASA and DOE have cakul_cd the health effects numbers on the
assumption that there will be adequate asaistance from NASA after an ar,xkient.
But will NASA provide this assistance, worldwide, in a timely manner, 500 years from now when the
probe might still be capabk of falling back to earth? Or will NASA provide this assistance in some
war-tom part of Africa in October, 1997, if something go_ wrong during early lift-off?
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27:
SinceNASA is doing a SUPPLEMENTAL an_ysis, [ think it makessensethat NASA shouldstudy the
effects of the nuclear-payload-equipped Russian Mars '96 orobe which recently incinerated, probably over
Chili and Bolivia. This will take, as NASA knows, about 500 years to study properly. But the most
crucial time to begin any study is now. And, NASA could test its cleanup procedures, starting with seeing
if NASA cameven FIND a nuclear payload that's been at least pm'tia_ incinerated in the upper
atmnsphere, let alone seeing if NASA can actually clean up the mess. If nothing else, NASA has already
shown that they are inc_oable ofrespomling quickly to a changing situation.
One would thk_ they would want to try to find tim plutonium powetpack to seehow well it a_
survived re-e_ry. Since Russia sells m the plutonium and works with us on nuraerom nuclear space
projects now, the _ are probably _aificant.
Yet NASA is hardly studying it at all! Nothing in the DSEIS indicates they even noticed it. As nsmfl,
NASA is making no effort to find out the truth.
28:
There is no discussion of role disposal oftho radioactive byproducts (there are many) from isolating Pu
238. The stuff'not destined for Satmn is still capable ofpoitoning Earth attd has half-live, of around
25,000 years, and is highly _. It will be NASA's responsibility for the next 500,000 yeats or
so. The risk entaikd ;,,that i.m_ desmflmd in thit report, and the cost im_ in any accoumi_ reports I've
seen, either... 10,000 yean from now, even 100,000 years from now, NASA will be detmmling money
from your descenda_ for the upkeep on its nuclear waste _ used to store the byprodtwts be_
created today for "your" _ mission. Tim cost it not reflect_ in any NASA doctlme_
29:
Global implicatiom (1): What if every ¢outmry started to use tim naeaem option? Sooner or _er a _-y
accident would occtw whkh might start a war, fffor exsn_le ea Iranian nuclear _teilite plummeted onto
Israel (or vice-versa). Nukes have m place in space! IfCassn fails, it could toppk govemmmts. If
Cassini fails, Mr. Clinton, it will certainly ruin your party!
30:
Gkalml implications (2): Political catastrophes accompanying a failure of Ctmini - these are not di_umed
in any NASA document I have seen m_twtmte! What it tim appropriate doctmmm for these very
importantconsiderations?
31-
Global implications(3): Although NASA describesseveralclean-up scenarios(costingup to
$ i,000,000,000.00) it doesnadescribewho will pay for this. And the costs given do not include
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loss-of-property and loss-of-fife costs, just clean up costs. And where does NASA think it can put all that
poisoned dirt, anyway? Earth is a closed-loop system.
32:
Global implications (4): "No effect" is the way NASA descn'hes the "no launch" alternative and it is the
way they have always described it. But is that correct? NOT AT ALL[ $3.4 billion dollars to clean up
underfund_ "Supcrfund" toxic waste sites, to interconnect the classrooms of_ to lay fiber-optic
cable... That's not "no effect", that's progress. And that's just the "counter-balance" to a successful
Cassim nfxssion! If anything goes wrong, even with no release of plutoninm, we're still out the money! If
we had invested in kid's education, on the other hand, we would reap the benefits for decades -
including,perhaps,even moreingortantdiscoveriesthananythingCassini will bringif it succeeds
completely!
33"
The DSEIS says that President Climon has his own sepa:ate Cmsim impact anaby_. But it also says that
the President's docum_ is derived from substamlally the _ databases as the DSEIS and its results
should be simil_. Ate geopolitical implicatiom discussed lathe Presidem_ statemem? Can the public see
it? Who wrote it for tl_ _7 Tbe same company tl_ wrote tbe Nuck_r Sat-ty _ _r _
Mission Environmental Impact Stateme_ Process? W'dl they give President Clinton another, unbiased
34:
What NASA has presented is not DATA to support their claims - it is ju_ the claims. They have
the information into a small set of numbers which is totally imppmpriate for the complexity of the
problem. They have clipped at every angle, from who should be counted to how much plutonium they
mightreceive. They haveheldbeckvital informatio_ They haveused imppmpriatestudiesof high-rein
damageto extrapolate low-leveldamage,end they haveignoredperfectlywell-_ easy-to-olxain
reports in respected and refereed journals, reports which have shown that low-level radiation is 100's to
l,O00's of thzz_ more dangerous than the large "shock tremmmts" of 10 to 50 rein which they choose to
study.
This draft, as written, assures us of nothing.
35:
The global model that NASA uses to do their modeling divides the world into 720 "grid boxes" of equal
size. This is not nearly enough for an accurate model since the incinerated plutonium in miUiom and
millions of tiny particles will be carried by the wind, which _ a much-too-complex behavior pattern
to determine in just 720 grid boxes. If someone were to try to prove global warming, for instance, with so
few grid boxes, they would probably be laughed out oftbe science haiLs!
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36:
NASA's contractor on the DSEIS is Halliburton NUS Corporation, a part of NUS Information Services,
Inc. They did the basic study under contract to our government. This company describes itself(at it's web
site, at the time of this writing (4/9/97)) as doing the following for a living: "Information Services' staff
members use a total of more than 50 internal and external data bases and 70 million pages of text to find
solutions for more than 660 electric generating units worldwide."
Another thing they do is run a Licensing Information Service, descn'oed by them at their web site as
"Serving the nuclear industry since 1973 with a variety of regulatory information."
But perhaps the most interesting thing they do is sen a Computer-Aided Rqlulatory Library. It is
descrt_ed by them at their web site (at the time this was written) as: "[A] CD-ROM _ full of
NuclearRegulatory Commissiondocummts thatcanbeseardxdandmonipulatedinnanmuus ways by
the powerful [soRware]." Manipulated. [ couldn't have said k _ myself.
Clearly they are part and parcel a laX_-nuclear organization masquerading as an information service. The
fox is guarding the henlmuse, except here, the henlmuse is motlm" earth. If Halh2mrton NUS have 70
million pages of text available to them, why oh why don't they know about the hazards of exuemely low
levels of radiation to woman's breasts, to infants, and to fetuses? Why doesn't NASA know of Dr.
$temglass's work, if this wonderful information company is so thorough at providing information?The_
is not one word in the DSEIS on Ix'east cancer, not one word on damage to fetuses, and not one word on
any st_c_ccammatall! All the studies were done as ifthe effects wea¢ universal - the same for all
people. "rbey mm'u Specifically,woman, fetusesaud iz_amswill m_ the greatest_ ifCasdui _s.
Nowhere - absolutely nowhere - is this discussed in any NASA document that I can find. _ not
in this important one. This documcm only covers death, and it doem_ even do that very welL Instead it
covers-up death. It's all a shell game - but they_ using live shells!
In reality NASA's "research" just proves one thing: that NASA
does not dare to present -- or even consider - the true possibilities
of the situation.
By Russell D. Hoffman
NASA's draft document will remain open for review until 4:30 pro, (Eastern Daylight Time) May 27th,
1997. So this important next step - demanding more answers - is coming to a close soon.
DON'T JUST READ THIS, DO SOMETHING!
You can order a copy of the DraR and accompany_ Nuclear Safety Analyses, and the o"nginal "Final"
EIS and other NASA documents directly from NASA. Or - since it's getting late (Casshfi launches in
October, 1997) - you can cut right to the chase and start correcting our clected officials fight away.
For example, print this document, and circle the points you think are most important, and tell NASA you
will personally want to see them prol_'ly _ in NASA's upcoming SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT. Send the document, with your notes, directly to NASA
before May 27th, 1997. Send a copy to your local press. Send a copy to the White House, too! And tell
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President Clinton that his "private" Cassini report needs to answers these charges as well. Or save trees
and time (and we're almost out of time - and trees): Email him the same message.
The two documents discussed in this article are the DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CASSINI MISSION (APRIL 1997) and NUCLEAR SAFETY
ANALYSIS FOR CASSINI MISSION ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS
(HNUS-97-0010). To contact NASA:
Mark R. Dahl, Program Executive,
Cassini Mission & Payload Development Division
Office of Space Science, Code SD
NASA Headquarters
Washington IX2 20546-0001
Comments to NASA must be submitted in writing and received at that office no later than 4:30 pm
Eastera Daylight Time, May 2"/, 1997. This is my answer.
CANCEL CASSINI
Things you can do today:
• Please read our other m,ticles.
• Print some of thorn out and share them with your frkn_
• Repr/nt any document at this web site.
* Ema/l your friends the URLs of the artkle(s) you like.
* Add • Unk to this page, or to our STOP CASSI/_I home page.
• Ifyou add a link to this document, and you think your visitors can staad a little levity (_ _
these days?), you mishx want to tell them it's an LQ. test for Space Cadet= whkh is self-scoring,
educationak fun and free, and whkh they can take intbe comfort and privacy of their own home!
fit's otfieial title, however, is Laugh, Cry, Be Angry, Do Something...)
• Contact your ¢onsressperson. We must tell NASA we will not al_w even one more launch based
on the unsafe nuclear option!
Related poses at this web site:
Stoo Cassini Home Page
No Nulls In Space/. Not now, not ever.
Space Debris Home Pa_ae
A series of articles on this shameful problem
This oracle has been presented on the World Wide Web by:
Thf Animatf_l _;gftware Comoaiv
htt p://www.animatedsoftware.com
I'_ll I rhQffman(_animatedsoffware.com
ITI w.tm _ 9th, 1997.
Lastmadm_lMay23rd, 1997.
W_:m'_: Ru_qll D. l-loll'man
Cop,/nehr (¢1 Ra:swlJ D. Ho_,m_
5/23/97 10:0l A3.
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Commentor 2: Russell D. Hoffman
The commentor is referring to the "hot particle" issue raised in the 1970s. This
issue addressed the practice of averaging the dose over the total lung mass. This issue
was based on the premise that high dose rates to cells adjacent to radioactive particles
deposited in the lungs led to much greater cancer risks than were represented by
averaging the dose over the total lung tissue. Experimental animal studies have
consistently refuted this premise (ICRP 1994).
The health physics community has generally used the radiation dose model
presented in ICRP-30 which used the dose-averaging approach (ICRP 1979). The
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) establishes
recommendations and guidelines for assessing radiation doses. The U.S. Department of
Energy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) use these recommendations and guidelines to assess potential
radiation doses. The concerns of Dr. Morgan and others have been taken into
consideration by the health physics community in developing the ICRP
recommendations regarding radiation dose estimates.
REFERENCES
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1979. Limits for Intakes
of Radionuclides by Workers. ICRP Publication 30.
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1990. 1990 Recommen-
dations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP
Publication 60. 1990.
International Commission on Radiological Protection.
Model for Radiological Protection. (ICRP-66).
Comment No. 2-1
1994. Human Respiratory Tract
The Cassini mission as planned and described in Section 1.2 and 2.1 of this Final
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS), and in Sections 1.2 and 2.2 of
the June 1995 Cassini Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), includes a four year tour
of the Saturnian system beginning in 2004, encompassing important investigations of
Saturn, its rings, icy satellites, and magnetosphere. During this four year tour there will
also be intensive investigations of Saturn's moon Titan by both the Cassini Orbiter and
the Huygens Probe.
The primary purpose of the Cassini mission is to study in detail over a four-year
period, the Saturnian system -- the planet, rings, magnetosphere, and the moons,
particularly the large satellite Titan, which shares many characteristics with prebiotic
Earth. The result of the Cassini exploration of the Saturn system will be new scientific
knowledge. This in turn will lead to new understanding about how the solar system
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formed, how each of the planets evolved, and what conditions are necessary for life to
begin. Cassini's findings would also enhance our scientific knowledge for
characterizing the forces and conditions that create and drive processes such as
volcanism and tectonics, and weather and climate changes.
The limiting factor for spacecraft operational life is the amount of attitude control
propellant, not the GPHS - RTG sources of on-board electrical power. GPHS - RTGs
have been demonstrated to be very reliable, long-lived power sources for scientific
space exploration missions as evidenced by their performance on the Pioneer, Voyager,
Galileo, and Ulysses missions.
Please also see response to comments 1-1 and 2-6.
Comment No. 2-2
As noted in Section 2.1.4 of both the Draft and Final SEIS, use of solar power is
not viable for the Cassini mission. The commentor is also referred to the JPL
Supporting Study - Volume 2 (JPL 1994) referenced in Chapter 8 of both the Draft and
Final SEIS. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory analyzed circular solar arrays for NASA
early in the development of the spacecraft design. The use of a circular solar array for
the conceptual "solar" Cassini spacecraft presented no net advantage over the linear
design depicted in the DSEIS. Circular arrays do not "pack" solar cells as efficiently
(i.e., fewer cells per unit area, because the cells themselves are rectangular) so the area
required for equivalent cell density is greater for a circular array. A circular array
would have to be moveable in at least two axes (as opposed to a linear array which can
be moveable in one axis) to fit within a launch vehicle payload fairing and would
require additional support structure, contributing to a mass greater than that required
for the linear array. In addition, when the circular array was pointed at the sun for
power, it would often be pointing near Earth, meaning that either the array or antenna
would need to be placed on a long deployable boom to avoid obstruction of the antenna
or instruments. This would also constitute an additional mass element.
Comment No. 2-3
Extending the consequence analyses beyond 50 years would not yield a
substantial increase in collective dose. The estimates do not go beyond 50 years because
the availability of the radioactive material potentially released would become limited
over time.
The presence of plutonium dioxide within the environment and its availability
for exposure following an accidental release would be limited due to the insoluble
character of plutonium dioxide and the largely non-inhalable particle sizes of most
releases. For releases within the troposphere following launch area or out-of-orbit
accidents, most of the dose to exposed populations would occur as a result of direct
inhalation during the initial plume passage and the inhalation of resuspended material
during the first year following release.
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The environmental removal mechanism of weathering would effectively remove
most of the deposited material from further interaction with the population after the
first year. When potential long-term agricultural and garden ingestion pathways are
considered, most of the ingestion doses result from direct deposition on above-ground
leaf surfaces following the initial plume passage. The insoluble nature of the plutonium
dioxide renders the bioaccumlation through root uptake an ineffective contamination
mechanism. Subsequent weathering of material from the upper soil layers through
runoff or downward percolation, removes such material from the surface.
Any high altitude release of vaporized material following an inadvertent EGA
reentry would be gradually removed from the atmosphere over a period of years,
primarily by rainout from the lower troposphere, with ground-level air concentration
peaking around 5 years following high altitude vapor release. Again, weathering
following deposition would effectively remove such material from the environment
during subsequent years. Any plutonium dioxide deposited in water bodies or making
its way to water bodies by runoff and weathering would be largely tied up in sediment
and removed from the water column.
The effectiveness of such environmental removal mechanisms of plutonium
dioxide within the atmosphere has been demonstrated by fallout studies of atmospheric
nuclear weapons tests. When such factors are taken into account, extending the
exposure period beyond 50 years, and even taking population growth into account
would not significantly increase (i.e., less than 5 percent increase) collective dose.
Comment No. 24
The effectiveness of environmental weathering mechanisms in reducing the bio-
availability of PuO2 within the environment has been addressed in the response to
comment 2-3.
It is generally recognized that the concentrations of radionuclides released into
the environment (air, water, and soil media) increase in the lower trophic levels of the
food chain, while the sensitivity to radiation effects decrease. The greater tolerance to
radiation effects is due in part to the shorter average lifetimes of animals which
preclude cancer development when compared to humans.
Potential impacts to flora and fauna were discussed in the Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Galileo Mission (Tier 2), distributed by NASA in May 1989. A
portion of that appendix is pertinent to this comment, and is summarized here.
The availability of plutonium dioxide to biota in aquatic and terrestrial
environments depends on the route of plutonium dioxide exposure to the biota and the
physical and chemical interaction of the plutonium dioxide with water and soil of the
affected area. These interactions determine whether plutonium dioxide is available for
root uptake by plants or for ingestion and inhalation by aquatic and terrestrial fauna.
The route of plutonium dioxide exposure differs between the two basic categories of
biota, flora and fauna. Flora, in both aquatic and terrestrial environments, can be
exposed to plutonium dioxide contamination via surface contamination, root uptake,
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and leaf absorption. Fauna canbe exposed via skin contact, ingestion, and inhalation of
plutonium dioxide particles.
Surfacecontamination and skin contact do not pose a significant danger to biota.
The alpha radiation emitted by plutonium hasvery little penetration power. Therefore,
little penetration can occur through the skin of fauna. In addition, several studies on
root uptake and leaf absorption of plutonium dioxide indicate that very little, if any,
plutonium dioxide is absorbed by plants.
The significance of ingesting plutonium dioxide canvary between terrestrial and
aquatic fauna. Most plants have limited uptake and retention of plutonium dioxide, and
the digestive tracts of the animals studied tend to discriminate against transuranic
elements. However, ingestion may be significant for small fauna in terms of total
exposure. These fauna, especially those that burrow, ingest soil along with food
material. If the soil is contaminated, ingestion of plutonium dioxide could result.
Although the transfer factor from the intestinal tract to the blood and other organs is
small, total activity passing through the tract could be large.
The impact of ingesting plutonium dioxide by aquatic fauna can be significant
depending upon plutonium dioxide availability. For example, studies have found that
accumulation of plutonium dioxide does occur in benthic organisms that ingest
sediments contaminated with plutonium dioxide. Inhalation is considered to be the
most critical exposure route for terrestrial fauna.
Inhalation impact depends on several factors, including the frequency of
resuspension of plutonium dioxide, the concentration and sizeof resuspended particles,
and the amount actually inhaled. Smaller particles have a greater chance than larger
particles for being resuspended and inhaled. Although many of the particles may be
subsequently exhaled, the smallest particles have the greatest likelihood of being
retained deep in the lung. However, resuspended material available for inhalation is on
the order of lx10 -6of the ground deposition. Thus high levels of ground concentration
would be required to constitute a risk to animals through this route.
Generally speaking, radiation can causethree main types of physical effects on
organisms: 1) somatic injury, that is, damage to the normal morphology and
functioning of the exposed organism; 2) carcinogenic injury, that is, an increase in the
incidence of cancers; and 3) genetic injury, affecting reproductive cells and causing
deleterious genetic changes in organism offspring. Any of these three physical effects
could cause increased mortality to exposed organisms. Although maximally exposed
individual organisms could die asa result of theseeffects,overall ecosystemstructure is
not expected to change, and therefore no significant ecological consequences are
anticipated.
Responseto comment 2-3 addresses the reasons why the consequenceanalyses
were not extended beyond 50years.
Comment No.2-5
Yes, human factors were included. While human error is not easily quantified
and generally not included in many reliability predictions unless specific data is
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available, the Cassini RTG Databook has accounted for it as part of the uncertainty
estimates and incorporation of flight history. Uncertainty bounds were applied to the
failure rate of each failure mode to account for process and human factors errors. This
creates a range of failure rates that accounts for uncertainty in the estimated mean
failure rate value. This uncertainty range is carried through the calculations to each
accident scenario probability. Flight history is also used in the calculations which will
contain the results of human error. The failure rates of the launch vehicle are combined
with the historical launch success/failure data to produce a refined estimate of failure
that accounts for actual flight experience.
The degree of precision reported is necessary to maintain the integrity of the
calculations. For details of the analyses, refer to the recently available Safety Analysis
Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997) which have been forwarded to the commentor.
Comment No. 2-6
It should be noted that Section 102(d) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 1958, as amended [42 USC 2451 (d)], provides in part the following:
"(d)The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as
to contribute materially to one or more of the following objectives:
(1) The expansion of human knowledge of the Earth and of phenomena in the
atmosphere and space; ***
(5) The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical
and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of
peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere; ***"
The technology advances created by the U.S. investment in space exploration are
considerable. It is a fact that spin-offs from technology development in connection with
space exploration find their way into medicine, communications, transportation, and
many other facets of our lives.
Comment No. 2-7
While there are about 73 pounds of plutonium dioxide in the Cassini spacecraft
RHUs and RTGs, the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G
1997) show that there are no credible accident scenarios which would lead to the release
and dispersal of the full plutonium dioxide inventory. The GPHS modules are rugged
devices and the plutonium dioxide, does not readily disperse into fine particles because
it is a ceramic material. It should be kept in mind that the chances of an inadvertent
reentry occurring on the flyby portion of the mission are vanishingly small, about 1 in
1.25 million.
The amount of plutonium that might be released in the event of an accident has
not been underestimated as the commentor implies. As noted in the question, the
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NASA Draft SEIS presented mean values for the potential releases that could occur in
the case of a flyby reentry, but this is not the only value reported in the Draft and Final
SEIS information. Larger releases are also reported, but they also have lower
probabilities. In conducting the safety analysis of the potential reentry, scenarios were
analyzed thousands of times using a-distribution of inputs and a sophisticated
computer program designed to capture all possible outcomes.
Contamination below 0.2 _t Ci/m 2 (taMi per square meter) is not ignored. The
health effects calculations do take into consideration contamination below this level.
The 0.2 !1 Ci/m 2 level is simply provided as an indication of the land contamination
areas for which the requirement for further action should be evaluated.
The commentor suggests that NASA eliminated possible health effects by using
the concept of "de minimis'. The commentor is in error and should see Section 4.1 of
both the Draft and Final SEIS where it is clearly noted that de minimis was not
considered in estimating accident consequences reported in either the Draft or Final
SEIS.
Comment No. 2-8
The estimates presented in the Draft SEIS were based on the best analysis
currently available on the potential consequences of a swingby reentry accident. The
current best estimate is (LMM&S b, Vol. II, Book 1, Section 5.4.5) that on the average
only a fraction (approximately ½ kilogram) of the RTGs total plutonium dioxide
inventory would be in the form of an in-air vapor release. While the analysis considers
a wide range of scenarios that encompass both smaller and larger in-air vapor releases,
the analysis indicates no credible case that results in an in-air release of the RTGs full
inventory of plutonium dioxide.
Comment No. 2-9
The analysis did not involve simply selecting three categories, i.e., "shallow,
steep, and skip" trajectories. The angles were selected to characterize the range of
angles for which one would expect the outer aeroshell to fail due to ablation and
structural loading. The results were then used to predict whether the aeroshells would
survive or if the graphite impact shells (GISs) would be released from the aeroshells.
Analysis was then conducted to determine the performance of the GISs during the
remainder of the reentry trajectory. Please see the recently available Safety Analysis
Reports (LMM&S a-j; and EG&G 1997), specifically Volume II Book 1 Section 5 and
Volume II Book 2 Section E.
Comment No. 2-10
The assertion that NASA's skip scenarios "never fall back to Earth under any
circumstances..." is incorrect. In our analyses, all "skip" scenarios where the spacecraft
is sufficiently slowed to be captured by the Earth's gravity field and subsequently
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reenter the Earth's atmosphere at a later time are counted as Earth impact scenarios.
Our studies indicate that at entry angles equal to or greater than 7.32 degrees at an
entry altitude of 122 km (76 miles), the spacecraft would directly reenter the Earth's
atmosphere.
At entry angles between 7.16 and 7.32 degrees, the spacecraft would skip out of
the atmosphere but lose enough energy to be captured by the Earth's gravity field,
reentering after several (but not "dozens") orbits around the Earth. It should be noted
that if an accident were to alter the spacecraft's trajectory into an Earth-impacting
trajectory, the probability of reentry at angles between 7.16 and 7.32 degrees is about 1
in 500 (JPL 1997). At entry angles less than 7.16 degrees, the spacecraft skips out of the
atmosphere still at or greater than Earth escape speed, and is not subject to a short-term
reentry. In some of these skip-out scenarios, the spacecraft could still be subject to a
long term reentry (i.e. an Earth orbit crossing trajectory) probability; in other cases, the
spacecraft could leave the Earth in a direction that would preclude any chance of a
long-term reentry.
The implication in this comment that NASA's skip scenarios can lead to the
spacecraft being in orbit around the Earth for "centuries" is incorrect. "'Skip" scenarios
where the spacecraft is sufficiently slowed to be captured by the Earth's gravity field
result in reentries that occur within months of the first skip. The only condition that
could result in the spacecraft staying in orbit for "centuries" is the Sufficiently High
Orbit (SHO) maneuver. A study of the potential effects of orbital debris on the
spacecraft in this condition concluded that the probability of the spacecraft posing a
threat to Earth due to collisions with orbital debris, either while boosting to or while in
SHO, is extremely remote. Over the 2,000 year period of the SHO a total of 14 hits by
orbital debris particles of I cm (or smaller) diameter is predicted. To impart a rotational
speed sufficient to cause the spacecraft to come apart or to "throw off" parts would
require many more collisions than what is expected.
Similarly, to alter the spacecraft SHO to the point where other forces would
cause the orbit to decay more rapidly (a change in velocity [DV] of approximately 74.6
meter/sec), would require several thousand 1 cm diameter particle collisions, all from
the same direction, to produce this large a DV. The probability of collision with a single
larger object is similarly remote. Even assuming a difference in relative speed as large
as 20 km/sec., a single object would still have to have a mass of approximately 15 kg to
produce the needed DV. At typical orbital debris velocities, it would be more likely
that the object would rip through the spacecraft, leaving the remnants in roughly the
same orbit the spacecraft was in prior to impact. Since there are relatively few
spacecraft around the 1200 km (745 mi) altitude, the chances of collision with another
object similar in size to Cassini is also remote, especially given that all these objects are
tracked and monitored from the ground.
Comment No. 2-11
Analysis of the skip trajectories indicates that localized heating can cause a
release of the spacecraft liquid propellants. Ignition of the propellants, however, is not
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expected because they would be rapidly dispersed at the reentry velocities which
would prevent significant mixing of the propellants. It is also expectedthat, for some of
the skip trajectories, heating can melt the aluminum caseof an RTG and release the
individual GPHS modules, which could then reenter and impact the Earth. The
outcome of such areentry would not bedifferent from other reentry scenarios.
Comment No. 2-12 (a) - DOE
Please see response to comment 2-7, final paragraph.
Comment No. 2-12 (b)
The potential consequences of exposure to plutonium were addressed in
Appendix C of the June 1995 Cassini EIS.
In the comparisons made in the Draft and Final SEIS, the quantities of Pu-239 are
described in terms of curies. A curie is a unit of activity defined in terms of a specific
number (3.7x101°) of disintegrations (decays) per second. The 1995 Cassini EIS provides
the amount of activity released during the weapons testing program in terms of curies.
A curie of activity from Pu-239 is equivalent to a curie of activity from Pu-238, and their
radio-biological health effects are nearly equivalent.
Please also see response to comment 2-7, first paragraph.
Comment No. 2-12 (c) - DOE
Potential cancer induction and genetic effects are described on pages C-5 and C-6
of the June 1995 Cassini EIS. The health effects estimator used to estimate excess cancer
fatalities reflects consideration of a range of cancer types. The International
Commission on Radiological Protection publication, ICRP-60 (ICRP 1990), addresses
total detrimental effects, including fatal and non-fatal cancers and severe hereditary
effects, in terms of an adjusted estimator of 7.3x10 -a effects per person-rem.
The overall approach to radiation health effects has been outlined in ICRP-60,
reflecting consideration of the Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
(BEIR), and United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) studies. The conclusions in ICRP-60 represent general consensus within
the health physics community, although by no means reflective of the viewpoints of all.
As such, the approach taken to health effects estimates in both the Draft and Final SEIS
is consistent with that taken at the Federal level regarding potential radiological
consequences of postulated radioactive releases resulting from nuclear incidents and
accidents.
There is much disagreement within the health physics community regarding the
effects of low-level radiation. Many of the issues regarding the mentioned effects relate
to gamma radiation and are not really relevant when dealing with alpha radiation.
While gamma radiation is associated with plutonium dioxide, its contribution to the
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dose is very small (less than 1 percent compared to that associated with alpha
radiation).
There are varying viewpoints regarding the effects of low-level ionizing
radiation. While a multiplier effect at low doses is promoted by some, such a potential
characteristic is not supported by the general health physics community in light of
animal studies, human health effects studies, and consideration of changes in natural
background radiation from region to region (NAS 1988,NAS 1990,and ICRP 1990).
Comment No. 2-12 (d)
All potential doses were considered in estimating the accident consequences
reported in the Draft and Final SEIS.
Comment No. 2-12 (e)
The commentor's accusations are unfounded. The Draft and Final SEIS have
been prepared using the best available information. See also responses to comments 2-a
and 2-36. The commentor has been supplied with a copy of the recently available Safety
Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997), which are referenced in this Final SEIS.
Comment No. 2-12 (f)
The comment postulates a non-credible scenario that has no plausible
relationship to the possible accidents that could occur with the Cassini mission. Please
see response to comment 2-18.
Comment No. 2-12 (g)
There are more than 7,000 objects whose trajectories are known that orbit the
Earth within the altitude band from about 200 km (124 mi) to 40,000 km (24,800 mi).
There is a much larger population of objects below 10 cm (about 4 inch) in size that is
also predicted within this region. The total volume of this region is roughly 100 trillion
cubic km (24 trillion cubic mi.). During the Cassini swingby, the spacecraft sweeps out
a volume of only 2.3 cubic km (0.55 cubic mi.). When the appropriate particle densities
are included in the actual analysis, the probability of Cassini receiving a critical hit
(leading to an Earth impact) is calculated at 7.5x10 -8 for particles of I gm or larger, and
at 2.2x10 -s for particles of size 1 milligram or larger. Additionally, the spacecraft speed
is so high at this point in the mission that no collision with space debris could provide
enough energy to put the spacecraft or its RTGs on an impact course with Earth.
Comment No. 2-12 (h)
Please see response to comment 2-7 last paragraph and response to comment 2-
12 (d).
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Comment No 2-13
This Final SEIS now includes this information, which recently became available
(See Table 4-2). It should be noted that the "maximum individual dose" refers to a
maximally exposed person in the population for each mission segment accident
simulation. The maximum individual dose is a useful indicator of the upper limits of
radiological risk to which an individual in the population might be exposed due to an
accident; whereas the collective dose, which incorporates the maximum individual dose
as well as all lesser doses, quantifies the radiological risk in the total potentially exposed
population. The maximum individual dose is included as part of the cumulative
population dose, which is used to estimate accident consequences.
The commentor is incorrect in implying that the maximum individual dose
would be expected to be received by each person in the event of an upper atmosphere
release from a swingby accident.
Comment No. 2-14
The analysis performed involved simulating thousands of accident scenarios and
thousands of release scenarios. Because it is not practical to generate a graphical
presentation for each case, the analysis proceeded on a mathematical analytical basis, as
opposed to graphical analysis. The Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997),
which were recently completed, make extensive use of graphics to present results of the
analyses.
Comment No. 2-15
The estimates of land contamination take into consideration the physical
mechanisms that are required to distribute the released material. The recently available
safety analyses (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997) incorporated among other factors,
meteorological factors and particle size distribution of postulated releases, to distribute
the released material. The scenario described in this comment could not happen in an
accident. The plutonium dioxide is contained within two rugged graphite (carbon-
carbon composite) structures and encapsulated within iridium shells. These materials
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are designed to mitigate the effects of atmospheric heating and mechanical loads
experienced during reentry and the subsequent impact event. With respect to the
commentor's implication that the entire inventory on board the Cassini spacecraft could
be released, there are no credible accident scenarios which would lead to the release and
dispersal of the full inventory of plutonium dioxide.
Comment No. 2-16
The comment takes out of context the monetary amounts authorized by the
Price-Anderson Act for indemnification, and confuses the indemnification authority
with insurance coverage. The commentor is referred to the entire text of 42 USC Section
2210 for the proper context of the monetary limitations authority of Price-Anderson.
Further, it should be noted that the Price-Anderson Act Amendments of 1988 (Pub. L.
100-408, 103 Stat 1066, August 20, 1988), as amended, is the law of the United States
and does not violate treaty obligations under the Outer Space Treaty (i.e., 1967 Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies).
Comment No. 2-17
Nuclear power is only used or proposed when it provides technical benefits. The
RTG technology has a proven record of long-term reliability in space applications and is
the only power system that satisfies all the performance criteria associated with the
Cassini mission. The satellite systems mentioned which would support commercial
communication networks do not come under NASA's purview, but it is extremely
unlikely that any commercial vender would suggest the use of nuclear power for Earth
orbiting communication systems. For Earth orbiting communication systems, solar
arrays are the power system of choice. This is because the Earth is much closer to the
sun and sunlight is sufficiently intense to permit its use in Earth orbit. This is a
significantly different scenario than that for the Cassini mission where the sunlight at
Saturn is not sufficiently concentrated to permit the use of solar arrays as a power
source.
Comment No. 2-18
There are more than 7,000 objects whose trajectories are known that orbit the
Earth within the altitude band from about 200 km (124 mi) to 40,000 km (24,800 mi).
There is a much larger population of objects below 10 cm (about 4 inch) in size that is
also predicted within this region. The total volume of this region is roughly 100 trillion
cubic krn (24 trillion cubic mi). During the Cassini swingby, the spacecraft sweeps out a
volume of only 2.3 cubic km (0.55 cubic mi). When the appropriate particle densities
are included in the actual analysis, the probability of Cassini receiving a critical hit is
calculated at 7.5x10 -8 (about I in 13 million) for particles of I gm or larger, and at 2.2x10 -5
(about 1 in 40,000) for particles of size 1 milligram or larger. However, the spacecraft
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speed is so high at this point in the mission that no collision with space debris could
provide enough energy to put the spacecraft or its RTGs on an impact course with
Earth.
Comment No 2-19
As in the Draft SEIS, the NASA Final SEIS and the recently available Safety
Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997) provide not just the mean but a range of
potential doses with the associated probabilities of the doses occurring. This range of
doses is presented for the 5-th, 50-th, 95-th and 99-th percentiles. Stated differently,
both the Draft and Final SEIS provide the probability that a dose could be equal to or
greater than the dose given in each of the percentile tables. The 0.2 _tCi/m 2 guidance
level developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is used in the Draft
and Final SEIS only as an indicator of the potential extent of land contamination that
may need further evaluation. Potential low doses were not excluded from the health
effects calculations. Those calculations incorporated all potential doses, from minuscule
to high.
For the population to be exposed to radioactive materials, the material must be
transported to areas in which people are located. A significant consideration in the
recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997), and in the safety
analysis process still ongoing, involves transporting of particles using models of wind
and weather conditions. That modeling of transport processes produces a range of land
contamination values. Because of the varying particle sizes in a potential release, the
material would not be evenly dispersed.
The commentor incorrectly implies that the potential effects of a release would
continue for generations and perhaps even involve more people as population grows.
Please see response to comment 2-3.
Comment No. 2-20
The commentor appears to be confusing the EPA guideline level for land
contamination with the de minimis concept.
The implication that NASA has discounted its estimates of consequences by
incorporating a "minimum lethal dose of plutonium" is misleading. There is an
ongoing discussiorr within the scientific community as to whether small levels of
exposure below 1 millirem per year (0.001 rem/yr) can, over 50 years, induce a cancer
fatality. This is referred to as the "de minimis" level. The safety analysis takes no credit
for the fact that there could be a dose level below which no effect will be observed. All
estimates in both the Draft and Final SEIS of the potential health effects that could occur
over 50 years due to exposure to plutonium take into account all exposures to
plutonium, no matter how small.
The average individual receives 300 millirem per year (15,000 millirem over a 50
year period) due to natural background radiation. The results reported in both the
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Draft and Final SEIS incorporated all dose estimates and health effect estimates even if
they were less than 0.001 rem over 50 years.
Comment No. 2-21
The EPA guidance level is utilized for evaluative purposes in the impact analyses
as a land contamination level at or beyond which further evaluations should be
considered. It is not a definitive statement regarding the land area that would or would
not be considered for mitigation. In the unlikely event that an accident releasing
plutonium were to occur, the extent and level of actual contamination would be
determined, and appropriate measures implemented. See also response to comment 2-
20.
Comment No. 2-22
The analyses considered only credible accident scenarios. Neither the Draft nor
Final SEIS provides an estimate of health effects involving the release of material equal
to a full RTG because best estimate analysis predicts that only a small fraction of the
aeroshells, and in turn the graphite impact shells, would erode sufficiently to result in
an in-air release of plutonium. For the most severe reentry case, that associated with an
Earth Gravity Assist (EGA) flyby, the analysis performed to date predicts that, on the
average, less than two of 54 modules would release their material in the air. In turn,
only a portion of that material would be of a form and location such that it would be
inhaled by persons around the world. Impact with space debris would not significantly
alter this finding. Reentry from an EGA or collision with space debris are of such a low
probability that they are not expected to occur.
Neither on-orbit nor reentry release of liquid propellant would result in damage
to the RTGs. See also response to comment 2-11.
The potential for plutonium dioxide releases in highly populated areas is
included in the collective dose and health effects predicted for the inadvertent EGA
reentry accident, but the dominant contribution to these radiological consequences is
related to very low dose levels (hundreds to thousands of times less than natural
radiation dose levels) received by the global population. NASA has taken extraordinary
efforts to reduce the chance of an inadvertent EGA reentry accident to less than one in a
million. The probability of hitting a highly populated area is further reduced by several
factors. Three-quarters of the Earth's surface is water. An impact onto water would not
result in any releases of plutonium dioxide. Further, the areas with high population
represent only a small fraction of the Earth's surface. This further reduces the
probability of an aeroshell impacting in a populated area. The probability of having
such an impact is on the order of less than one in one-hundred million.
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Comment No. 2-23
Ice impacts were accounted for in the analysis (LMM&S a-j, specifically Vol. III,
Book 2, Appendix E, page V. III E-8). Impact on ice might produce releases similar to
those associated with impacts on rock. Impacts on snow or packed snow would be less
likely to produce releases. Overall, the potential for release under ice and snow
conditions would not be significantly different than that for impacts on soil and rock,
which were addressed in the simulations referenced in the Final SEIS. While recovery of
plutonium from icy conditions might complicate the recovery process, the presence of
moisture upon impact could lessen the spread of the particulate that is assumed in both
the Draft and Final SEIS.
Comment No. 2-24
Please see response to comment 2-4.
Comment No. 2-25
The RTG casing is designed to melt upon reentry, releasing the modules, which
in turn reenter individually and reach the ground at the much reduced, terminal
velocity (about 49 m/sec). This design protects and contains the module's plutonium
dioxide under a wide range of entry and impact conditions. RTGs and RHUs are not
nuclear reactors; they are passive devices with no moving parts. The physical
appearances and makeup of the RTGs and RHUs were addressed in greater detail in
Section 2.2.4 of the June 1995 Cassini EIS, and in the recently available Safety Analysis
Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997). See also response to comment 2-8.
Comment No. 2-26
Emergency response planning for the Cassini mission was referenced in Section
4.2.9 of the June 1995 Cassini EIS.
In accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP),
comprehensive radiological contingency plans will be finalized before launching the
Cassini mission. These plans, similar to the ones developed for the Galileo and Ulysses
missions, will ensure that any accident, whether it involves a radiological release or not,
will be met with a well-developed and tested response. The plans are being
coordinated with Federal agencies including EPA and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and with the State of Florida and Brevard county organizations
involved in emergency response. Pertinent portions of the plans will be exercised to
ensure that the various organizations are prepared to respond to any radiological
emergency associated with the launch. In accordance with the FRERP, NASA is the
Lead Federal Agency (LFA), coordinating the Federal response for accidents occurring
within U.S. jurisdiction, and will coordinate with the Department of State and other
cognizant agencies, as appropriate, in the implementation of other responses.
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Regarding the use of iodine pills, they would be useful only in blocking the
uptake of radioiodine by the thyroid following a nuclear reactor accident. Since no such
releases are associated with the type of accidents involving plutonium dioxide
addressed in the Draft and Final SEIS, the use of iodine pills would not be planned.
Comment No. 2-27
The Mars 96 accident response was the responsibility of Russia, not the U.S. Any
response by the U.S. would have to be requested by the affected countries. Accident
scenarios of the Mars 96 - type have been considered as part of the Cassini mission
design and safety analysis efforts.
Comment No. 2-28
The June 1995 Cassini EIS and the SEIS are NASA payload NEPA
documentation, in compliance with NASA regulations at 14 CFR 1216.305 (c) (3).
Comment No. 2-29
Comment noted.
Comment No. 2-30
Political and geopolitical considerations are outside the scope of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.
Comment No. 2-31
In the unlikely event of an accident leading to a release of plutonium dioxide to
the environment, the U.S. Government would be financially responsible. Should
plutonium dioxide contaminated soil removal be required, it would be disposed of in
an approved radioactive waste site.
Comment No. 2-32
Comment noted.
Comment No. 2-33
The commentor mischaracterizes the nuclear launch safety evaluation as a
"Presidential Statement." What the June 1995 Cassini EIS and the Draft and Final SEIS
reference is a Presidential-level nuclear launch safety evaluation process. The process
includes a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and its evaluation in an independent Safety
Evaluation Report (SER). That process is ongoing and is separate from the National
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. The Department of Energy is responsible
for the SAR. The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP), supported by
national consultants in varied fields of expertise, is responsible for the independent
SER.
Comment No. 2-34
The commentor's accusations are unfounded. The Draft and Final SEIS have
been prepared using the best available information. See also responses to comments 2-a
and 2-36. The commentor has been supplied with a copy of the recently available Safety
Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997), which are referenced in the Final SEIS.
Comment No. 2-35
The 720 equal-area grid of the worldwide data base was used to represent
demographic and surface-type (water, rock, soil) distributions required for the type of
modeling being performed for the Cassini mission safety analysis. Much higher
resolution was used within each grid cell to develop the following probability
distributions used in the analyses:
Land and water fractions
Total population and population densities
Probability distribution over 15 population density classes
Probability distribution over 7 soil/rock classes
Probability distribution over 9 land use/cover classes, and
Joint probability distribution of population density class and soil/rock class.
Comment No. 2-36
The NASA contractor for the June 1995 Cassini EIS and SEIS is Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
Please see response to comment 2-12(c).
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Gary L. Bennett
5000ButteRoad • Emmetl,Idaho83617-9500
TelephonWFacsimile:(208)365-1210
21 May 1997
Mr. Mark R. Dahl "
Program Executive, Cassini
Mission and Payload Development Division
Office of Space Science
NASA Headquanen
Code SD
Washingu)n,D.C.2054643001
DearMr.Dahl:
Enclosure: Comments on DSEIS
Enclosed for your consideration m'e my cerements ¢mthe Draft "Supplemental
Environmental Impact Stammentf_ theCassiniMission".
If you have any questicm m"need cladficafion of any comment please ecm:_--t me at the
above address or t_lephoned_ number.
Sincerely,
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COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT
"SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE CASSINI MISSION"
Document Dated April 1997
Prepared by
Gary L. Bennett
General Comment
This document reads as ff all the accidents and all the releases are foregone conclusions.
The DSEIS has a stnmgiy dctmministic tone when. in fact, these are postulated or
hypothetical accidents which may or may not cause releases which may or may not have
any measurable health effects. In every statement in the DSEIS where accidents are
mentioned the conditional wold "postulated" or 'laypo_tical" should be inserted before the
word "accident". A similar ctatcment applies to releases and health effects. These am.
calculated results they are not foregone conclusions.
The DSEIS would benefit f_om a short discussion of the foregoing points to ensure that the
public understands that the DSEIS is based on calculations and that Immcifing Cassini dora
not mean that these accidents will automatically happen and cause the listed comatmnces.
Risk analyses needs to he put in contcxt. The results presented need to be put in c_ mxt;for example, about 20% of all the people alive today will pmbebly die of canc_ ( I billion
people) so the health effects cakulated for the postulated Cassini accidents are dearly
mini_ule. Moreover, given the relenses them is no assurance that even the calculated
health effects will occur. The "true" health effects ._ven the accidents) are somewhere
between zero and the numbers presented. The public needs to know this.
There have been some good, genenfl-intcrest write-ups Iacpamd pointing out the bmefiu
of nuclear devices (smoke detectors, medicine, etc.). These should be consulted so that a
proper belance can be presented in the SEIS.
As a reference point, "Since the first nuclear weapons test at Alamogordo, N.Mex., on July
16, 1945, appro_mately 360,000 CA (360 kCi) of 239,240pu has been injected into the
atmosphere. In addition, 17,000 Cf (17 kCi) of 238pa entered the atmosphere in April
1964 as a result of the high-a/titode buraup of a SNAP-9 satelfite power source ..." (cf.
Tran_ranic Elemera_ in the Ent, iromnem, DOPd'IXC-22800, 1980). Keep this in mind
when the critics start saying that therc's enough plutonium on boant Cassini to give
everyone lung c_. That hasn't hat.cried from the weapons tests which were much
mort finely and widely distributed than any of the postulated Cassini accidents.
S neeifie Comments
Page iii - At the bottom of the page - does the Cassini spacecraft really "care" if the rings
are nearly edge-on to the Earth and Sun? Can it be maneuvered to overcome that
alignment?.
Page iv - The first paragraph should be much more positive. Describe what the RTGs and
RHUs are and what they do - how essential they are. ALlanyone gets from this paragraph
is how "awful" they arc. List the benefits.
3-1
3-2
Page 1
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Pave v -The fh'st and secondparagraphsneedwordslike"postulated"and "potential"
insertedjustabouteveryplace.The lastsentenceofthesecondparagraphshouldreplace
theword "would"with"arecalculated".Itisnotacertaintyhatthesereleaseswilloccur.
Page v - In the second line of the second paragraph the simulations are experimental and
analytical are they not?
3-3
3-4
Page vi - In the first paragraph, replace the word "threaten" with "affect" (two places). The [
health effects are calculated given the postulated accidents occur. This entire paragraph is [ 3-5
fullof pejorative words.
Page vi - In the second paragruph why is the lime period from T+143 s to T+206 s not [ 3-6
considered? Can't there be explosions with fragments released?
Page vi - In the third paragraph the reader is left dangling as to what these "new" prelaunch
accidents are. A sentence or two explaining the situation would help. Also, the reader
shoudd be told what exceeding the EPA guideline level really means. The world isn't going
toend, is it?
3-7
Page 1-1 - In the second paragraph be much mct'e positive, Describe what the RTGs and [
RHUs are and what they do - how essential they are. All anyone gets from this paragraph [ 3-8is how "awful" they are. List the benefits.
Page 1-1 - In the third paragraph the words "substantial impacts" have a highly negative
connotation with no context given for judging if that is indeed the case. Suggest replacing
those words with something like "an effect upon the human environment".
Page I-2-Inthefirstfullparagraphisthen:acontradictionbetweenthestamnent "No
launchPhase0 accidents were identifiedthatcouldcanseacrediblerelease"andthethizd
paragraph of page vi?
3-9
3-I0
I
Page 1-2 - Frankly, from the xeaults presented the statement in the last sentence of the [ 3 11
fourth full paragraph doesn't seem wan'anted. In real terms the changes an: all in the noise
level and the DSEIS probably isn't needed.
Page 1-4 -Was this page leftintentionally blank?
Page 2-2 - In the paragraph labeled "Changes in Mission Design Since the EIS", some
clarification is needed as to why delaying the last wajectmy correction increases the biasing.
Somewhere it should be clearly stated that at any given lime the trajectory will be such that
the velocity vector is pointed away from an Earth intercept.
Page 2-6 - Some mo_ information should be presented on the ESA ceils. For example, are
they concenuator cells and, ff so, what is the concenualion ratio? Are they just GaAs cells
or is there another material (multi-junction, multi-bandgap)? What is the efficiency of the
cells? How do these cells compare with the U.S. GaAs/GaSb ceils that have produced
30% eW_ciency in lab(ratc_ conditions? If the cells are concenwator cells this severely
resu'icts the alignment of the array which means mote _t.
Page 2-8- If thecellsareGaAs theyshouldnotbeasradiationsensitiveasSicells;
althoughtheend pointintermsofpercentpower lossmay end up beingthesame.
Page 2-8 -Diodesarea standardpartof solar arrays.Whafs specialaboutdiodeson the
hypotheticalCassiniarray?
I 3-12
3-13
3-14
3-15
3-16
Page 2
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Page 2-9-Section2.1.5-Hydrazineby itselfisusuallynot"burned"itisdecomposed.
Page 2-11 - In the first full paragraph some explanation of Hazards Class 1.3 would be
helpful. As it is the lay reader is left with a negative impression. Can a smmment be made
that these are benign solids(i.e., they won'tgo "high order" in an impact or explosion;
won't detonate).
Page 2-16 - In the first full paragraph are there any explosion/fragment issues in Phases 2,
3 or 4 (see also page 2-20)?
Page 2-16 - In the third full paragraph the enti_ discussion about cancers is too
deterministic and too fatalistic. These are cakulated numbers with the "real" value (given
the accident) lying somewbem between zero and the number calculated. What is meant by
"large number of people worldwide"?. Pet this in context! The "expectat_ of lamm cancer
fatalities"i somewhere betweenzeroand thenumbercalculated.
Page 2-17 - In Section 2.4.2, fnlt bullet, second paragraph: Should it say that "The
updated analyses use more deutiled accident descriptions... "7 As it is, the im_ is
left that the EIS used nothing.
Table 2-2 - For comparison with the text, a separam column listing the Phases should be
included. Footnote ck These are potential, calculated latent cancers. PUT IT IN
CONTEXT!!! Footnote g implies another EIS is coming. How long will this conrlnue?
Sometime you have to launch!
Page 2-20 - In thc first paragraph if the hypotbelical ixclaunch accidents are now of
concern then so should be the postulated accidents in Phases 2,3 and 4 (page 2-16).
Page 2-20 - In the second immgraph, what does it mean to exceed the EPA guidance level?
The last sentence should include the words "the benefits of' before the word
"implementation".
Page 2-22-The No-ActionA/mmmive doeshaveadverseimpacts,k means lossofjobs.
Itmeans lossofAmerican planetarysciencepreeminencewhich willhurtU.S.science
which inturnwillhurtU.S.technologicalleadership.Itmeans allthishaxdwan:was built
and the fmancial/personal/envimemeaml impe_ were talmn and no benefits achieved. The
No-Action Almmalive is the most costly of the alternatives.
Table 2-3 - For comparison with the _ext' a separate column listing the Phases should be
included. Most people will only read the tables so they need to be clear and in context.
Page 4-I -Section4.1-Explainthatby notincludingde_ theresultsarexeally
worstcase.Don'tleaveitdangling.
Page 4-3 - In the first full paragraphcan a statement be made that these typesofanalyses
are fully consistent with U.S. and internationally accepted guidance? This would give the
reader the impression that this is an accepted, orderly process.
Table4-I- Note thatthesearepostulatedaccidents.
Page 4-6-Inthefirstparagraphof Section4.1.2.2notethatallofthisassumes theaccident
happensinthefirstplace.The oddsarethemissionwillbea success.
[ 3-17
3-18
3-19
3-20
3-21
3-22
3-23
3-24
3-25
3-26
3-27
3-28
[ 3-29
3-30
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Table4-2 -For comparisonwithflaetext,aseparatecolumn listingthePhasesshouldbe
included. Most people will only read the tables so they need to be clear and in context.
Footnote d: These are pomntial, calculated latent cancers. PUT IT IN CONTEXT!!!
Foomote g impliesanotherEIS iscoming. How longwillthiscontinue?(Thisisclearlya
growthindustry- how many treesisthiscostingus?)
Page 4.-8 - Second full paragraph - is the probability 2 x 10-7 for all time or per year?. The
lime makes a difference. In seven ha/f-lives there will be less than 1% of the 238pu left.
Page 4-8 - Third full paragraph - these ideas need to be expressed earlier. This helps put
everything in context.
Page 4-12 - Second paragraph - then,, won't be much 238pu left in a few half lives.
Page B-I - Can Becquerel and Curie be put in context, e.g., related to smoke detectm_ or
something? Mr. & .Mrs. Public may decide that I disimegratiou.per second is one too
many.
Page B-2 -Dose genea-aIlyreferstothetotaldosereceivednotperunitbody mass.
Page B-3 -The definitionof"initiatingevent"seemswrong. Are systemsfailmesreally
n_luired?
Page B-3 -Why isplutoniumsingledoutas "heavy"?Lead isheavy,too.Plutouiumis
producedinstellarexplosionsoit'snotslaictlyanificisliyproduced.Infact,plutonium
hasbeen found on Earththatdidnotcome fromweapons testsorSNAP-9A.
Page B-3 -At one timeREM = (RBE)*(Rads).Now we haveQualityFactors.Just
checking.
Page B-3 - Solar energy usually refers to the energy provided by the Sun; how ifs
converted or used is another matter. (Whafs really imlxxtmat is solar power;, specifically
insolation.)
3-31
3-32
[ 3-33
13-34
3-35
3-38
I 3-39
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The illumination of Saturn's rings is important and does matter for scientific
observations. If the rings are edge-on to the Sun, imaging science observations of the
rings would be severely limited. The spacecraft could not be maneuvered to overcome
this alignment.
Comment No. 3-2
Comment noted. Please refer to the 1995 Cassini Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), Section 2.2.4.2, and Volume I of the recently available Safety Analysis
Reports (SARs) (LMM&S a-j; and EG&G 1997) now referenced in this FSEIS. The SARs
have been forwarded to the commentor.
Comment No. 3-3
The commentor is correct in asserting that the postulated release would not be
certain to occur. In fact, for a large number of the accidents evaluated for the recently
available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; and EG&G 1997), no release would
occur. The recommended substitution of "are calculated" for "would" at this location is
accepted.
Comment No. 3-4
Yes, the simulations are experimental and analytical. For additional details, the
commentor is referred to the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j;
EG&G 1997).
Comment No. 3-5
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-6
During this time interval there could be explosions with fragments released;
however, because the payload fairing has been jettisoned prior to this interval and thus
would no longer be in place to contain and direct explosive forces at the spacecraft,
there would be no threat to the RTGs and RHUs. See the recently available Safety
Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; and EG&G 1997).
Comment No. 3-7
The new prelaunch accident considered in the consequence analyses is similar to
the Centaur tank collapse accident described in Section 4.1.5.2 of the June 1995 Cassini
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EIS. For additional details of the prelaunch scenarios addressed in the updated analyses
see the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; and EG&G 1997).
Comment No. 3-8
Descriptions of the RTGs and RHUs can be found in Section 2.2.4 of the June 1995
Cassini EIS and in the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; and
EG&G 1997).
Comment No. 3-9
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-10
There is no contradiction between the referenced paragraphs.
describes what was presented in the June 1995 Cassini EIS.
Comment No. 3-11
This paragraph
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-12
Yes the page was left intentionally blank.
Comment No. 3-13
By delaying the final trajectory correction maneuver, the spacecraft remains
biased away from the final swingby altitude at Earth for a longer period of time (i.e., an
additional 3 days). In addition, the final swingby altitude has been raised to at least 800
km (500 mi) from 500 km (320 mi). These two independent actions were implemented
as part of the mission design that ensures that the probability of an inadvertent Earth
swingby reentry remains less than one in one million.
Comment No. 3-14
The ESA cells are not concentrator cells. ESA developed both GaAs and Si cells.
The efficiency of the cells at Saturn has been estimated at 22 - 24%. In comparison to the
U.S. GaAs/GaSb combination cells, the ESA cells exhibit a lower efficiency; however the
U.S. cells, because they are actually two cells combined, are approximately 2 to 3 times
heavier than the ESA cells. The GaAs/GaSb cells have only been fabricated under
laboratory conditions, and have not been tested for LILT effects.
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Comment No. 3-15
The commentor's observation that both GaAs and Si cells would be subject to
radiation degradation for this type of mission is correct.
Comment No. 3-16
The diodes that would be necessary for the hypothetical Cassini array would
require a special design (i.e., would have to be a wafer design rather than the
conventional cylindrical design) that is compatible with thin and collapsible (i.e.
foldable) solar arrays.
Comment No. 3-17
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-18
Tests have shown that SRMU propellant cannot detonate (i.e., go high order)
under any credible launch accident scenario. Hazard classification 1.3 refers to
Department of Defense document DOD 6055.9-STD-DOD, Ammunitions and
Explosives Safety Standards, October 1992.
Comment No. 3-19
No. The payload fairing has been jettisoned and is no longer available to contain
and direct explosive forces at the spacecraft. See also response to comment 3-6.
Comment No. 3-20
Comment noted. Section 2.4.1 of the Draft and Final SEIS is a summary of Section
4.1.6 of the June 1995 Cassini EIS.
Comment No. 3-21
Text revised accordingly.
Comment No. 3-22
Mission phases were grouped into mission segments for the convenience of the
reader. The mission segments consolidate potential accidents which could affect the
same portion of the environment. Footnotes "d" and "g" have been updated.
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Comment No. 3-23
The accidents postulated during the referenced phases would lead only to water
impacts; no releases occur from such an impact.
Comment No. 3-24
In both the June 1995 Cassini EIS and the Draft and Final SEIS, the EPA guideline
level is used for illustrative purposes as an indicator of the potential amount of land
contamination that could require some level of cleanup. If an accident were to occur the
actual amount of land subject to cleanup would be determined as one element of the
emergency response. The recommended addition of "benefit of" is noted.
Comment No. 3-25
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-26
Mission phases were grouped into mission segments for the convenience of the
reader. The mission segments consolidate potential accidents which could affect the
same portion of the environment.
Comment No. 3-27
NASA did not include consideration of de minimis in reporting potential
accident consequences in the Draft and Final SEIS. NASA does not take a position on
the issue of de minimis; accordingly the SEIS reports only the consequences estimated
by considering the full potential radiation doses.
Comment No. 3-28
The analyses conducted are consistent with established radiological risk
assessment methodology and practices.
Comment No. 3-29
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-30
Comment noted.
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Comment No. 3-31
The Draft and Final SEIS text (Section 2.1.7) attempts to explain to the reader that
the launch phases used in the June 1995 Cassini EIS were somewhat different from
those used in the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997).
The breakdown of the phases referenced in the table are those used in the Safety
Analysis Report and will better facilitate an understanding of the analyses upon which
the Draft and Final SEIS is based
It was not intended that the footnotes convey or imply that another EIS is
coming.
Comment No. 3-32
The 2x10 -7 is for 100 years; or slightly more than one half-life of Pu-238.
Comment No. 3-33
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-34
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-35
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-36
The definition as stated in the Draft and Final SEIS is correct.
Comment No. 3-37
The definition as stated in the Draft and Final SEIS is correct.
Comment No. 3-38
Comment noted.
Comment No. 3-39
Comment noted.
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Comment noted.
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ANTHONY EHRLICH
96 HILLDALE AVENUE
ORMOND BEACH, FL 32176
Subject: Supplemental Envirore_ntal In_act Statement for the Cassini Mission
May 21, 1997
References: I. NASA DSEIS transmittal letter dated April 4, 1997 by Mark R. Dahl
2. Letter of correction for DSEIS dated April 8, 1997 by Mr. Dahl
3. Nuclear Safety Analysis for Cassini Mission Envlrcr_emtal Impact
Stat_mnnt Process, R_0S-97-0010, April, 1997
Code SD
NASA Wea_
Washington, IX: 20546-0001
Dear Sirs-
we hawe Just campleted a review of the Draft Supplmental Envir_mntal
In_ Statement (SEIS) transmitted by reference I and _ by ref_ 2.
We are also in rlceipt of and hawe read reference 3 (HN_S), transmitted by
reference I. Our review has found what appear to be serious flaws and omissions.
Our coKments are gi91n below. We z_ully z_ that you answer our commants
incorlx_--ate the rem_lta in another SEIS.
Cc_snt 1 below has to do with the use of solar arrays instead of pluta_um.
2 through 5 identify missing data or misleading L_formation presented
in table 4-2, which off face value w_d _ to be a compilation of possible
hazarde. Cc_ent 6 req_e_ an explanation intelligible to the lay_n of why
uncertainty techniques had to be applied to the results of the radiological
analysis results and what the results of the _inty study mean in tangible
terms to the citizens of Florida and the United Statea. C_Jsnt 7 has to do with
the timing and cofltent of the c_tingency plan still being developed. And c_ent
8 _ the data presented for pote_ial clean up coats and plans for di_
of any radioactlwe materlals cleaned up.
I. Pages 2-6 thrc_ 2-9, Solar Arrays. Despite the "low _ estimate of radio-
logical ri_ in the Draft SEIS for the planned mission, we fell any risk
imrolved with putting plutc_ium into space is not warranted and that solar
arrays provide an _le alternate. Page 2-8 includes a stat_ent by
-...remazchare _bo developed the ESA [D_x_mn Space AgencT] solar celXs,"
who c_uded that, "Low (insolation) intensity and low texture (LILT)
solar cells (includlng those developed by ESA) are not a viable power source
alternative for the presently defined Cassini mission of NASA (H. Hasson,
1996)" This statement of non-vlability, however, is not a formal input; the
source cited in SEIS Section 8.0, References, merely says, -Hassan H. 1996.
Personal communication to D. Kindt, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, regarding
ESA assessment of the JFL syst_ etu_ related to the po_ible use of photo-
voltaic arrays for the Casslnl mission." It is our understanding, how_m_er,
that _ ESA officials hawe co_clu_ that solar arrays could be used for
this mission. Please provide a 4___-M,_ted, written, formal respoflse from ESA
as to the feasibility of the use of soloar geflerators instead of plutO,.
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2. Table 4-2, page 4-7, mission segment VVKTGA (Venus-Venus-Earth-jupiger_
Gravity-Asslst, planned trajectory for the primary launch opportunity in
October/November 1997). The table contains no value for the maximum indiv-
idual dose from the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGe) because
this information is not yet available. Yet the RT_s contain most of the
plutofllum on Cassinl and are the biggest source of potential radlolog_cal
risk. Furthermore, as the table indicates, this mission segment is the
one with the potential for contamlnatlng the largest land area. The
inclusion of individual dose data could havo a significant effect on the
mission risks shown in this table. And these increased risks would probably
affect more people as the area of contamination is greater.
3. Table 4-2, fourth coltmm, Maxlmm Individual Dose, ram. The _ of
this heading appears to be subJoctive rather than solentific, that is, to
assure rather than to ex_dne. A qulck read vould lead one to believe that
the values gigln are the maximum doses IxSsible, but the footnote i_llcates
that these valuee are really the mean e_/matss of the _ individual
doses. These may be the _ li_oly estimates statistically, but they are
less than the possible in_Ivlo_al doses at other distribution points. In-
deed, table 6-5 of Raf_ 3 shows a ccmbinod o_L_all mission _ at the
99 perclntile as 2.4 x 100 (or Jult 2.4), c_ to the 1.1 x 100 (Just 1.1)
dose shown in the SEIS, about twice as m_h.
4. Table 4-2, fifth colum, land Area _taEtnated. This data appears to
continue with the same intent as above, to assure rather than to present
objectively. The valuss shown here are the estimated mean valuss, as indic-
ated in the col_m heading. Why am the estimtod values for the 9_ and 9_
distributions not shown? Table 6-5 in Refm 3 shows a _ted land
area for the combined overall mission to be 4.8 x ld_ (Just 4.8) at the
99th percentile cremated with 4.4xi001 (0.44) for the SEIS value, about
10 times more.
5. Table 4-2, mum Mission Risk. The preaentation of this "low- mean
mission risk would oe_ to be an m/mplification of the results of this
analysis to aLt but statisticians. The man mission risk shown is .rarely
a predicted best guess. The public and decision makers should be informed
as to the puesihle, credible mission ria_ at the 95 and 99 percent points
even _ _ risks may be less likely on a probabalistic basis. To
ignore risks at these points will lead maw/ to think they are not po_ible,
an implication that o_rv_ neither the _t or the people. From the
data glv_n in lleferanc_ 3 and the em_dolcgy given in table 4-2 (ris_
equals probability times boalth effects)£ the overall combined mission risk
at the 99 perco_t point would be 4.4xI0-_ (0.0044) c__ with the value
given in the SEIS, 3.2x10-4 (0,00032), about I0 tlmss _rso.
6. Paragraph 4.1.2.3, page 4-8, and table 4-3, page 4-9, uncertainty. The
tm_acknowledgos the "uncertainty- of the analyses sm_arizod in table 4-2
and tells us that s_ill ano_ha= statistical _ol, an -uncor_tn_¥ anal_sie,-
was used, the results of uncertainty being given in _le 4-3. The tat,
however, provides no _xplanation of the ramlficati_s of this uncertainty,
but Just stat_s the obvious: that the 95 percent c_fi_ level is two
orders of magnitude higl_r than the best estimate, etc. What does this
uncertainty mean in human terms? Because this mission as currently planned
involves the largest amount of plutonium ever to be deployed in space and
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because plutonium is the most toxic substance known to man, the meaning
of this uncertainty should be stated in clear terms that the layman, be
he politician, governmant official, or ordinary citizen, can understand
and evaluate. Please add such an explanation to the SEIS.
7. Paragraph 4.1.2.4, page 4-9, contingency plan. The text mentions a
comprehensive radiological contingency plan that -...is being developed."
This plan "...would ensure that any accident...could be met with a we11-
de_eloped and tested response." The text states that the contingency
plan is being developed by federal, state, and local organizations. Who
in my city, Ormcmd Beach, and my county, Volusia, is participating in the
formulation of this plan? Who is participating at the state level? k_en
will the contingency plan be available and will there be provisions for
public review and input? We are most curious as to what actions will be
mxjgested or mandated for us, our ch/ldren, our wives, and other residents
of our area in the event of an accident releasing plutonium dioxide if
the winds should blow in our direction. Will the contlngm_7 plan cover
(Xlly _he time frame immediately after an accident or will it address
actions in the following waeks and exmths, etc.? Please include the
answers to these questions a much as is applicable in the SEIS.
8. Paragraph 4.1.2.5, page 4-9, and table 4-4, page 4-10, potential clean
up costs for contaminated land. The table shows the predlcTad areas of
contamination at the man, 95_, and 9_ distribution points for acci_ts
that might occur in the pre-launch and early launch mlsslon segzmnt_. Why
are no estimates and costs for accidents during the VVEJC,A segment shown
in the table? This is the mission segment that would involve the largest
area of contamination according to table 4-2. Do the comte that are shown
include the coet of disposal of contaminated materials? What might the
location of disposal site be and w_at might be the means of disposal?
We respect the professionalism and competence of the team planning and
intended to operate the Cassini mission, but as recent events rematnd us, the
unexpected, and catastrophic do scmmtlmes occur. Because of the potential
harm from an accident involving airbor_l plutoni_ particles and the long
half life of plutonium (which I believm to be 24,000 years), we feel that
this version of the SEIS _st be co_ia_-_d flawed. Until the data and explan-
atic_s that are missing per the abc_ ccmmmnte are included in the SEIS, no
conclusion could be reached as to the estimated risks of Cassini and no
decision should be made whether to launch as currently planned. We are there-
fore sending copies of this letter to our local, state, and federal officials.
We understand that this letter will be included in the final SEIS and that
that _t will incorporate thoee comments that are deemed correct and
applicable. We look forward to the final SEIS and to the contingency plan.
(address atx:v,m) 538_ Magnolia Avenue
Daytorm Beach, FL 32114
cc: President Bill Clinton, _ Lawton Chiles, Seflator Bob Graham,
Senator Connie Mack, Representative Tillie Fowler, Representative Corrine
_, Representative Evelyn Lynn, Senator Bur_ Lock_, County Councilamn
Stan Rosevear, Mayer Bud Asher, Mayor Dave Hood, Commissioner Jeff BOyle
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Comment No. 4-1
For the convenience of the reader the entire Hassan reference, which is a
technical evaluation of the JPL solar Cassini concept, has been included in the Final SEIS
as Appendix C. Mr. Hassan is the European Space Agency (ESA) Cassini Project
Manager. Please also see response to comment 1-1.
Comment No. 4-2
The maximum individual doses for an inadvertent reentry during Earth swingby
are now available and included in this Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (SEIS). The effects of individual dose were already included and accounted
for in the values reported in the Draft SEIS; therefore, there is no need to adjust the
mission risks. The doses that contributed to maximum individual dose were accounted
for in the original analysis, but the maximum individual doses were not available at the
time of the Draft SEIS.
Comment No. 4-3
The maximum individual doses are mean values and are presented as the best
representation of the highest dose that an individual might receive for a given accident
segment. The estimates are obtained by accumulating the highest doses for each of the
accident simulations for a mission segment and obtaining the average for that segment.
The 95% and 99% values are presented to provide an indication of the distribution of
the mean doses that might be expected if an accident were to occur. In total, this
information is presented to provide a more complete indication of the potential doses
that might be received in the event of an accident. All doses are accounted for in the
risk and health effects estimates.
Comment No. 44
The 95-th and 99-th percentile land contamination values were included in the
draft SEIS. See Section 4.1.2.2 of this SEIS.
The commentor also refers to a difference between the overall mission land
contamination values reported in Table 4-2 of DSEIS and Table 6-5 of the HNUS
supporting document. Table 4-2 of the DSEIS is reporting the mean value for the
overall mission, while Table 6-5 of the HNUS supporting document addresses the 99 *
percentile values. As one would expect, the 99" percentile value is larger than the
mean.
Comment No. 4-5
The overall mission risk given in Table 4-2 of the Draft SEIS is the probability
weighted health effect consequences summed over all mission segments. This measure
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of potential radiological consequences includes the information contained in all health
effects probability distributions determined from the individual accident scenarios that
contribute to each mission segment. Additionally, the Draft SEIS presented information
on the distributions of health effect consequences by mission segment at the 5-th, 50-th,
95-th, and 99-th percentile levels to inform decision makers and the public on the
elements used in the determination of mission segment and overall mission risks.
The calculation provided in the comment is not correct. It is important to
understand that the Cassini mission nuclear safety analyses considered a broad range of
outcomes to minimize the possibility of overlooking possible high radiological
consequence outcomes even at extremely low probabilities of occurrence. The health
effects distributions in Table 4-2 provide such information, but they need to be
interpreted carefully. Except for mean health effects, the values listed under each
percentile level are upper bound health effects associated with the percentile level. For
example, the nuclear risk analyses predict less than 0.92 health effects for the overall
mission at the 99-th percentile level, given the postulated occurrence of a plutonium
dioxide release as a result of an accident. An alternative interpretation is that given an
accidental release there is a 1 percent probability of 0.92 or more health effects for the
Cassini mission.
The overall mission probability for 0.92 or more worldwide health effects is then
2.8x10 -5 (or about 1 in 36,000), which is obtained from the product of the total
probability of a plutonium dioxide release accident during the mission (2.8x10-3), and
the conditional probability of observing 0.92 or more health effects as the outcome of
plutonium dioxide release accidents (1.0x10-2). The health effects risk includes this
information, because it is based on all predicted health effect outcomes with
consideration of their probability of occurrence.
Comment No. 4-6
While plutonium is a heavy metal with known chemical toxicity, it is not the
most toxic substance known. The radiation effects of plutonium would be manifested
well before chemical toxicity effects.
In response to the expressed desires of the commentor, the following brief
explanation of uncertainty is provided: By their nature, consequences for a potential
accident scenario can vary over a wide range. To reflect this variable nature, the Draft
and Final SEIS present a range of analytical estimates of potential consequences (e.g.,
'best estimate', 95-th percentile, 99-th percentile). The uncertainty analysis establishes
bounds which enclose the consequences of potential accidents, to a high level of
confidence. For a more detailed technical discussion of uncertainty, the commentor is
referred to the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997),
specifically "h" - Supplemental Analyses. These reports have been forwarded to the
commentor.
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Comment No. 4-7
Radiological contingency plans are being developed by NASA/Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) and USAF/Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) to address specifically the
initial response that would be required in the unlikely event of an accident affecting the
launch site. Similar plans already exist at the State and county (Brevard) levels in
Florida, and are in the process of being updated for the Cassini mission. While Ormond
Beach and Volusia county have not been specifically represented at planning meetings
held for purposes of development of contingency plans, planning activities have been
accomplished in concert with representatives from the State of Florida Division of
Emergency Management, Office of Radiation Control, and Emergency Management
and Public Safety representatives from Brevard County. The NASA/USAF and State of
Florida plans are also being closely coordinated with the DOE, which maintains its own
set of emergency response instructions for radiological accidents of many kinds, to
ensure a coordinated initial response to any accident. Emergency response would be
coordinated through local government contacts.
NASA/KSC and the Department of Energy (DOE) are coordinating closely with
the State of Florida on development of recommended protective actions that could be
implemented in the unlikely event of a release of radioactive material, both for the
launch site and the general public in affected areas. Because there is a range of variables
influencing the outcome of potential accident situations, there is a range of potential
protective actions. Protective actions for the general public would be announced by the
State of Florida after consideration of the specific circumstances accompanying any
accident.
The NASA/KSC and USAF/CCAS contingency plans currently under
development deal primarily with the initial response to a radiological contingency,
although there is some discussion of the concept of operations for longer-term actions
such as recovery of the radioactive material and facilities. Long-term actions will
depend on the facts and the circumstances surrounding an accident, and will be
responsive to such circumstances.
Comment No. 4-8
No cost estimates were developed for cleanup of potential land area
contamination as a result of a VVEJGA accident as they would be highly speculative
because of the many variables involved. Regardless of where any contamination
occurred, the United States would respond appropriately and assume responsibility for
cleanup, as needed.
As stated in Section 4.1.2.5 of both the Draft and Final SEIS, an upper estimate
was used to illustrate the potential costs associated with removal and disposal in an
appropriate repository. Should plutonium dioxide contaminated soil removal be
required, it would be disposed of in an approved radioactive waste site. The selection
of location and method of disposal or storage would be dependent upon the location of
the release, quantity of material, level of contamination and Federal regulations.
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Comment No. 4-9
The commentor notes the half-life of plutonium as 24,000 years. The half-life of
Pu-238, which comprises 71 percent of the plutonium dioxide (See Table 2-3 of the June
1995 EIS; and Section 1.1 of the Draft and Final SEIS) in the RTGs and RHUs, is 87.7
years. The recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; and EG&G 1997) are
referenced in this Final SEIS.
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For accidents other than the Earth flyby, the quantities of plutonium that would
be released are small. The flyby is the only accident scenario that has a potential for
releasing an average fraction estimated at less than eight percent, of the total inventory
of plutonium dioxide on board the spacecraft. Because of this potential for release,
NASA has taken extensive steps to reduce the probability of this accident to the point
that it is not likely to occur, i.e. to a probability of less than one in one-million. If such
an accident were to occur, the carbon-carbon aeroshells and graphite impact shells are
designed to limit the release of the plutonium dioxide. If released, most of the material
would fall in the oceans where, due to the chemical stability of the plutonium dioxide,
its solubility in the oceans would be very limited. The dominant radiation released
from plutonium is in the form of alpha particles which can only travel a very short
distance through the air. In fact, the primary way for an individual to receive an
exposure from plutonium is to breathe it in. The fraction of material that would be
inhaled by the population in total, let alone any one individual, is small.
As the Draft and Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS)
indicate, there is a very low probability that an individual could receive high doses.
Taking the above into consideration, a potential accident during the Cassini flyby
would not result in "a disaster of global proportions." For additional related
information see response to comments 2-7 and 6-2. For information related to
plutonium toxicity, see response to comment 4-6.
Comment No. 5-2
The commentor is referring to the 2001 mission alternative discussed in the June
1995 Cassini EIS (Section 2.3) and in the Draft and Final SEIS. The primary launch
opportunity alternative would use a Venus-Venus-Venus-Gravity Assist (VVVGA)
trajectory to Saturn. This alternative would need 10.3 years to reach Saturn as opposed
to the Proposed Action's 6.7 year trajectory. In addition, the 2001 mission alternative
would lead to reduced opportunities for science investigations and would require
development and flight testing of a new spacecraft engine. With the primary VVVGA
trajectory, there would be no opportunity for a short-term inadvertent reentry but a
long-term inadvertent reentry risk would remain. However, with the backup Venus-
Earth-Earth-Gravity Assist (VEEGA) trajectory for the VVVGA primary, both short- and
long-term inadvertent risks would be present and be approximately the same as
indicated for the (VEEGA) trajectories of the secondary and backup to the primary
launch opportunity presented in Section 4.1.2.4 of the Draft and Final SEIS. A more
detailed discussion of the impacts of the 2001 alternative can be found in Section 2.7 of
the June 1995 Cassini EIS. Additional details of the reduction in science return can be
found in Section 2.7.5 of the June 1995 Cassini EIS.
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Comment No. 5-3
The recently available Safety Analysis Reports for the Cassini mission (LMM&S
a-j; and EG&G 1997) are referenced in this Final SEIS. The commentor is referred to
these Safety Analysis Reports for details of the extensive analyses performed for this
mission. The Safety Analysis Reports have been forwarded to the commentor.
Comment No. 5-4
There is historical experience of many planetary and satellite flybys executed
with high precision by the JPL Navigation Team over the past three decades. For two of
these flybys, the Galileo spacecraft swung by the Earth twice for gravity-assist purposes
before reaching Jupiter. The first Earth swingby occurred at a closest approach altitude
of 952 km (590 mi), and the second occurred at 304 km (188 mi). Tracking data after
each of these swingbys showed that the actual trajectory was controlled to an accuracy
or 8 km (5 mi) for the first swingby, and an accuracy or 1 km (0.6 mi) for the second
swingby. The Earth swingby altitude for Cassini will be 800 km (496 mi.) or higher,
depending upon the launch date, and the navigation precision is expected to be slightly
better than that for Galileo.
See response to comment 5-3 above.
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MARC M. COHEN
4242 POMONA A VENUE
PALO ALTO. CA 94306-4337
Mr. Mark R. Dahl
Cassini Program
Office of Space Science (Code SD)
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-(XX)I
May 21, 1997
Dear Mr. Dahl,
This letter is in response to the NASA invitation for public comment on the Cassini Mission
Draft Supplemental Environmental Immct Study (DSEIS). I am deeply concerned about
some of the assumptions, methods, and conclusions pertaining to the potential release of
Plutonium 238 into the earth's environment It is a question of simple justice. People
sitting in offices in Washington and Pasadena propose to take a risk - however small -
that would have the consequence (according to its own original, "Final" 1995 EIS) of
giving 2300 people a carcinogenic dose of vaporized Plutonium 238 or (according to the
"Supplemental" 1997 DSEIS) giving 120 people such a dose who have no say and who
may never know who they are. The Cassini decisionmakers bear no personal liability for
the consequences of their decision, should Cassini release plutonium. Victims of
carcinogenic or toxic releases of Plutonium 238 would have no recourse or due process of
law to seek compensation from the decisionmakers or NASA.
I reviewed the three key documents that your Office provides on potential environmental
impacts from Cassini:
Office of Space Science, (April, 1997) Draft Sup_emental Environmental
Imvact Statement for the Cassini Mission, Washington, DC: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Haliburton NUS Corporation, (April, 1997) Nuclear Safew Analyses for
C_sini Mission Environmental Imvact Statement Process, HNUs-97-0010,
Gaithersburg, MD: Haliburton NUS Corporation.
Solar System Exploration Division, (June, 1995) Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission, Washington, DC: National
Aeronautics and Space Adminisumion.
OVERALL EVALUATION
As an overall evaluation of these documents, I was disappointed that none of them
provided the mathematical models for their findings nor the key assumptions from which
they derived. The DSEIS states:
"The analysis makes wide-scale use of probability distributions. It uses
best estimate values for certain key parameters, and more comprehensive
modeling to determine PuO2 particle dispersion, uptake but people and the
potential for latent cancer fatalities." [pp. 2-17--2-18, emphasis added].
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I questionwhetherthese "best estimates" truly are the "most representative mathematical
models, parameter values used in the models, and probability distributions to describe
inherent variability as inputs to the analysis" [p. B- I, from definition of a "best estimate"].
I question further whether the authors applied this probability distribution approach in a
fair. impartial, and consistent manner.
l found the near total reliance upon probablistic risk assessment techniques disturbing,
while the DSEIS neglects completely the empirical data available for the failures involving
recent NASA planetary probes. Since the early yeats of this decade, NASA launched four
planetary probes: Galileo, Mars Observer, Mars Global Surveyor, and Mars Pathfinder.
Three of the four (all except Mars Pathfinder) suffered mission threatening or mission
limiting failures - a rate of .75. Galileo suffered a stuck main antenna that would not
open, imposing severe penalties on data rate and computer performance. Mars Global
Surveyor suffered a stuck sol&army that may yet affect its ability to maneuver into Mars
orbit. Mars Observer suffered a catastrophic failure when undergoing a fuel tank
pressurization procedure shortly before orbital insertion around Mars, and may have
impacted upon the Mars surface. Thus the empirical catasm_hic failure rate for NASA
planetary probes in this decade is .25. If C._ssini suffered such a pressurization failure in
prep_ng for the Earth Hy-by maneuver, it could fail like Mars Observer, lose all
guidance, and most likely plunge into the Earth's atmosphere. I expected to see the DSEIS
address the Mars Observer-type scen_io, which most closely resembles C_ssini's
proposed Earth fly-bys. How could the EIS and DSEIS omit such an essential empirical
data point?
The DSEIS's probablistic analysis places the probability of a comparable failure of Cassini
during an Earth fly-by to be .0000008, less than one in one million. How do the DESIS
authors explain this enormous discrepancy between the empirical mission data and the
probablistic wishful thinking? Have we forgotten NASA's most painful experience with
probablistic crystal-gazing: the Challenger Accident? NASA's estimate for catastrophic
failure was .00001, but the failure occurred on the 25th launch, giving an empirical
catastrophic failure rate up to that time of .04. The DSEIS brags: "The updated analyses
include the most extensive evaluation of the uncertainties of accident consequences ever
attempted for a space mission." What good is all the Monte Carlo simulation in the world if
the key parameters ignore all the empirical data, and.experimental design assumptions are
either unavailable or wrong?
The EIS and DSEIS'do not meet the standard for scientific, scholarly publication. No
respectable scientific or technical journal would allow an author to publish a paper offering
such precisely defined numerical conclusions without showing how he obtained those
results - without providing the "most representative mathematical models" promised in the
definition of a "best estimate." Several of the key parameters, upon which the most
important issues turn, rest solely upon undocumented "personal communications;"
specifically from H. Hassan of ESA to D. KJndt Of JPL on the unsuitability of high
efficiency solar cells to replace the RTGs, [DSEIS p. 2-9] and C.E. Kohlhase to I.E.
DeFillipo [Haliburtono p. 5-7] on the probability distribution for reentry angle and reentry
latitude. Neither is this reliance upon unsupported personal communications instead of
documented evidence allowable for scholarly publication. In the absence the DSEIS and
EIS providing these models, data, and parameters, it is difficult to accept the EIS and
DSEIS authors' analytical process to produce the probablistic risk analysis The absence of
their mathematical and methodological models is particularly difficult to understand in light
of their claim to have performed "the most extensive evaluation ... ever attempted." The
exclusion of their vaunted probability distributions (ANOVAs or whatever) and tests for
validity further undermine this report.
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RISK BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Instead of the EIS and DSEIS dubious and obfuscating probablistic risk assessment, 1
propose a simple, common sense risk-benefit analysis. There are two occasions for
catastrophic failure during the Cassini Mission: the launch sequence and the Earth fly-by.
The benefitof launchingtheCassiniMission istoobtaintheScience.The riskistodump
thePlutonium intheocean. IfNASA does nottaketheriskoflaunching:no science.
The benefit of the Earth fly-by maneuver is to obtain the Science data a few years sooner.
The risk of failure is to disperse 73 pounds of Plutonium 238 oxide in the atmosphere,
with fatal cancers that the contractors estimate very conservatively at a "mean" of from 120
to 2300 people AND No Science return. Avoiding the fly-by maneuver eliminates the
threat of an accidental reentry at the cost of a few years delay in returning the Science data.
All the flyby maneuver does is get the Science data faster.
The Cassini vehicle design is an anamoly in this era of"Faster,. Better, Cheaper." Because
Cassini is so big and heavy, it pushes conventional launch capabilities beyond their limit,
and making necessary the complex multiple planetary fly-by trajectory to Saturn. Why has
NASA not replaced it with a small, inexpensive, reliable New Discovery or Millenium class
mission that would not pose so many difficulties and hazards, and would use more
advanced insu-ument and sensor technologies? I hope the answer is not "throwing good
money after bad."
6-4
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I found five areas in which I question the technical approaches of the three EIS reports:
Plutonium isotope, aerothermodynamic heating, atmos'pheric n'ansport mechanism, the
radiobiological health effects, and the solar power optqon.
PLUTONIUM ISOTOPE
The 1995 EIS devotes a great deal of attention to the amount of Pu239 released or
consumed in nuclear weapons tests before the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, as if to say
"Nuclear tests released thousands of kilograms of Plutonium. what does another 20 to 30
Kg of Pu238 isotope matter.'?" However, the fissionable isotope is Plutonium 239, which
has a half-life of 22,000 years, and is a relatively weak alpha emitter. The RTG fuel for
Cassini is a different isotope, Plutonium 238, which is a very strong emitter, corelating to
its half-life of 88 years. Chemically, their toxic effects as a heavy metal are the same, but
the radioactive and carcinogenic characteristics may be different. However, the 1995 EIS
does not appear to distinguish sufficiently between the two isotopes, and refers back
several times to nuclear testing as a source of environmental (fissionable) Plutonium 239,
which it seems to equate to Plutonium 238. To what degree do the EIS and DSEIS rely
upon a generalizability of the two isotopes to characterize carcinogenicity? The DSEIS
does not clear up this situation.
6-5
AEROTHERMODYNAMIC HEATING RATE
In the event of an Earth atmosphere reentry during a flyby maneuver;the C_as.sin! spacecraft 16-6
would enter the atmosphere at 19.4 km/sec for the preferred option or a VVF_,JOA trajectory I
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and at 17.4 kin/see for the secondary or backup mission options. All three reports express
considerable uncertainty about whether the Cassini probe would vaporize, and go to some
lengths to speculate about the pmhability of a small or large piece striking the ground intact.
in this respect, the authors seemed to have difficulty in distinguishing between a reentry
from orbital decay at ..7 knVsec to 11 kin/see and a fly-by VVE.IGA reentry at 19.4 km/sec
[Haliburton, p. 5-71. Perhaps this uncertainty is not surprising because the neither the EIS
or DSEIS teams included an expert aemthemodynamicist. Instead, they relied upon
probablistic scenarios, using "CFD data" that they do not provide, without expert
qualifications, in ways that are not clear.
I was disappointed and surprised to not find any informed discussion about the
aerothermodynamic heating rate, which varies as the cube of the velocity. I expected to
find a discussion of the Fay-Ridell equation, and associated computations. Fay-Ridell is an
approximation for convective heating to a general stagnation point of a vehicle undergoing
atmospheric entry. However, at higher velocity, it may apply less because of the
contribution from the radiation heating that is not taken into account (the convective heating
is diminished by the complex nalaa'e of the flow which is in non-equilibrium and very likely
causing a chemical phase change on the surface). The other complication is that the vehicle
would be tumbling, and hence the 'stagnation point' would be rotating - thus lowering the
energy delivered to a particular point as a function of time. How do the EIS and DSEIS
account for these aerothermodynamic considerations?
It is not clear from the three reports for which late launch orbital decay reentry velocity
Cassini was designed. The Haliburton Report refers obliquely to the "most severe launch
reentry accident," but does not stipulate its parameters. All other things being equal, the
aerothermodynamic heating rate on a vehicle entering at the flyby gravity assist rate of 19.4
km/sec is 5.48 times greater than the heating rate on a vehicle entering at the "maximum"
orbital decay rate of 11 km/sec. However, it is far more likely, that a vehicle would suffer
a "late launch" orbital decay failure because it had insufficient velocity of about 7 km/sec -
not because it achieved maximum velocity, sufficient or nearly sufficient for earth escape.
In this case, the aerothermodynamic heating rate for the flyby reentry is 21.48 times greater
than for the minimum and more likely launch reentry velocity. The consequence - at a
range of oblique incident angles - is certain vaporization and release of all the Plutonium
238 into the atmosphere. Instead of taking a hard look at the aerophysics, the DSEIS
attempts to answer all questions with its probablistic analysis, without really answering
most of them. The key question is at what altitude this vaporization and release of
Plutonium dioxide would occur. Why do the EIS and DSEIS offer no guidance in this
regard?
6-6
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ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT AND PARTICLE SIZE
The three reports make vague speculations about how the Plutonium 238 would travel from
the place in the atmosphere to disperse around the world. Nowhere do the reports cite any
literature involving modem models of atmospheric transport mechanisms. In the short term
that altitude of release is key for disperal patterns. Release in the troposphere -- up to about
12.3 km (41,000 It) - indicates circulation around the globe in a matter of weeks, in the
manner of particles from Chemobyi, which were detected worldwide about three weeks
after that accident. Release at the top of the stratusphere could take up to several years to
disperse the particles worldwide. However, there is no doubt that even from the top of the
ozone layer, the Plutonium 238 would eventually come down to Earth. The real issue is
what sort of probablity distribution of particle densities are likely to occur, based upon the
altitude and particle size. These distribution densities would contribute in turn to the human
population's exposure to Plutonium 238. It is not clear from reading the three reports what
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model of altitude, atmospheric transport, and particle density -- if any -- the authors
employed to obtain their results.
Perhaps this uncertainty is not surpising, given the absence of an atmospheric scientist
from the EIS and DSEIS teams. One need only look to the Cretaceous/Tertiary terminater,
associated with the last mass-extinction of species 65 million years ago marked worldwide
by a thin deposited layer of Iridium, to recognize the potential for world-wide distribution
of an element by atmospheric transport mechanism.
i believe that should the Cassini probe enter the atmosphere on a flyby, at the most likely
capture angles, it would vaporize entirely. It appears that despite all the probablistic
models, the EIS and DSEIS fail to take this outcome properly into account.
6-7
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BIORADIOLOGICAL HEALTH EFFECTS
The particle size and density relate to inhalation and dose absorption into the human body.
In this regard, I found it difficult to accept the way in which NASA shrugged off some of
the public comments in the Appendix of the 1995 EIS. Dorothy Scott Smith wrote to
NASA, quoting Dr. Helen Caldicott:
"... it [Plutonium] is so toxic that less than one-millionth of a gram (an
invisible particle) is a carcinogenic dose.
One pound, if uniformly distributed could hypothetically induce lung cancer
in every person on earth."
The EIS response to Dorothy Scott Smith quibbles about Dr. Caldicott's particle size,
treating it as a precise value rather than as an approximation or figure of speech. What we
would expect from Plutonium 238 vaporized in the atmosphere would be a population of
particles with a distribution of values across a range of sizes. However, neither the EIS
nor DSEIS apply their proud probablistic distribution techniques in this instance when,
perhaps, it does not suit them to show a range of particle sizes. Why do the EIS and
DSEIS fail to discuss the particle population?
Human health effects constitute the area that ultimately generates the most concern. The
EIS and DSEIS define the "health effect" of Plutonium exposure very specifically as an
excess (above normal rate) latent cancer fatality within 50 years after release of the
Plutonium 238. This approach presents several possible shortcomings, which are not
surprising, given the absence from the EIS/DSEIS teams of a medical doctor.
First. the notion of excess latent cancer fatalities is extremely limited: it rules out a range of
other, and possibly more common health effects of radiation, including possible "prompt"
effects upon the endocrine system (changes in hormone production), neurological system,
reproductive system including sterility and birth defects, and other non-fatal effects. Why
is there no discussion of non-cancer death health effects?
Second, the EIS and DSEIS ignore the direct toxic affects of Plutonium, a heavy metal that
is one of the most toxic substances known. Why is there no discussion of Plutonium
toxicity?
Third, it omits any discussion of the "quality factor" for the absorbed radiation dosage.
The problem with giving absorbed dose values in centiSyverts (rems) is that it is not a
generic measure, and it is incorrect to assume that the radiobiological damage effects from a
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centiSyven from Plutonium 238 is equal to a centiSyven of dental x-rays. One important
difference is that Plutonium 238 keeps emitting radiation for years after a human absorbs it,
creating a situation in which the body's natural repair mechanism may not be able to keep
up with the tissue damage from its ionizing panicles. Why is there no discussion of
quality factor for an inhaled or absorbed dose of Plutonium?
Are the EIS and DSEIS ignoring and downplaying the real health consequences of
Plutonium exposure because they use a probablistic model that can calculate only one kind
of hypothetical outcome, the defined "health effect" only as a latent excess cancer fatality?
Table 4-.2 Summary of Radiological Consequences and Mission Risks plays some further
funny games with the numbers for the health effects. Di_nguishing between the Plutonium
238 in the RTGs and in the LWRHUs, makes possible the "probability weighting" of these
two sources separately. Thus, for the mean predicted health effects of a VVEJGA reentry,
the RTGs alone would cause 130 mean "health effects" and the LWRHUs alone would
cause 13 mean "health effects." Yet, combined, RTG and LWRHU cause only the 120
mean "health effects" because of the manipulative probability weighting. However,
common sense dictates that if the whole Cassini spacecraft must vaporize on reentry,
probability weighting is meaningless and the two sources are additive, yielding 143 mean
"health effects."
6-8
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SOLAR POWER ALTERNATIVE
The 1995 EIS [p. 2-53--2-58] presents a strawnum design for a solar array system that
might replace the RTGs. This strawman design is the worst possible array configuration
with the longest moment arm, the greatest need to stiffen the arrays against thermal flux and
oscillation, and the worst vibratory modes, reminiscent of the arrays that the astronauts
replaced on the Hubble Space Telescope because they created so many problems. The
suawman comparison is not honest because it is not a "best estimate" as defined in the
DSEIS but a contrived worst case that requires substantial added mass to correct (although
the authors never state how much mass). This artificial worst case has only one purpose,
to stack the deck by setting up an easy comparison to the RTGs so that the EIS can say they
looked at solar power and it was so bad everyone can dismiss it from their minds.
A valid comparison would require an optimized, compact design that did not suffer from
the obvious suuctural problems of the EIS strawman. At the same time, the authors fail to
raise the most obvious operational difficulty for the solar power option: that with the
unidirectional solar arrays, the spacecraft would need to fly in a solar-inertial orientation
(pointing toward the sun). Departures from solar-inertial mode would require a
corresponding increase in battery mass to store the power to yield the approximately 800
watts necessary to sustain the oversized, power guzzling Cassini. Why did the EIS
overlook so obvious a critique of a mission-limiting aspect of solar power? Did NASA or
its contractors ever make an honest attempt at designing an optimal solar power alternative
for Cassini?
6-9
CONCLUSION
The computed probability of a malfunction causing the spacecraft to reenter the Earth's
atmosphere may be small, but the negative consequences are obviously great. The
consequences of this failure mode may well outweigh the benefits of success for Cassini.
[ therefore recommend that the Cassini launch be postponed. This delay would allow
further consideration and implementation of either of two feasible alternatives which would
substantially reduce the risk: adoption of the triple Venus flyby VVVGA trajectory in 2001
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which does not involve an Earth fly-by or the installation of a solar power supply in lieu of
the RTGs. [ also recommend the development of a much more efficient and powerful
upper stage booster to reduce or eliminate the need for complex planetary fly-by
trajectories, so instead we can launch space probes direct to their destinations.
! support Space Science. i support planetary exploration. I support the Space Program. !
support NASA. I do not oppose the responsible use of nuclear power systems for deep
space probes and planetary exploration. However, I cannot support biased research,
incomplete and inconsistent analysis involving bogus comparisons, and substandard
documentation. I am also concerned that the poor quality of the EIS and DSEIS will place
NASA in a poor light should there be a reentry accident and subsequent investigation.
If a builder submitted an Environmental Impact Report of this quality to support the
conslruction of a shopping center or a housing project, it would have no chance of passing
the scrutiny of a modem municipality due the the absence of the input clara, the key
assumptions, and the methods of analysis. While delaying the Cassini launch would delay
the receipt of valuable scientific data, I believe the increase in safety, and in the public
perception of NASA's dedication to safety would be much more valuable.
Thank-you for your consideration in this matter.
Sincerely,
Marc M. Cohen
6-I0
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Comment No. 6-1
Details of these models and parameters are in Volume II, Book 2 and Volume III,
Book 2 of the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) prepared for the Cassini
mission (LMM&S a-j; and EG&G 1997), and have been forwarded to the commentor.
Comment No. 6-2
The spacecraft trajectory is specifically designed to avoid Earth's atmosphere
(JPL 1993b; JPL 1997: see Chapter 8 of the Final SEIS). The trajectory is biased 5000 km
(3106 miles) or more away from the swingby altitude (not less than 800 km; about 500
miles) for all but 7 days prior to the swingby. The possibility of an Earth reentry only
becomes conceivable if an extremely unlikely sequence of events and failures occur. The
vast majority of potential spacecraft failures do not alter the spacecraft's trajectory. To
initiate an impact trajectory, a failure would have to cause a change in the spacecraft's
velocity of exactly the right magnitude and direction. For this reason, it is extremely
unlikely that a misfire of the Cassini rocket system would result in an inadvertent Earth
reentry. Another fact to keep in mind is that a number of spacecraft maneuvers will
have to be successfully conducted just to bring the spacecraft within tens of thousands
of kilometers of Earth. A maneuver at 7 days before swingby will ensure that the
spacecraft arrives at the desired point in space for the gravity-assist but does not come
closer to Earth than 800 krn (about 500 miles).
All relevant failures encountered on previous U.S. planetary missions have been
accounted for in the analysis and were considered in the design of the spacecraft's
propulsion system, other spacecraft engineering subsystems, the swingby trajectory,
and the overall mission design. Much of the Cassini design was driven by an effort to
minimize the probability of an earth impact. Trajectory biases and flyby distances were
increased, additional micrometeoroid shielding was added, a number of on-board fault
protection monitors were incorporated into the design, propulsion subsystem operation
during the swingby period was constrained to a benign mode, and ground system
procedures and constraints were modified, all to minimize the probability of Earth
impact. Flight experience was used in deriving the propulsion, electronic and ground
system failure rates and common mode and design errors were incorporated. Key
failure rates of concern are those that cause both a change in velocity or direction, or
loss of commandability. Even though these failure rates are on the order of several
percent, the trajectory bias, spacecraft redundancy and on-board fault protection, result
in Earth impact probabilities of less than one in a million. The Galileo stuck antenna
and Mars Global Surveyor stuck solar array would not have had any effect on an Earth
swingby. It should be noted that Galileo successfully performed two Earth swingbys
and is now gathering science information from Jupiter and its environment. To
eliminate the threat of a Mars Observer type failure, the Cassini propulsion system was
modified to enhance control of vapors. In addition, during the swingby phase of the
mission, the propulsion system will be operated in a benign mode (i.e., a mode in which
the system is not further pressurized until after the swingby).
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Comment No. 6-3
The recently available Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997)
for the Cassini mission are now referenced in this Final Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement (SEIS). The Hassan reference is included as Appendix C to this Final
SEIS.
Comment No. 6-4
The Cassini mission was approved in October 1989 and redesigned to reduce
costs early in 1992. The Cassini mission is a comprehensive study of the Saturnian
system -- the planet, rings, magnetosphere, and the moons, particularly Titan. The
objectives of this mission could not be accomplished with a smaller spacecraft.
Comment No. 6-5
Nowhere in the 1995 Cassini EIS or SEIS does it say or imply as the commentor
suggests, "what does 20 - 30 kg of Pu-238 isotopes matter?" The primary purpose of
preparing and issuing the 1995 Cassini EIS and Draft and Final SEIS has been to address
the potential impact of plutonium dioxide release on the quality of the human
environment.
Second, the statement that Pu-238 is a strong emitter of alpha particles and Pu-
239 is a weak emitter of alpha particles is not a scientific characterization of the
radioactive decay properties of the two isotopes. As noted previously, Pu-238 has a
half-life of 87.75 years. Pu-239 has a half-life of approximately 24,400 years. Both are
alpha particle emitters. The energy of the alpha particles from both are about the same:
i.e., about 5.5 MeV for Pu-238, and about 5.2 MeV for Pu-239. The statement concerning
one being a stronger emitter of alphas than the other relates to the half-lives of the two
isotopes. This means that for the same mass of material, Pu-238 emits 280 times the
energy per unit time as Pu-239.
In the comparisons made in the Draft and Final SEIS, the quantities of Pu-239 are
described in terms of curies. A curie is a unit of activity defined in terms of a specific
number (3.7x101°) of disintegrations (decays) per second. The 1995 Cassini EIS provides
the amount of activity released during the weapons testing program in terms of curies.
A curie of activity from Pu-239 is equivalent to a curie of activity from Pu-238, and their
radio-biological health effects are nearly equivalent.
The amounts of material released from weapons testing and the potential
releases from Cassini accidents are both expressed in terms of curies; thus a one to one
comparison between these two releases is appropriate. Three factors affecting the
primary cancer risks are the level of activity, the energy, and the type of the decay
particles or photons emitted. When described in terms of curies, the risk presented by a
curie of Pu-238 and Pu-239 are about the same. This is the comparison that is made in
the 1995 Cassini EIS.
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Comment No. 6-6
A detailed reentry analysis was performed in support of the Cassini safety
analysis process. That information is described in the Cassini General Purpose Heat
Source Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (GPHS-RTG) Final Safety Analysis
Report (SAR) in Volume II, Book 1, Section 5 and in Volume II, Book 2, Appendices E
and F and Volume III, Book 1, Sections 4.3 and 4.4, which are being made available to
the public. This SAR was only recently available after issuance of the Draft SEIS.
The analysis differentiates between the orbital and VVEJGA (EGA swingby)
reentry conditions. A team of experts from Lockheed Martin and the John Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU-APL) performed the reentry analysis
contained in the SARs for the Cassini mission. For Earth orbital reentry, the analysis
uses a later formula by Lees which is functionally similar to the equations developed by
Fay and Ridell. The use of Lees equation is described in the RTG SAR Volume II, Book
2 Appendix F (LMM&S c). The SAR contains a detailed discussion of the
aerothermodynamic heating and computational fluid dynamic (CFD) methodologies
used to develop the results presented in the Draft and Final SEIS for the EGA reentry
scenarios. The analysis does take into consideration a full range of the phenomena
encountered by ablating reentry bodies, including convective and radiative heating plus
structural analysis which was not mentioned by the commentor. The modeling
addresses the issue of tumbling. Tumbling is the less severe condition as the heating
and ablation is distributed over the surface of the reentering body.
The GPHS-RTGs modules and the Light Weight Radioisotope Heater Units
(LWRHUs) were designed to withstand reentry from Earth orbit. The carbon-carbon
composite of the RTG aeroshells and graphite impact shells (GISs) mitigate the effects of
the EGA accident reentry. The reentry conditions for the VVEJGA reentry were
analyzed using the CFD methodologies with the findings predicting that most of the
GISs from the RTG modules would remain intact during reentry.
No RTG module in-air failures were predicted for the Earth orbital reentry
scenarios. Details of the findings are discussed in the SAR. All potential plutonium
dioxide releases were taken into consideration in developing the health effects and the
risks presented in the Draft and Final SEIS.
The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) performed the
analysis for the LWRHUs. The results of the analysis are reported in Appendix VI of
the Cassini LWRHU SAR (EG&G 1997) and summarized in Section 7.7 of the same
document. A significant fraction of the LWRHUs are predicted to release their
materials depending upon the LWRHU orientation and the VVEJGA reentry angle.
For the RTGs, the 90 degree reentry angle is the most severe. The differences in
reentry velocities are taken into consideration in the analysis used to develop the results
presented in the Draft and Final SEIS. The analysis did consider shallow (oblique)
angles and no RTG module in-air failures are predicted for reentry angles less than 16
degrees. A discussion of the equation used for altitude of release is contained in the
RTG SAR Volume III Section 4.4.1 EGA Consequence Analysis Process (LMM&S d).
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Comment No. 6-7
The list of preparers and contributors to the Draft and Final SEIS document is not
meant to indicate the full extent of the expertise involved in the analyses. The models
used for dispersion and transport were all developed by experts in their field, and were
applied by the engineers and scientists doing the analyses. The 1995 Cassini EIS and
Draft and Final SEIS take into account the degree to which vaporization would occur in
the unlikely event of an Earth swingby accident (see RTG SAR Volume II, Book 1,
Section 5.4.5, pg. VII 5 - 102, and Table of particle sizes (5.4-8) on pg. VII 5 - 104,
LMM&S b.) The analyses indicated partial vaporization under certain reentry
scenarios. Models of atmospheric transport mechanisms were used in estimating the
dispersion of any plutonium dioxide released during an inadvertent Earth swingby
reentry (see RTG SAR Volume HI, Book 2, Appendices F, G, H, LMM&S e). High
altitude releases would result in near-global distribution (see RTG SAR Volume III,
Book 1, Section 4.4.1.2, pg. VIII 4-38 and Volume III, Book 2, Appendix H, LMM&S e).
Please also see comments 2-7, 2-8, and 2-9.
Comment No. 6-8
The EGA inadvertent reentry analysis predicts a mean release of 3 percent of the
plutonium dioxide inventory at high altitude, consisting of 1.4 percent as vapor and 1.6
percent in particulate form characterized as a particle size distribution (see the recently
available Safety Analysis Reports; specifically Table 5.4-8, of the RTG SAR Volume II,
Book 1, pg. VII 5-104, LMM&S b). The vapor portion is initially dispersed at high
altitude. The inhalation of the particulate portion of the release is taken into account
using particle-size dependent dose conversion factors. Dilution of the high altitude
vapor release within the atmosphere globally, coupled with the small fraction of the air
in the atmosphere inhaled by people prior to its removal by deposition on the Earth's
surface, result in only a small fraction of the release being inhaled. This is estimated to
be less than 1.3x10 -17 grams inhaled by an individual per gram of plutonium release (See
the 1995 Cassini EIS, Appendix D, pg. D-25; response to comment 4B).
Regarding potentially non-fatal health effects, see response to comment 2-12 (d).
Regarding medical expertise, while the EIS team did not include a medical doctor, the
team did include members with extensive experience in health physics (expertise
related to radiation protection and radiation health effects).
The particle-size dependent internal dose factors for plutonium dioxide used in
the analysis are based on an internal dosimetry model of the International Commission
on Radiological Protection (ICRP) documented in ICRP Publication 30 (ICRP 1979).
These dose factors are widely accepted at the Federal level by the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (DOE 1988). The internal dose factors for plutonium dioxide incorporate a
quality factor of 20 which reflects the relative biological effectiveness of alpha radiation
compared to a quality factor of 1 for x-ray, gamma, and beta radiation. The internal
dose factors take into account the time integration of doses within the body for a period
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of 50 years following exposure (termed the "50-year dose commitment period"). In
addition, the metabolic characteristics (particle size, solubility, respiratory region
clearance rates, and organ clearance rates) are taken into account.
Regarding the allegations of "downplaying the real health consequences of
plutonium exposure," see response to comment 2-12 (c).
The combined mean health effects of a VVEJGA reentry of 120 health effects for
the GPHS-RTG and the RHUs represents a probability weighted mean, calculated as
follows [then rounded]: [(8.0x10 -7 )(13) + 6.3x10 -7 (140)] / 8.0x10 -7 = 120
The results of 13 health effects for the RHU and 140 health effects for the GPHS-
RTG can not be simply added. The difference in the total release probabilities of 8.0X10 -7
for the RHU and 6.7x10 °7 for the GPHS-RTG, reflects the situation that given a VVEJGA
reentry with a probability of 8X10 -7, there is a conditional probability of 1.0 that there
would be a consequence from the RHU and a conditional probability of (6.3x10-7/
8X10 -7) = 0.79 that there would be a consequence from the GPHS-RTG. This difference
in conditional probabilities is associated with the larger number of RHUs (157
considered in the analysis) compared to the number of GPHS modules (54) that reenter.
Comment No. 6-9
The linear design depicted in the DSEIS was based on a flight proven design which
had been modified and ground tested with Advanced Photovoltaic Solar Array (APSA)
technology to achieve the highest possible specific performance (lowest weight per
output power) using existing or near term real technology. The design depicted
conforms to existing proven designs for large area, high power solar arrays, and has
been optimized for the factors pertinent to use of solar arrays for spacecraft.
In the course of solar design studies conducted for the Cassini mission several
arrangements for the solar arrays were investigated, including designs using circular
arrays and those using additional linear arms each of shorter length. The purpose of
these studies was to optimize the array design while accounting for the following:
• requirements for spacecraft structure stiffness and strength, spacecraft
instrument fields of view and navigation;
• minimizing the stowed launch volume, the number of drive motors, and the
overall complexity of the design; and
• maximizing the ease (simplicity) of deployability, array packing (solar cells
per unit area) efficiency, and array specific performance.
Comment No. 6-10
The only perceived advantage of the 2001 primary launch opportunity is that the
Cassini spacecraft would not execute an Earth swingby maneuver, thus alleviating the
need to address potential environmental impacts that could occur in the unlikely event
of reentry during an Earth swingby. It should be noted, however, that the 2001 launch
opportunity employs a Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity Assist trajectory as a backup. In the
unlikely event that the spacecraft could become uncommandable any time after
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injection and before Saturn Orbit Insertion, the probability of a long-term Earth impact
is estimated to be about 1.7x10 -7, or about 1 in 5,800,000. For additional details
regarding the long-term impact scenario, see chapter 4.1.5.2 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
Additional details regarding the 2001 mission are addressed in the Section 4.2,
third paragraph of this Final SEIS, and Chapter 2 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
The 2001 launch opportunity requires substantial spacecraft propulsion system
design changes, and is minimally acceptable with respect to the science objectives.
Also, solar power is not a viable alternative to RTGs for the Cassini mission (see
Section 2.1.4 of the Draft and Final SEIS, and response to comment 1-1).
Comment No. 6-11
The environmental and nuclear safety assessments conducted for Cassini are the
most comprehensive and rigorous studies ever conducted for any space mission.
Comment No. 6-12
Copies of the recently available SARs (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997) have been
forwarded to the commentor.
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May 23, 1997
Thomas W. Chad
1555 W. Middlefield RO., Apt 99
Mountain View CA 94043
Mr. Mark R. Oahl
Cassini Program Office
Office of Space Science (Code SO)
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-0001
According to President Marc Cohen, Architect, National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 997, the Caesini
Investigating Committee nor the General membership meeting
Wednesday Nay 21 could reach an agreement on a recommendation for
action about the Cassini probe which is powered by 73 pounds of
Plutonium 238. According Hr. Cohen, the general meeting voted
to inform membership of the above address to send comments on the
Environmental Impact Studies by 4:30 pm EST May 27, and Mr. Cohen
apologized for the lateness of this news update.
Enclosed is e-mail correspondence from myself as a member of
this Committee, and as a non-expert, layperson, compared to the
other scientists, who are considered to be experts on this topic.
I. The first letter talks about natural radioactivity, and the
measures of radioactivity in Curies and radiation or dosages
in roentgen equivalents for man (ram) or RADS (ergs). Also
discussed are certain natural radiactive elements, and then
Helen Caldicott's recent book, 'Nuclear Madness' which talks
about the problems with radwaste and Plutonium, emphasizing
how toxic the radioactive Plutonium is. Note that Dr. Caldicott
argues that • department for radioactive waste disposal should
be created, and that radioactive wastes should be quantified
according to biopathway equivalence. Also Dr. Caldicott
proposes more stringent standards for exposure from 5 rams to
2 rams for workers handling radioactive materials and wastes,
as well as establishing epidemiological life-cycle studies
for these nuclear workers.
2. The second letter to Paul Davis, Chair, Cassini Investigating
Committee, argues that the 1ongpathway remote sensing, abstract
experiment is not realistic from the point of view of time-
wise projected probability. A serious need to delay and
investigate further on the Cassini probe exists, as was
delineated by the resolution of the Marin County Board of
Supervisors, which also declared Matin County to be a 'nuclear
free zone.' There is reasonable concern & fear of the
incineration of Plutonium 238 if there was either a launch
of Earth fly-by mishap. In light of recent problems with
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the unmanned remote-sensing space-craft, this is a reasonable
fear. Questions as to (a) the atmospheric models for transport
and dispersion or aerothermodynamic effects with respect to
the orbital decay of the craft, and incineration, as it travels
through the atmosphere [is a reasonable objection to the
statistical summary of the EIS draft], (b) the possibility of
impacting space debris or other objects in its pathway, (c) the
statistical probability of high-energy particles or
electromagnetic waves damaging onboard computers(?), (d) the
apparent relatively safer alternative 2001 launch which
eliminates the Earth Gravity Assist (EGA) with a Venus-Venus-
Venus Gravity Assist (VVVGA) [what are the objections to
the 2001 launch?], (e) a better statement as to the toxicity
of the Plutonium-238 is in order, (f) the source of the
Plutonium-238 is Russian, and the risks involved in the
manufacture, and with nuclear energy need to be emphasized,
and finally, (f) the mission-risks included in actual costs
are probably under-exaggerated.
3. The third letter explains the limits for the remote sensing
unmanned spacecraft should be the limits of the energy of the
sun, thermodynamically. In other words, the unmanned craft
really should be solar powered only.
4. This letter, again to Marc Cohen, President, NFFE, Local 997
states that there is concern that NASA public policy making
could be a part of the reason that the fight for the environment
is a losing one, as according to the news media. The concern
for the technology being a useful complement for improving
the 'quality of life on earth' is that 'life in space' be
enhanced is the criteria for future projects. So, this is
consistent with the bio-astronomy program currently at NASA
Ames Research Center. I propose NASA studies in bio-astronomy
on radiation & environment & human health. Perhaps, Dr.
Caldicott, the Doctors for Social Responsibility, who are
concerned about the proliferation of a nuclear environment
just from the use of nuclear energy, but also with the earlier
nuclear arms race, should from a PARTNERSHIP with NASA to
address this nuclear problem within the earth's ecosystem.
5. This letter, I noted that even though I objected to the
Plutonium-238 power and request that it be replaced by
solar cells, that the gravity-assists are probably energy-
saving in that the acceleration gained by the planetary
gravitational field could be a savings. Again I request
a bio-astronomy program with respect to nuclear energy.
In summary, I am supporting of the Matin county Board of
Supervisors resolution to delay the Cassini flight until there
is more investigation on the health dangers of the Plutonium-238
energy source. I am in favor of replacing the radio-isotope
thermo-electric generators (RTGs) with thermonuclear fusion
powered solar cells. This is consistent with bio-astronomy
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principals in exploring our solar system.
Thank you for considering my opinion.
Sincerely,
Thomas W. Chao
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To: pkdavis
From: Thomas Chao <tchao@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Subject: NFFE Cassini Committee
Cc: mcohen, trivell
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Paul,
You have a copy of the final Environmental Impac_ Statement (EIS)
for the Cassini mission. I hadn't read through it, and the technical
or statistical analysis is where the controversy is. Over the weekend
I read through Helen Caldicott's revised 'Nuclear Madness.'
I have the measures that Marc went over with me on the phone from
earlier.
radioactivity in Curies (Ci) or milliCuries
radiation or dosages in roentgen equivalents for man (rem) or RADs
(ergs)
The information I have is old, and is from an earlier Remington's
Pharmaceutical, some introductory physics books, the Encyclopaedia
Britannica,
and Helen Caldicott, MD., and Tom R's internet handout.
According to the old Encyclopaedia Britannica sea level has .02 -.04
RADs per year of cosmic radiation exposure. At about 5,000 ft this
increases
to .04 -.06 RADs per year. According to Caldicott the current health
standards
give permissible levels not-to-exceed 170 rems.
Carbon-14, Potassium-40, Radium have natural radioactivity which is
quantized in curies, and as to type such as alpha or beta particles or
gamma rays, and has certain physiological affects. Note the natural
occurrences
of radium, thorium and uranium.
EXTERNAL DOSE DUE TO NATURAL RADIOACTIVITY
SOURCE
Ordinary regions
Active region
Granite in France
Houses, Sweden
Alummina shale
Monazite alluvial
Deposits, Brazil
Monazite sand
Kerala, India
DOSE in RADs/year
.025-.160
.180-.350
.158-.220
Mean .500 Max 1.00
.37-2.8
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As Marc pointed out, the Plutonium-238 has a half-life of 87.7
years, and
the radioactive by-products have 25,000 years half-life total!!!!
Caldicott
has a chapter in her book on Plutonium and has that 'Plutonium is one
of
the most carcinogenic substances known ...... So toxic that less than
one-
millionth of a gram ...... is a carcinogenic dose. Irradiation of
mouse and
hmaster cells by plutonium alpha particles creates chromosomal
abnormalities
that appear only after several generations of cell divisions.'
According to Caldicott the 1969 industrial fire at a military
reactor
site in Rocky Flats, Colorado released forty-four pounds of respirable
plutonium, and that it was disruptive to the local ecosystem.
Also at present there is 5 tons of plutonium thinly dispersed over
the earth from nuclear bom testing, satellite re-entries and orbital
decay, and effluents
from nuclear testing. The tragedy at the Chernobyl reactor added 1/2
ton.
The amended Price Anderson act limits liability in case of a nuclear
accident to 7.8 billion/accident. The doubling dose for incidence of
bone marrow cancer is 3.6 fads per lifetime, and is 33-38 fads per
lifetime for other forms _f cancer.
Caldicott's book talks about the problem with radioactive wastes.
The
difficulty of this is interestingly not different from the
carcinogenic
compounds of the organic chemistry based technology such as
pesticides.
However, the radioactive compounds are orders of magnitude more potent
in that respect. Possibly the strong forces, compared to
_ electromagnetic
forces or to weak forces, and possibly to gravity, might be the first
approximation as to strength.
In Chapter II, 'Waste Cleanup,' 'In the 1950's the United States
possessed only a few hudred curies of radioactive waste. By 1984, it
has accumulated 14.7 billion curies stored in interim centers; by the
year
2000, experts predict a total of 42 billion curies--overkill for every
human
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To: pkdavis
From: Thomas Chao <tchao@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Subject: NFFE Cassini Committee
Cc: mcohen, trivell
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Paul,
You have a copy of the final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
for the Cassini mission. I hadn't read through it, and the technical
or statistical analysis is where the controversy is. Over the weekend
I read through Helen Caldicott's revised 'Nuclear Madness.'
I have the measures that Marc went over with me on the phone from
earlier.
radioactivity in Curies (Ci) or milliCuries
radiation or dosages in roentgen equivalents for man (rem) or RADs
(ergs)
The information I have is old, and is from an earlier Remington's
Pharmaceutical, some introductory physics books, the Encyclopaedia
Britannica,
and Helen Caldicott, MD., and Tom R's internet handout.
According to the old Encyclopaedia Britannica sea level has .02 -.04
RADs per year of cosmic radiation exposure. At about 5,000 ft this
increases
to .04 -.06 RADs per year. According to Caldicott the current health
standards
give permissible levels not-to-exceed 170 rems.
Carbon-14, Potassium-40, Radium have natural radioactivity which is
quantized in curies, and as to type such as alpha or beta particles or
gamma rays, and has certain physiological affects. Note the natural
occurrences
of radium, thorium and uranium.
EXTERNAL DOSE DUE TO NATURAL RADIOACTIVITY
SOURCE
Ordinary regions
Active region
Granite in France
Houses, Sweden
Alummina shale
Monazite alluvial
Deposits, Brazil
Monazite sand
Kerala, India
DOSE in RADs/year
.025-.160
.180-.350
.158-.220
Mean .500 Max 1.00
.37-2.8
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on earth.'
Note the parallels to Rachel Carson's 'Silent Spring' which I read a
long time ago.
The suggestions that Caldicott gives at the end of her book is:
(in my own words, approx.)
I. Create a department of radioactive waste dispoal (NASA would be
ideal
for this position!)
2. Radioactive waste must be quantified according to biopathway
equivalence.
(I made this suggestion earlier in my paper to the basic research
council)
3. Establish more stringent exposure standards 'from 5 rems to 2
rems
for workers handling radioactive materials and waste.' Establish
epidemiological studies on these nuclear workers at the
life-cycle
level. Open Dept. of Energy radiation exposure & releases data
to the public.
--Thank you.
Tom Chao
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! pkdav±s, 04:01 _ S/7/97, No Subject
To: pkdavis
From: Thomas Chao <tchao@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Subject:
Cc: mcohen, trivell
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Paul Davis, Chair, Cassini Investigating Committee
Courtesy of Tom Rivell, I got a chance to browse through all the
various
Environmental Impact Statement drafts at the Law Library in Building
19.
Since obviously the staff at Ames are experts on this topic, I'll
input
some of my layperson perception [or misconception] of the problem.
The distances or (I/,)(I/r) (I/4) are vast [if we can get away with it]
and the velocity impossibly high (EGA swing-by, 19.4 kilometers/set).
And
the craft is impossibly loaded with fuel & oxidizers.
You might theoretically consider that it should have an artificial
ecosystem
so that it's more than a missile. Here it has physics remote sensing
tools and a high gain attenna. Because initially, you would have
success,
but eventually this kind of system with probability would eventually
catch
up to you on motivation as well as in errors that could conceivably
meet tragic results. Again, the astrobiology question is posed. [The
pictures at an
exhibition of the planets is satisfying only at first????)]
['By entropy it wins at first, but then it loses'] [Repetition in this
circumstance is not desired]--Reasonable? At the limits of technology
anyway. (I must be dreaming)
Questions:
I. On the EGA (Earth Gravity-Assist), the analysis of transport and
dispersion
of radioactive particles, as was argued by opponents--The question
as to
why the incineration of the iridium clad Plutonium-238 would not
occur,
and [I might be misreading] why it would descend & impact the earth
or fall into the ocean [approx 3/4 surface?]. That seems
improbable without
computations to support it. {I guess that a missile envelope
shield
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for the Plutonium-238 would not help if the 'steering failed[?]'}
2. Other questions are that is there space debris as was pointed out
and
what is the probability of impacting such? Also, can the debris be
anticipated at least in near earth orbit. Then can early detection
systems & steering mechanisms be built to avoid these
micrometeroids
or anthropogenic space age debris?
2a. If there is a RTG or other Plutonium-238 sources onboard, then
is there statistical probability of high-energy particles or
electro-
magnetic waves damaging onboard computers? Of course as with
distributors, which have electromagnetic shields, they obviously
shield the electronics. Then, the same question is posed for
cosmic
radiation.
3. Since the 2001 alternative launch involves a Venus-Venus-Venus
Gravity
Assist (VVVGA), then what is the objection to this alternative
launch?
4. Since the environmental health is a reasonable issue, then perhaps,
delaying until solar cell alternatives can be achieved for this
kind
of an experiment [if not critical to the course of space science]
would be a reasonable pathway for the space program. Remember the
bioastronomy problem, with all the concern about nuclear [rad]
wastes.
[Cosmic radiation as the source of the nuclear energy.]
5. Perhaps, a clarifying statement on the biopathway toxicity of the
Plutonium-238 or of its fission byproducts is in order.
6. The source of the Plutonium-238, and perhaps liability with respect
to the US initiated international space treaty(?) according to
animated software. What is the risks occurred in creating this
plutonium,
conceivably with a breeder reactor(?) [I don't really understand
this]
7. Are the risks under-exaggerated? Remember that this venture has to
be costed. Whole cost accounting includes sources of the
plutonium,
and then considering the fuel & such, etc., the
costs/risks/benefits
has to be questioned. Aren't there other problems that could be
relevant to NASA's bio-astronomy program which might be even more
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worthwhile investments?
--Thank you.
Tom Chao
No sub_ _t
mcohen
trivell
,
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To: pkdavis
From: Thomas Chao <tchao@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Subject: NFFE Local 997 Cassini Investigating Committee
Cc: trivell, mcohen
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
'[The] sun's the reason...'
The thermodynamic equation for costs/risks/benefits of a manned or
unmanned spacecraft might be conjectured to take in consideration
'heterotrophic' and 'autotrophic' considerations, as the heat of sun's
thermonuclear fusion and C-N-O cycle is the energy source of the
earth's ecosystem. Observing the sun's II year cycle or correlating
solar flares to disturbances of the earth's electrical field is what
I've read in the news media. Possibly looking at the reversal of the
Earth's Southern hemisphere coreolis in the Pacific Ocean, or the 'El
Nino,' which is observed by the height and temperature of the Ocean
surface, and brings rains and drought to the continents, and relating
highs and lows in atmospheric pressure to phenomena on the sun's
surface(?) is today's science.
'Day speaks unto day. Night with night shares it knowledge.'
For an abstract space experiment, operating on
make that
thermodynamic equation go forward, I would guess.
solar energy might
Thank you. [This is just my own opinion]
--Tom Chao
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To: mcohen
From: Thomas Chao <tchao@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Subject, COMMENTS, Ca==in_ Investigating Committee Draft
Cc: pkdavis, trivell
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Marc,
I. I always read in the news media that there is a 'losing battle for
the
environment.' I am concerned that that NASA public policy making
is
a part of this problem. As critics have written, the lack of
concern
for environment & health problems is not reasonable for pure
research
with respect to abstract space science. The benefits/costs/rlsks
assessment or the EPA would have to concede that to a layperson
this is
an abstract space experiment; and considering the health of
ecosystem
life on the planet earth--The consideration as to environment has
to weighed over remote sensing phenomenal observation benefits
derived from the experiment. Note that NASA is a civilian
organization
that is under international laws, i.e., United Nations. There
should
not be unnecessary jeopardy.
2. The limits of any abstract solar system exploration are the limits
of the thermonuclear fusion energy release of our sun. This would
appear to
myself as an obvious thermodynamic equation of energy conservation.
I think that thermodynamically, the equation doesn't go forward
otherwise.
I could be mistaken on this matter though. Therefore, solar cells
should be the power source--SUSTAINABILITY.
3. The 'solar powered sailing' of any abstractunmanned spacecraft
would be deemed to be 'environmentally-friendly.' Solar powered
spacecraft appear to
be advantagious, naively. However, building more powerful boosters
to launch instead of taking advantage of the accelerative
gravity-assists
from the planets would probably lose some of the energy
conservation
for these abstract solar system unmanned spacecraft. Possibly the
gravity-assists or planet swing-bys are some kind of breakthrough
in
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orbital mechanics theory. This is my ownguess.
4. Also the bio-astronomy consideration that NASA Ames has publicized,
has it
that life in the solar system or perhaps in the galaxy or universe
is
what is important for determining the goals and objects for the
space
program. The consideration of life in space is what is to be
achieved
or enhanced. The limits of the space program is the limits of life
in that respect. At this time, improvements in the earth's
biosphere
is possibly. NASA should be supporting work An this respect. As
part of its bio-astronomy program, NASA needs to disseminate
information
to the public on the problems of radiation. This is a part of the
bio-astronomy problem, and the natural radio-isotope environment in
the ecosystem, as well as radiation encountered An
aerothermodynamic
flight, as well as space flight needs to be addressed as part of
NASA
program along with problems with anthropogenic sources of
radiation--NASA BIO-ASTRONOMY STUDIES ON RADIATION &
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH.
5. Another problem to be addressed by the bio-astronomy program should
be
the problem of radwastes (NUCLEAR 9_%STES). The recent protests of
'activists' concerning the secret transport of nuclear fuels from
Japan to Cherbourg, France, or England (reprocessing plutonium),
and use of
reactors for nuclear weapons (Plutonium or tritium) are of concern
also.
The problems at Three Mile Island, and the tragedy at the Chernobyl
reactor are evidence that the 'FEAR OF' a nuclear accident is a
very
REASONABLE one. The environmental health can be improved by
establishing
'nuclear free' zones. In some sense, space should be 'nuclear
free.'
I guess that this is ironic, as the space program was formed in
part
as a response to survival in a nuclear age; and obviously without
the
protective atmosphere of the earth, near & outerspace is a
radioactive
environment at best. The 'Doctors for Social Responsibility' with
Dr. Helen Caldicott should form a PARTNERSHIP with NASA to address
this nuclear problem within the earth's ecosystem.
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Taking this BIO-ASTRONOMY or earth-friendly approach to space
research
is the only viable pathway for the space program, as then the
program will
be concerned about the QUALITY OF ECOSYSTEM LIFE on the planet
earth.
Sincerely,
Tom Chao
cc: pkdavis
trivell
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Tc: "Marc M. Cehen" <mcohen@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Frem: Thomas Chao <tchao@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Subject: Re: COMMENTS, Cassini Investigating Committee Draft
Cc: pkdavis, trivell
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Marc Cohen, President, NFFE Local 997
[I could very well have more than a few misconceptions on this
problem.] However, I think the gravity-assist might be an
energy-efficient journey for these remote-sensing, unmanned
spacecraft. [However, I don't remember whether
the rocket boosters from earlier were larger.] It's just the
Plutonium-238
power supply I'm concerned about [or the Earth Gravity Assist (EGA) in
this
circumstance.]
Note the uncertainty or statistics involved in the failure analysis
is that science appears to say that there must be some. In physics,
we
were taught the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle; and this plays in
the
nuclear physics. Also 'curved space-time' in both special & general
relativity seem to have this problem. Also, in parallel, behavioral
human psychology also allows for errors as a part of learning. So I
think that problems have to be allowed for in space flight, especially
for a sustainable, realistic program.
The other suggestion was for insertion of a bio-astronomy program
for
the study of radiation & problems with nuclear energy so far as the
health of the ecosystem & humans is concerned. At the same time, the
radwaste issue has to be addressed as a current international problem,
and
also one of physics.
The manufacturing of this kind of Plutonium-238 is one of the
questions that
I would have. Whether it requires a breeder reactor, etc... Then if
the source if international, then what kinds of safety, health
considerations
pertain? Also, what kinds of international law apply? What happened
to our
sense of history? [Space historian?]
Mostly, I'm in support of the letter. I appreciate the Union
applying
its expertise, knowledge, and physical adeptness in the space sciences
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in considering the Marin County sBoard of Supervisors Resolution.
Thank you.
Tom Chao
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>From mcohen@maii.arc.nasa.gov Fri May 23 11:24:06 1997
Return-Path: <mcohen@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 11:24:00 -0700 (PDT)
To: Recipient. List.Suppressed:;
From: "Marc M. Cohen" <mcohen@mail.arc.nasa.gov>
Subject: Cassini Committee Outcome
To the NFFE member,
Neither the Cassini Investigating Committee nor the General membership
meeting this week could agree on a recommendation for action about the
Cassini probe and its 73 pounds of Plutonium 238.
Instead, the general meeting voted to inform the membership of the
address
to send comments on the Environmental Impact Studies by 4:30 EST May
27.
I'm sorry for the lateness of this news update. The EIS is available
in
the Ames Law Library on the second floor on Bldg NI9, at the end near
the
post office.
The address is:
Mr. Mark R. Dahl
Cassini Program Office
Office of Space Science (Code SD)
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Here are to Web Sites: Cassini Project at JPL and the Stop Cassini
Action
group.
http://www-hpcc.astro.washington.edu/mirrors/solar/cassini.htm
http://www.animatedsoftware.com/cassini/actionpl.htm
Sorry we were not able to achieve a more specific resolution for the
concerns that members had brought up to the union.
Sincerely,
Marc
Marc M. Cohen, President
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 997
NASA-Ames Research Center
Mail Stop 19-13
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Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
TEL (415) 604-0068
FAX (415) 604-0673
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Commentor 7: Thomas W. Chao
Comment No. 7-1
Comment noted.
Comment No. 7-2(a)
Please see response to comments 2-9, 2-10, 2-11 and 6-7.
Copies of the recently available Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) (LMM&S a-j;
EG&G 1997) have been forwarded to the commentor.
Comment No. 7-2(b)
Please see response to comment 2-18
Comment No. 7-2(c)
As part of the failure analyses conducted for the Cassini mission design, various
spacecraft failure modes were examined for their potential to adversely affect the
functionality of the spacecraft and cause a mission failure. The Cassini spacecraft
electronics have been especially selected and/or built and packaged into the spacecraft
to improve their resistance to and protection against radiation damage during its flight.
The radiation field emitted by the RTGs and RHU's is also taken into account in this
design- and-build process for both the spacecraft and spacecraft instruments.
Refer to the 1995 Cassini Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Supporting
Studies Volume III (JPL 1993 b).
Comment No. 7-2(d)
Please see response to comment 6-10.
Comment No. 7-2(e)
Please see response to comment 6-8.
Comment No. 7-2(f)
All of the Pu-238 used for Cassini is of domestic (U.S.) origin. The Department of
Energy has prepared separate National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and safety
documentation for each facility involved in the processing of Pu-238.
Comment No. 7-2(g)
Only potential cleanup costs are addressed in the Draft and Final SEIS.
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Commentor 7: Thomas W. Chao
Comment No. 7-3
Please see response to comments 1-1, 2-1 and 2-2.
Comment No. 7-4
Comment noted.
Comment No. 7-5
Comment noted.
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Victoria Nichols
2230 53rd Ave.
Vero Beach, FL 32966
May 22, 1997
Mark R. Dahl, Prosram Executive, Cassini
Mission and Payload Development Division, Office of Space Sciences
Code SD
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 205460001
RE: Commentsto Draft SupplementalEnvironmental Impact Stat_aertt for CassiniMission
Mr. Dalai:
In January 1997, a Delta II rocket exploded at Cape Canaveral, releasing a toxic cloud that spread to
Vero Beach, Orlando and beyond. This explosion, of what you at NASA promote as a very reliable
rocket, emphasizes to Florida residents the very real and grave consequences of a launch explosion
involving deadly plutonium It b clear _om the events in January that no anmtmt of"emergency
numasemeat" could protect anyone from an accident at the Cape involving mtdear material. The
County Emersency Management agency was totally unable to adequately inform the citzem3¢of
Indian River County that there was a toxic cloud of gas in the vicinity - in fact, even the people who
did learn of the situation (and then only by rumor and word of mouth) did not become aware of it
until the gas cloud was already overhead. Many people were exposed without even knowin8 it.
Telephone calls to Emergency Management reve_ed an extremely casual attitude about the situation
and a startling lack of information as to the exact nature of the toxins. It is obvious that a similar
explosion of the Cassini raison or any other mission with a nuclear payload could not be "managed"
by any definition of the temt The only sdequate safety _ would be toUd evacuation of the
major portion of central Horida and the _ areas before launch.
In November 1996, a failed Russian Mars 96 spacecraft re-entered Earth's atmosphere over South America
and might have released u muchas 200 grams of toxic aerosol plutonium particles. Again we are made
aware of the fallibility of space technology and the very real danger presented by the use of nuclear materials
in spacecra/_. No mnount of"science" b worth this risk.
As a citizen who is under imP'ate threat _rom NASA's imistence on using unreliable and dangerous
technology, I call on you to cancel the Cassini mission and all future missions involving nuclear materials.
[n peace,,
Victoria Nichols
8-1
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Commentor 8: Victoria Nichols
Comment No. 8-1
Launches of radioactive materials from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) or Cape
Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) require special planning to address the presence of
radioactive materials and the potential for accidents involving those materials.
Accordingly, for Cassini, radiological contingency plans are being developed by
NASA/KSC and USAF/CCAS to address specifically the initial response that would be
required in the unlikely event of an accident affecting the launch site. Similar plans
already exist at the State and county (Brevard) levels in Florida, and are in the process
of being updated for the Cassini mission. Planning activities have been accomplished
in concert with representatives from the State of Florida Division of Emergency
Management, Office of Radiation Control, and Emergency Management and Public
Safety representatives from Brevard County. The NASA/USAF and State of Florida
plans are also being closely coordinated with the DOE, which maintains its own set of
emergency response instructions for radiological accidents of many kinds, to ensure a
coordinated initial response to any accident. Additionally, NASA/KSC and the
Department of Energy (DOE) are coordinating closely with the State of Florida on
development of recommended protective actions that could be implemented in the
unlikely event of a release of radioactive material, both for the launch site and for the
general public and affected areas. The plans under development include coordination
of public affairs information with public media, sophisticated predictive modeling tools
to assist in the emergency response, and the predeployment of significant resources
including people and equipment. A tabletop walkthrough and a command post
exercise are planned prior to the launch, to ensure that the multiple plans being
developed mesh together to provide a unified response plan to a launch accident with
the potential to release radioactive materials.
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Every life is precious.
Whydowe permit people
to make a fortune
by making, selling and using
Things that kill, injure and destroy?
Every life is predous.
Why is having an adventureor a thrill
more important than saving
every precious lifefrom injury or death?
If it were a diseasethat was
doing this destructionwe
would do everything we could
to find the cause and eliminate it.
Why is our convenience
more important than another's life?
what kind of role models
are we forour children?
Why do we provide other countries
with weapons that kill, injure and destroy?
Their opponent'slives are all precioustoo.
If you believe we are all made in God's image,
then why are we killing the divinity in us?
We pride ourselveson our inventions
cars, planes, trains, buses, boats
They all kill and injure.
Birdswere made to fly.
We were made to walk or run.
Every life is precious.
Peaceis not made with a gun
or a bomb or a mine.
Peaceis made with love and forgiveness.
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Commentor 10: Jeanne Vicini
Comment No. 10-1
NASA's and the Department of Energy's extensive analyses of both launch and
Earth swingby accidents that could potentially result in a release of plutonium dioxide,
indicate that only a small fraction of the 73 pound inventory is likely to be released.
The analyses of potential accidents indicate that there are no credible scenarios that
could result in a complete release of the full inventory on-board the Cassini spacecraft.
The consequences of potential releases have been provided in the Table 4-2 of the Draft
and Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS).
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Commentor 11: Margaret N. Spallone
Comment No. 11-1
Please see response to comment 2-1.
Comment No. 11-2
Please see response to comment 2-2.
Comment No. 11-3
Please see response to comment 2-3.
Comment No. 11-4
Please see response to comment 2-4.
Comment No. 11-5
Please see response to comment 2-5.
Comment No. 11-6
The Cassini mission is an international scientific mission for peaceful purposes
and has no "military goals." The objectives of the mission have been addressed in
Section 1.2 of the Draft and Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS),
with further details provided in Section 1.2 of the 1995 Cassini EIS. Briefly stated, the
Cassini mission involves a four year tour of the Saturn system to scientifically
investigate the planet, its rings, satellites and magnetosphere. The commentor has been
provided with a copy of the 1995 Cassini EIS, and this Final SEIS.
Comment No. 11-7
Please see response to comment 2-7.
Comment No. 11-8
Please see response to comment 2-18.
Comment No. 11-9
Please see response to comment 2-9.
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Commentor 1 I: Margaret N. Spallone
Comment No. 11-10
Please see response to comment 2-10.
Comment No. 11-11
Please see response to comment 2-11.
Comment No. 11-12
NASA makes no claim that there is a low, safe level of plutonium exposure. All
potential doses were considered in estimating the accident consequences reported in the
Draft and Final SEIS.
Comment No. 11-13
Please see response to comment 2-13.
Comment No. 11-14
Please see response to comment 2-14.
Comment No. 11-15
Please see response to comment 2-15.
Comment No. 11-16
Please see response to comment 2-16.
Comment No. 11-17
The Cassini mission sets no precedent. It would be the 25-th mission since 1961
to be launched with nuclear power sources on board. For additional details, refer to
Table 2-2 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
Comment No. 11-18
Please see response to comment 2-18.
Comment No. 11-19
Please see our response to comment 2-19.
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Commentor11: MargaretN.Spallone
Comment No. 11-20
NASA has not rejected such studies. The analyses reported in the Draft and
Final SEIS took into account all potential doses in estimating accident consequences.
The Draft and Final SEIS report only results without de minimis, i.e. the estimated
consequences reported account for all potential doses received.
Comment No. 11-21
Please see response to comment 2-21.
Comment No. 11-22
The psychological impacts to the general population of a potential accident
involving release of plutonium dioxide are not within the scope of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Please also see response to comment 2-22.
Comment No. 11-23
Please see response to comment 2-23.
Comment No. 11-24
Please see response to comment 2-24.
Comment No. 11-25
Please see response to comment 2-8.
Comment No. 11-26
Please see response to comment 2-26.
Comment No. 11-27
Please see response to comment 2-27. NASA and DOE have no knowledge as to
whether the Russians have recovered their own radioisotope power source from Mars
96.
Comment No. 11-28
Please see response to comment 2-28.
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Commentor 11: Margaret N. Spallone
Comment No. 11-29
Cassini does not set an example. There is a successful history of the use of
plutonium dioxide - fueled RTGs onboard U.S. spacecraft as noted in the response to
comment 13-1. The environmental consequences of the Cassini mission have been
addressed in the June 1995 Cassini EIS and the Draft and Final SEIS.
Comment No. 11-30
Please see response to comment 2-30.
Comment No. 11-31
Please see response to comment 2-31.
Comment No. 11-32
NASA has included all members of the potentially exposed population in
estimating the consequences of a potential accident involving the release of plutonium
dioxide. The increased sensitivity of women, fetuses, and infants to low level radiation
with respect to detrimental effects (fatal cancers, non fatal cancers, and severe
hereditary effects) has been addressed by ICRP-60. The recently available Safety
Analysis Reports (SARs) (LMM&S a-j; EG&G 1997), referenced in the Final SEIS used
the health effects estimator from ICRP-60. The SARs have been forwarded to the
commentor. See also response to comment 2-12 (c).
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Commentor 11 : Margaret N. Spallone
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Commentor 12: Edward D. Ramsberger
Thank you for your letter. Request noted.
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Commentor 13: Florida Southwest Peace Educatio.n Coalition
FLORIDA SOUTHWEST PEACE EDUCATION COALITION
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1312 Whispering Lane • Venice, FL 34292
Mark R. Dahl
NASA Headquarters
Nashington, DC 20546-0001
Dear Mark Dahl,
Thank you for mailing the safety analysls and the draft
for the impact statement for the Csssini Nisslon."
This launch Is a particularly dangerous one wlth 73 Ibs.
of Plutonium on board. Our organization has opposed
this launch before the recent crash of the Russian Mars
96 spacecraft crashed somewhere in Chili or Bolivia. A
fev reeks ago the headlines read, "Space shuc_le makes a safe and
early return." The record for success£ul nrfssiona is not good and
nov NASA plans to put 73 ibs of PLO 2, the most dangerous substance
knov to san in space v_th a potential danger to the vhole vorld.
13-1
Ne have had many redioactive releases from failed spacecraft
spreading debris around the earth causing who knows how many cases
of cancer? I r_ember Transit 1 5BN-3 where 2.1 lbs plutonium
vaporized in the atmosphere and spread around the vorld, Nimbus B-l,
Apolo 135.5, Cosmos 954 and nov Mars 96. Nhy risk spreading 73 Ibs
of cancer causing plutonium around the world? Ne have enough cancer
here on earRh already. None o£ these accidents was supposed to happen,
but they did!
13-2
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For the trlp to Saturn Cassini will circle Venus twice then plunge
toward earth to gain speed for its 7 year trip to Saturn. It will
pass within 320 miles of the egrths surface. It is this flyby,
according to NASA risk assessment that carries the greatest potential
danger because the probe could burn up if it should veer into the
earths atmosphere.
The environmental study admits that in a worst case accident 5
million people could be exposed to radiation and 2,300 could suffer
health effects as a result. Before the Challenger accident NASA said
the likelihood of an accident was less than 1 in a million. After
the accident the estimatewas revised to 1 in 76.
Michio Kaku, a nuclear physics professor at the City College of New
York said, "These numbers are s scientific fraud, I don't know the
exact probality of failure, but neither does NASA."
I do not believe the US should be playing "Russian Roulete" with
the health of the world.
Please hold up this launch until solar power for the mission is
developed. Kaku nays NASA's own plans call for a mission that would
travel out beyond the orbit of Pluto, using only solar power. Is
enough being done to develope this alternative? Probaly not.
Peace and Justice,
Malcolm Chubb
1312 Whispering Lane
Venice, FL 34292
Ph: 941-488-6451
April 29, Igg7
13-3
13-4
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Comment No. 13-1
The comment appears to imply that all five of the cited missions/spacecraft
deposited plutonium into the atmosphere. This is not correct. Of the five spacecraft
cited in the comment, the Transit BN-3 in 1964, Nimbus B-1 in 1968, and Apollo 13 in
1970 were U.S. spacecraft and carried earlier generations of RTGs. (Cosmos 954 and
Mars 96 were Russian not U.S. spacecraft, with Cosmos 954 carrying a reactor).
The three U.S. missions cited were part of the total 24 U.S. missions to date to
carry RTGs. A complete listing of all U.S. missions to date can be found in the Table 2-2
of the 1995 Cassini Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Of these three missions, two
involved accidental reentrys (Transit BN-3 and Nimbus B-l; Apollo 13 was not an
accidental reentry, as is well known through the recent movie of the same title.) The
early design SNAP-9A RTG on board Transit BN-3 burned up upon reentry as noted in
the comment. This early type of RTG was designed to burn up under these conditions.
The two SNAP-19B2 RTGs onboard Nimbus B-l, and the SNAP-27 onboard Apollo 13
performed as designed, did not burn up, and fell into the ocean intact. The two SNAP-
29B2 RTGs were recovered, and the SNAP-27 lies at the bottom of the Tonga Trench in
the Pacific Ocean. Of the total 24 U.S. missions to date, only those three were not
successfully completed. In each case, the malfunction was neither caused by nor related
to the presence of RTGs on board.
Cassini carries the current generation RTG design - the General Purpose Heat
Source. This generation RTG is designed to survive reentry from Earth orbit without
release of the plutonium dioxide inventory. For additional details regarding RTG
design, see Section 2.2.4 of the 1995 Cassini EIS.
Comment No. 13-2
Please see response to comment 6-2.
Comment No. 13-3
The comment cites the results of the preliminary analyses performed for the 1995
Cassini EIS, not the updated analyses upon which the draft and Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) were based. The "5 million" people exposed to
radiation, presumably as a result of an Earth swingby accident, was cited in the 1995
Cassini EIS as 5 billion worldwide receiving some level of radiation exposure. A
swingby accident of the type analyzed for the Draft and Final SEIS would potentially
result in exposure of about the same number of people. In this accident scenario, only a
tiny fraction of the released plutonium would be breathed in or consumed and retained
by humans. The small amount that would be taken in and retained by people would be
distributed among approximately 5 billion people. Over a period of 50 years, on the
average, individuals would take in less than one trillionth of a gram and receive less
than 1 millirem of radiation. Over the same period of time, individuals would be
exposed to approximately 15,000 millirem from natural background radiation.
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Commentor 13: Florida Southwest Peace Education Coalition
The 2,300 health effects cited by the commentor was the estimate developed for a
swingby accident. The recently available Safety Analysis Reports (LMM&S a-j; EG&G
1997) estimated the mean consequences as 120 health effects.
The overall probability of an accident resulting in a release from the RTGs and
RHUs is about 2.8x10 -3 or about 1 in 360. The probability of an Earth swingby reentry
accident resulting in a release is less than 1 in a million.
Please also see response to comment 6-2.
Comment No. 134
Please see response to comment 1-1.
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